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Abstract
The higher education literature has developed a growing number of frameworks identifying the
economic, demographic, and political influences on state support for public colleges and universities.
Among the important political factors that affect state support, the role of lobbying has been
highlighted by many authors as an important factor for future study, especially in light of the growing
state lobbying forces present in legislatures across the country. Although some studies have
incorporated aggregate measures of lobbying in comparative state support studies, the power of
institutional lobbying as it relates to appropriations and other forms of support remains understudied in
the literature.
This study examined institution-level data for 534 public 2- and 4-year colleges in 15 states
over a period of 10 years, with the goal of examining institutions working under similar lobbying
disclosure laws. A unique lobbying expenditure dataset was collected from state government websites,
and a multilevel model using panel data was employed to examine the effects of institutional lobbying
on state support measures.
The results of analysis reveal that institutional lobbying has increased over 80% in real terms
over the 10-year dataset. Significant differences also exist in lobbying expenditures by institutional
type, with research universities spending an average of 10 times more than community colleges. No
statistically significant relationship between an institution’s lobbying expenditures and measures of
state support were found, suggesting future scholars should continue to examine lobbying from
different perspectives and consider expenditure data as a new source for the creation of institutional
and state measures.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Public college budgets have been suffering from a hemorrhage of state support lasting almost 4
decades. In terms of the share of spending within state general fund budgets, the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences (2015) found that higher education went from 14.6% in 1990 to 9.4% in 2014. The
drop in state support alone is not the only problem, as over the same period of time that states have
lessened their role in supporting institutions, enrollments have increased. The amount of state
appropriations per FTE for state institutions was 25% lower in 2009–2010 compared to 1999–2000
(Baum et al., 2013). The fallout from reduced support has not been overlooked by the media, and some
of the direct costs from less state support have come in the form of rising institutional tuition, student
debt, and criticism of the value of public colleges.
Illinois State University’s Grapevine Study helps provide funding data to outline the decline of
higher education appropriations annually. Combining funding data with student enrollment totals from
the Integrated Post-secondary Education Data System (IPEDS), Figure 1 shows the clear negative trend
line representing the drop in state appropriations for higher education per full-time equivalent student
among state budgets over a 30-year period.

Appropriation per FTE $

Inflation-Adjusted Appropriations per FTE
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.
Figure 1-1. Inflation Adjusted Appropriations per FTE to Public Institutions in all 50 States
(Grapevine, 2016; IPEDS, 2015)
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This phenomenon has not gone unnoticed by other authors (Tandberg, 2008, 2010a, 2010b;
Toutkoushian & Shafiq, 2010).
A cursory look at overall funding trends shows a cyclical pattern exists in state higher education
funding. State appropriations for higher education maintain a second order position within the political
business cycle (Shaw & Heller, 2007). Hovey’s (1999) balance wheel hypothesis was the first to coin
the second order moniker while explaining the cyclical rise and fall of various appropriated programs
in state legislative budgets. In short, legislatures spend more on higher education in good times and cut
more in bad times; this is an observation that has been replicated in research multiple times in the past
10 years (Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 2011). The balance wheel hypothesis emphasizes the political nature
of state higher education support, and other authors utilizing Hovey's paradigm note that the internal
characteristics of state politics and policy-making such as government institutional differences,
partisanship, and party control are important in analyzing whether a certain policy will pass, or whether
the view of higher education as a public good will be considered favorably (Berry & Berry, 1999;
McGuinness, 2005; Orkodashvili, 2008).
If higher education has taken up a second order status among budget priorities, what are first
order priorities and how do they relate to second order priorities? First order items are generally
guided by specific laws stating their required funding formulas, and these items often have no internal
source of self-funding as higher education institutions do (Weerts & Ronca, 2006). Medicaid, K–12
education, and corrections spending are three state budget items considered first order, and have a
different historical funding pattern compared to higher education. Medicaid and corrections shares in
state budgets have skyrocketed during the period in which higher education has slowed down (Kane,
Orszag, & Apostolov, 2005). Medicaid, in particular, as a counter-cyclical budget item, has been found
to “crowd-out” higher education spending in state budgets (Kane, Orszag, & Gunter, 2003; Okunade,
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2004). Scholars who have written on the crowding-out effects of first order budget items and second
order items such as higher education funding have put in context what is happening. This has partially
tied the hands of legislators, who cite higher education’s ability to self-fund as a reason for its shifting
importance as a state budget item.
Internal characteristics of government, and competing state priorities are not the only concerns
related to the politics of state higher education. Several scholars have highlighted how state
indebtedness and public resistance to tax increases have played a role in reducing public support for
higher education (Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Mumper, 2003; Okunade, 2004). Skepticism towards
public support of education and the positive externalities it presents has fed into a change in public
priorities that stretches back to at least the 1980s (Palmer, 2013). These themes related to public
opinion play out amidst the more obvious divisions in political attitudes toward higher education
including differences in political party platforms, level of partisanship in legislatures, and gubernatorial
influence over the budget process, to name a few.
It cannot be understated just how important state political context is to financial support
outcomes for higher education. With the decline of public support for higher education, rising state
indebtedness, and competing priorities, the state higher education sector has turned to generating
revenue from tuition as appropriations have stagnated. Where net tuition revenue in 2002–03 for 2-year
colleges was 24%, and 4-year bachelor’s degrees was 35%, by 2012–2013 it had reached 35% and
49%, respectively (College Board, 2015). These increases have drawn further political scrutiny about
the worth of higher education as a public good (Kane, et.al., 2005; Zusman, 2005). In fact, the
recommendation of private and public cost-sharing made in the 1970s through a government
commission provided the impetus for reductions in higher education support per student in the 1980s,
representing a political shift in attitudes about the role of government in supporting education
(Hauptman, 2001).
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Government scrutiny has continued under the auspice of accountability, with states launching
numerous initiatives to control costs, limit tuition increases, or tie student outcome measures directly to
funding (Daigle & Cuocco, 2002; McKeown-Moak et al., 2013). Many scholars such as Zumeta (2001)
have suggested that the relationships between political leaders and higher education has always been
somewhat adversarial, and when combined with political and economic pressures, higher education
will continue to be faced with challenges of public scrutiny regarding how they handle their own selfpreservation financially (McLendon & Mokher, 2009; Vedder, 2007).
Although it is important to point out the emerging or continuing trends of falling support,
increasing price, and political or public scrutiny of higher education across the United States, it is of
equal value to note these are not equitable across all states. In the same period of great average
increases in tuition noted above, there are counter examples of states with little or even negative
average tuition increases such as Montana, Maine, New Hampshire, or North Dakota (College Board,
2015). The same lack of equity can be shown with appropriations, where even the cyclicality of state
funding for higher education varies greatly between states who decrease, hold equal, or maintain
increases in funding during recessional periods (Pernsteiner & Carlson, 2015).
The differences in state outcomes related to higher education support, and the rich diversity of
state political, economic, and demographic environments are in large part the reasons why the crossstate study is valuable when trying to answer questions about how educational stakeholders may be
able to influence support for higher education both locally and nationally. Beyond controlling state
differences, researchers should be interested in determinants of state funding that allow for actionable
conclusions. Economic and demographic characteristics of states have clearly shown to be important in
funding outcomes across states, but these types of characteristics such as unemployment level, age
distribution, and income levels are unlikely to be influenced by higher education institutional decisions
(Kane, et. al., 2003; Okunade, 2004).
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In the same way economics and demographics of states cannot be altered by higher education
institutions, many internal and external political factors affecting state funding are beyond the reach of
colleges to influence. Factors such as state citizenry and political culture, state representative ideology,
gubernatorial control of the budget process, political polarization among parties in the state, and
legislative professionalism are examples of these important but exogenous influences on state budgets
with respect to how colleges influence their positions in the state budget picture (Gray & Lowery,
1996, 2001; McLendon, Deaton, & Hearn, 2007; Shaw & Heller, 2007; Tandberg, 2008, 2010, 2010a).
With all of these exogenous variables affecting state budget decisions, higher education scholars must
further study the political context colleges exist as actors in, but also single out mechanisms, if they
exist, which colleges have to influence the decisions legislators make in terms of supporting public
institutions.
Higher Education Lobbying as a Determinant of State Budgets
Researchers are continually trying to reconcile higher education institutions and state political
context. Dar (2012) succinctly iterates this observation, and laments the dearth of research when she
states:
… politics matters in higher education policy outcomes, but much less is known about how it
matters. The effects of public opinion, politicians' preferences, and political institutions vary
according to the context, timing, and nature of the higher education policy under evaluation
(p. 770).
Many authors have been creating political frameworks and conducting studies, consistently
growing a list of political, economic, and demographic variables affecting state finance (Barrilleaux,
Holbrook, & Langer, 2002; Delaney & Doyle, 2007; McLendon, et al., 2007; McLendon & Hearn,
2007; Rigby, 2007; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a; Weerts & Ronca, 2012). What Dar’s quote helps to
articulate is that within these existing political frameworks, a strong need exists to investigate how and
how much state political characteristics influence higher education funding outcomes.
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Although many authors have designed frameworks for state political context in the higher
education landscape, a seminal approach was taken by McLendon and Hearn (2007) to gather literature
bases across higher education and political research bodies. Their framework highlights seven
categories of factors that affect higher education finance policy within states: (a) higher education
demography and organization, (b) socioeconomic climates, (c) political culture and ideology, (d)
legislative organization and membership, (e) gubernatorial influence, (f) party strength and control of
governmental institutions, (g) interest group climates, and (h) interstate policy diffusion. Tandberg’s
(2008, 2010b) work encapsulates these framework variables, amongst others, in the building of a State
Fiscal Policy Framework. These two frameworks are important because they have strong theoretical
grounding in the political and higher education literature, but also because they make room for the
emerging focus on interest group influence in state politics.
Collectively, public colleges and universities within states represent an interest group in the
state political landscape. Broadly defined, this means they represent “organizations trying to influence
government” (Berry, 1997, pg. 4). Interest groups influence governments in several important ways:
they spend money on campaigns to elect representatives friendly to their positions, and they utilize
multiple manners of influence on elected officials to provide them a return for their efforts in the form
of advantageous policy. Some forms of interest group influence, such as campaign spending, have been
closely scrutinized and tracked on a national level for quite some time.1 The other type of influence
directed towards currently elected officials, known as lobbying, has had a relatively short history of
study in comparison (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; McLendon & Hearn, 2007). The passage of
the 1995 Federal Disclosure Act helped initiate the registration and tracking of lobbying at the federal
level. States were in many cases slower to act on measuring and reporting lobbying in the political

1

Federal Election Campaign Act (1975), Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.
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process, with the earliest state included in this study tracking information only back to 1992 and the
latest in 2009.2
Higher education institutions and other stakeholders have a strong reason to care about this
issue. Interest groups are an important influence on legislative and executive actions, and this includes
matters of state budgets (Jacoby & Schneider, 2001; John et. al., 1993; Nice, 1984). Interests with more
resources (money, access, information, etc.) usually will obtain better results than interests with fewer
assets, or those who employ them less effectively (Berry, 1997; Dahl, 1982; Loomis & Cigler, 2007).
Considering the many state variables impacting a budget beyond the control of higher education
institutions, lobbying is something every individual institution must decide its involvement in. For this
reason many authors have suggested it as a future variable of interest in state higher education finance
models (Bowling and Ferguson, 2001; Gray and Lowery. 1996; Jacoby & Schneider, 2001; McLendon
& Hearn, 2007; Wiggins, Hamm, & Bell, 1992).
Lobbying, in addition to other measures of political spending, has been increasing steadily for
the past 20 years. To gain an empirical sense of this increase, the number of registered lobbyists within
states has more than doubled between 1980 and 2009 (National Institute on Money in State Politics,
2011). An explanation for the explosion in interest group representation included changing of federal
finance guidelines issued in the 1970s as well as court decisions and the development of so-called “soft
money” contributions that provide a loophole for organizations to funnel money and resources to
candidates outside of established limits. This process has played out over 4 decades and continues in
the 21st century (Laskow, 2006; Loomis & Cigler, 2007).
The rise in monetary contributions to state politicians from interest groups through campaigns
and committees has exploded alongside the rise in registered lobbyists. By 2005, expenditures on
lobbying and campaign contributions reached over $1 billion among all 50 states. A report from the

2

Appendix C includes the historical dates of lobbying registration & transaction law.
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Council of State Governments suggests that universities and colleges are actively lobbying in over 45
states, and they are consistently ranked as being between the 11th and 20th most effective lobbies on a
12-factor measure including financial resources, organization, and ability to work with lawmakers and
other groups (Thomas, Hrebenar, & Nownes, 2008). It should be noted that the relative position of
higher education in this study was in the third (lowest group) in order. Notably, several important staterelated groups, such as local government and other state departments, boards, and commissions are also
ranked in the lower end of the top 20 lobbying groups. The status of the higher education lobby as a top
20 group, as well the increased spending by organizations in the group, suggest that education
stakeholders see value in spending money on lobbying.

Current Literature on Higher Education Lobbying
One way to analyze the existing literature on higher education lobbying is to focus on the data
sources researchers have used. De Figueiredo and Richter (2014) categorized the empirical literature,
separating out surveys, registries, and transaction reports as the main sources for research. Survey
research on state lobbying and higher education holds a minor foothold in the literature. This research
focuses on the views of lobbyists, legislators, or college administrators, measuring their attitudes on
strategy and effectiveness of lobbying. A few major examples include Ferrin’s work on in-house
college lobbyists’ methods for communicating with state legislators (Ferrin, 2003, 2005). Several
dissertations have focused on the effectiveness and relationships between lobbyists in particular
situations, focusing on a single state in a single time period (Avery, 2012; Brumfield, 2007; Burkum,
2009). Much of this work is descriptive, learning about the differences between higher education
lobbyists compared to other industries. Some of the useful findings include the emphasis on budget
matters as a top priority of college lobbyists. One drawback to these types of survey methods is that
they mostly do not examine systematic impacts of lobbying.

9
Most of the existing research in the higher education lobbying literature focuses on registration
data of lobbyists. Because this information has been publicly available and is relatively standardized
across many states, a state-level study of questions related to lobbying registrations has become the
predominant method of modeling interest groups in large-scale higher education studies on financial
support (McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a; Weerts & Ronca, 2012). The
major issue with the use of registration data, as de Figueiredo and Richter (2014) point out, is that its
use is “particularly problematic if the goal is to identify how ‘active’ or ‘effective’ interest groups are
in lobbying” (p. 177). Lobbyists can register while expending no funds and receiving no compensation
in an active period. This does not discount the findings of the existing literature, but it does mean that
very important questions about the effects of lobbying require more than looking at how many
registered lobbyists an interest group wields in a given state and time.
Even with the drawbacks to using registration data, these major studies on higher education
state lobbying environments have provided valuable evidence that lobbying matters. The theoretical
basis for using registration data is justified using Gray and Lowery’s (1996) Population Ecology
Theory. This biological theory stresses the importance of “density” within an environment, which in
this case references the ratio of higher education lobbyists compared to other lobbyists in a state. The
most comprehensive studies have used this measure of lobbying environment within a greater State
Fiscal Policy Framework developed by Tandberg (2008, 2010b; Tandberg & Griffith, 2013). Almost
all of the major studies including this density measure have found that more dense higher education
lobbying environments tend to have a positive effect on state higher education budgets. Multiple
outcome measures have been used in these works, including higher education shares of state budgets
and measures directly tied to appropriation levels.
The final lobbying data type available to researchers is transaction reports. These are actual
measurements of lobbying expenditures done within a specific time period. Very few studies have
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attempted to utilize this data, with de Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) being a prominent example.
This research involved college-lobbying expenditures used to affect committee members in charge of
federal committee research funding. The results of this study included that lobbying was a significant
determinant of academic earmarks to individual institutions, and that institution size mattered as a
mitigating factor. De Figueiredo and Richter (2014) posit that transaction records are valuable because
they are the closest thing to an accurate measure of the “intensity” of lobbying, and they also exist at an
institutional level of analysis, which together make them a very fruitful area for studying the impact of
lobbying.
One major organization attempting to catalogue lobbying expenditures across all sectors is the
National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP), which recently released a 19-state database of
expenditures in 2016. The use of records being put together by the NIMSP, or the direct collection of
lobbying expenditure data from state records for examination in cross-state studies in higher education,
has been recommended in recent years as one potential avenue for researchers to expand the literature
in this part of the field (de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014; Ness, Tandberg, & McLendon, 2015).

Statement of the Problem
Three related problems emerge in an examination of the state of lobbying research in the higher
education literature. Although several recent studies have focused on how state-level lobbying efforts
may impact state budget decisions, many scholars have commented on the lack of depth in this area of
study, particularly with respect to the quality of proxy variables and the unit level of analysis
(McLendon & Hearn, 2007; McLendon, et al, 2009; Ness, et al., 2015; Tandberg, 2008; Weerts &
Ronca, 2012). Many of these same scholars have helped push the literature forward with their own
work, testing out aggregate proxies for lobbying within state-level studies of higher education budget
outcomes. As Dar (2012) points out, political variables are of rising interest to higher education
scholars in modeling determinants of state support, and there are large gaps in how and how much these
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different factors may impact state budget outcomes. It is likely no coincidence that interest in this
variable coincides with the rise in lobbying expenditures across states and the growing literature on
lobbying effects in other industries.

The lack of studies on this topic is due in part to a lack of data. All studies on higher education
and lobbying that intend to use state data, such as registries or transaction reports of lobbyists, are
limited to what is publicly available from state governments. Most states have provided lobbying data
publicly beginning in the 1990s (de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014). The wide variety of laws related to
the storing and release of lobbying records as well as the differences in what is recorded create
significant methodological challenges which have impacted the ability of scholars to research trends in
lobbyist spending. Although many organizations, such as the Council of State Governments or the
National Association of State Budget Officers, track characteristics of state government, they do not
consolidate state databases of lobbying registrations or transactions. The NIMSP’s recently released
database did take a step forward with aggregate transaction record data for campaign finance and
lobbying activities, but specific lobbying data including compensation and other specific expenditure
information cannot yet be parsed from other forms in the database. Individual collections from state
government websites or from staff requests are the only way to secure this kind of data.
Political scientists and sociological researchers have spent decades examining how groups of
individuals actively utilize channels of influence to change public policy. Interest groups use many
tactics such as soft money donations, promises of constituency delivery in elections, and public
campaigns across legislative and gubernatorial branches of state governments to pressure lawmakers
and bureaucrats (Nownes & Freeman, 1998). These actions have been found to have substantial sway
on public priorities of state politicians (Bowling & Ferguson, 2001; Jacoby & Schneider, 2001;
McLendon, et al., 2007). One big problem highlighted in the literature is that interest group influence
has not been well understood, compared to mobilization, formation, and tactics of interest groups
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(Hojnacki, Kimball, Baumgartner, Berry, & Leech, 2012; Sloof, 1998). Sloof’s (1998) explanation
relies on the “black box” that represents how interest groups actually impact policy in studies of
interest group influence. Although many theories can be drawn upon for how it is possible, limits in
data and operationalizing interest group influence remains difficult, especially in terms of repeatable
research performed in political subfields. This lack of available proxies for lobbying represents a third
problem related to the lack of data and studies to date.
The existing studies in the higher education literature rely on Gray and Lowery’s (1996, 2001)
political ecology theory as a representation of interest group influence, though it would be better
described as relating the density of higher education lobbyist environments within states to
appropriations outcomes. One competing tactic to create a proxy for interest group influence is to look
directly at college lobbying expenditures. This method does have drawbacks, including aggregating
spending directed towards other lobbying goals like policy change, which may be unrelated to budget
outcomes; however, utilizing transaction records as a source of data has benefits that other methods do
not, and many studies have tried to connect spending on lobbying or campaign contributions and
outcome measures as a “return on investment” (Barber, Pierskalla, & Weschle, 2014; de Figueiredo &
Silverman, 2006; Fellowes & Wolf, 2004; Hogan, Long, & Stretesky, 2010; Kang, 2012; Richter,
Samphantharak, & Timmons, 2009).

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study is to examine the relationship between lobbying
expenditures of public higher education institutions, and the institution funding outcomes, controlling
for state and institutional context. Tandberg’s (2010b) State Fiscal Policy Framework served as a guide
for the study design to control for state characteristics, as were other relevant studies testing similar
outcome measures. Institutional-level studies examining characteristics relevant to appropriations
outcomes were also culled to design a set of controlling institutional factors. This study also expands
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the knowledge base on what institutional lobbying expenditures from public institutions look like,
considering this data has not been gathered and assembled in other reports or research.
This study will utilize a model at the institutional level of analysis, and test the hypothesis that
variations in institutional lobbying expenditures may have a causal effect on variations in institutional
appropriations and other types of non-appropriational support. This will inform future researchers in
understanding, in a systematic way, the growth of lobbying expenditures over time, differences in
lobbying efforts across types of institutions, and whether institutional lobbying efforts may directly
affect appropriational returns.

Research Questions
This study uses data at the institutional level of analysis. The first research question pertains to finding
out about descriptive measures related to new data on institution-level lobbying expenditures. The
second 2 questions require inferential analysis to determine relationships between institutional lobbying
and returns from the state in the form of financial support (appropriational and non-appropriational).

1. How are lobbying expenditures distributed among public 2- and 4-year institutions within the
states included in this study, and how do lobbying expenditures differ based on institutionallevel and state-governance models?
2. Does a relationship exist between a public institution’s expenditures on lobbying and its state
appropriation received, when holding constant economic, political, and demographic
differences in institutions?
3. Does a relationship exist between a public institution’s expenditures on lobbying and its overall
state support received from all sources, when holding constant economic, political, and
demographic differences in institutions?
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Research Methodology
Participant Dataset and Model Variables
Considering the vast differences in state laws related to what information must be collected on
lobbying, rules for state inclusion are required to maintain internal validity in this study. The goal of
state selection is to winnow out states that do not include the most important aspects of lobbying in
their disclosure requirements, cannot connect lobbyists with lobbyist employers, or do not have
substantial temporal records. Research published by the NIMSP provides an initial definition for what
“comprehensive” expenditure records are, with a primary requirement being records on lobbyist
compensation (King, 2011). Although 27 states met initial criteria for the reporting of compensation,
only 15 states (containing 534 public 2- and 4-year colleges) reported and made available data for study
over a long enough period of time to be included. 13 states had data for more than half the period of the
dataset, and were used for most of the descriptive analysis in the study. The collection of lobbying data
occurred between January of 2014 and May of 2015.
The collection of lobbying expenditure data in a cross-sectional time-series, or panel, format
represents a unique contribution to the literature on state higher education research. This is the only
data that requires collection in this manner, as other institutional and state data is available through
existing databases operated by the US Department of Education and Department of Labor as well as
organizations such as the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), the State Higher
Education Executive Officers Association (SHEEO, 2012), and the Council of State Governments
(CSG).
One factor guiding the overall study is a desire to use panel data, considering that the interest in
lobbying effects coincides with the rise of lobbying across states over the past 30 years. The dataset
spans a timeline of 2002–2003, through 2013–2014. Although it would be desirable to include older
data, the majority of states in the study did not have consistent data prior to 2002–2003, and
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minimizing missing data while having the largest panel possible is desirable for descriptive
comparisons. The independent variables are all lagged by one year, outside of lobbying expenditure
data for biennial budget states that is combined and overlaid on a 2-year period as each budget is
expended. The dependent variables span from 2004–2005 through 2013–2014, making the length of
dataset span 10 years.
The dependent variables in this study include adjusted state appropriation per full-time
equivalent student, adjusted appropriations plus operating and non-operating grants per full-time
equivalent student, year-to-year percentage change in adjusted appropriations, and year-to-year change
in adjusted appropriations plus operating and non-operating grants. The use of appropriation level and
appropriation change allows for modeling of the dependent variable in a way that may deal with the
autocorrelation issues inherent to this data (Weerts & Ronca, 2012). The appropriations plus grants
dependent variable provides an additional test of the effectiveness of lobbying, especially since other
authors have recently broadened the scope of research on state support and its determinants using state
fiscal frameworks to analyze forms of support, such as financial aid and capital appropriations
(Tandberg, 2013).
Independent variables for this study include institutional measures of prestige, size, private
support, and cost as well as state economic, demographic, and political variables. Although the
foundation for choosing these variables came from the existing major frameworks modeling state
policy outcomes, research using these models was evaluated to determine which variables best fit this
institution-level analysis (McLendon, et al., 2009; Okunade, 2004; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a, 2010b;
Weerts & Ronca, 2012).

Data Analysis
Following the lead of many other researchers examining higher education finance, this study
utilized panel-data regression to evaluate a 10-year dataset. This method has been referenced
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extensively in modern recommendations for the analysis of higher education data (Tandberg & Griffith,
2013; Zhang, 2010). To provide for sensitivity analysis of missing data, a balanced panel and an
unbalanced panel were created. Imputations were required for the independent variable of lobbying
expenditures to make a balanced panel, with only about 7% of the lobbying variable requiring
treatment to make the dataset balanced. An unbalanced 15-state panel of 534 institutions was analyzed
along with the smaller 13-state panel with balanced data, to see the effects of fuller early lobbying data
compared to the effects of more state data and overall observations.
Following the analysis of a similar dataset and dependent variable of interest, this study
considered the work of Weerts and Ronca (2012) in analyzing nested panel data using a Mixed-Effects
model. This is a multilevel model, consisting of observations within an institution over time (firstlevel), nested within states (second-level). The reason for analyzing the data in this way is to include
important time invariant variables, such as Carnegie classification and higher education governance
structure as well as to capture across-subject variation in the dependent variable. Like Weerts and
Ronca (2012), this study includes an AR(1) term to account for the high level of autocorrelation in the
residuals, but does not take a pairwise approach to variable selection, choosing to test all model
constructs together.

Significance of the Study
This study will inform its readers in two separate ways. Past studies have focused mostly on a
state-level study of lobbying. Such an approach does help test the assumptions about lobbying
environments and state policy outcomes, but it ignores institutional actions individually. This study
focuses on the institution level of analysis first. Institutional leaders may find results of this kind of
research more appealing. Second, past studies have utilized proxy measures for lobbying that do not
represent the intensity of the lobbying effort put forth by institutions. This study will utilize a proxy
measure for lobbying that represents actual intensity of the lobbying effort through expenditure. Such
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an approach will yield results that tell readers the value of dollars spent. Beyond the results of the first
two research questions, an institution-level approach to organizing lobbying expenditures will allow
future researchers to better understand how much lobbying efforts differ across institutional strata.
From a theoretical perspective, this study represents a test of the theoretical link between
lobbyists, who are information brokers, and their influence on legislators who control budget outcomes.
This relationship is defined in theories such as Wright’s Communications Theory of Lobbying (Wright,
1996). Since organizations spend money on lobbyists who directly communicate with legislators, the
more money spent by institutions, the more information is shared regarding the benefits of higher
education support, and this should result in higher returns for colleges willing to commit the most
resources. The use of lobbying expenditure data as the measure of energy will provide for an
examination of this theoretical relationship. Additionally, this study contributes to the growing body of
literature integrating political variables into state budget frameworks, similar to Tandberg’s (2010b)
State Fiscal Policy Framework. This integration helps to inform future studies about the contextual
importance of different political, economic, and demographic factors in the process of state budget
outcomes.

Definition of Terms
The following terms are utilized throughout this study, and these definitions are provided for
the purpose of comprehension and consistency. The researcher developed all definitions not
accompanied by a citation.
Interest Group: A voluntary organization of individuals, outside of government, with similar
interests or occupations, who are attempting to influence the government (Berry, 1997)
Lobbying: An attempt to influence current government decisions or create a relationship
conducive to shaping future government decisions (Nownes & Newmark, 2013).
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Lobbyist: “In-house” employees and “contracted” individuals working on behalf of colleges
and universities (Nownes & Newmark, 2013). These lobbyists are considered government lobbyists in
the greater lobbying literature.
Lobbying Expenditures: Costs for direct and indirect activities related to lobbying, including
gifts to legislators, event costs, travel, meals, lodging, and salaries paid to lobbyists and lobbying staff
(King, 2011). Differences in what states collect are outlined in the study Appendices.
Higher Education: US institutions providing post-secondary education including
vocational/trade programs, 2-year degrees, 4-year degrees, and post-graduate degrees. References in
this study to higher education refer to publicly supported higher education institutions and ignore
private and for-profit institutions.
State Support: This study describes state support as state appropriations and non-appropriation
support decided on by state legislators through the budget process. This includes direct appropriations
as well as operating and non-operating grants. The research questions delineate how these are grouped
in the model for this study.

Organization of the Study
Chapter 1 contains the introduction, a primer on state higher education budget research as well
as the current state of the literature on lobbying in higher education, a statement of the problem,
research questions, research methods, a definition of terms, and the significance of this study. Chapter
2 contains a history of higher education funding research, and delineates the role of lobbying within the
frameworks of state higher education finance. A model developed specifically for this study is also
introduced based on the existing literature. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and procedures used
to gather and analyze data for this study. Chapter 4 covers the results of the data analyses and findings
that emerged from the research questions. Chapter 5 includes a summary of overall study findings,
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conclusions drawn from the model and methods employed as well as a discussion and
recommendations for future studies and use of results.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The relationship between states and higher education institutions is complex. Interest in
attendance has certainly shaped the relationship, along with the increased use of higher education as a
driver for research and the growing criticism of the fiduciary role of state institutions. This literature
review will focus primarily on the political, economic, and demographic aspects of the relationship
between higher education financing and states. The goal is to determine a model that maximizes
explanation of higher education funding outcomes within states and to examine the specific role that
institutional-level lobbying has on institutional appropriations.
The determinants of higher education finance as well as the theory base have been understudied
within the literature (Dar, 2012; John & Parsons, 2005; Lane, 2007; McLendon & Hearn, 2007; Ness,
et al., 2015; Tandberg & Griffith, 2013). In part, this is likely due to the interdisciplinary nature of the
subject, where politics, public policy, and higher education research come to a crossroad. This means
that critical theoretical gaps will be filled using explanations from political and public policy research.
Reaching across disciplines to examine the political, economic, and demographic forces that effect
state higher education financing, this literature review seeks to provide: (a) an overview of higher
education funding and history, (b) an examination of interest group lobbying theory, and (c) a review of
political, economic, and demographic variables that affect higher education financing at both the state
and individual levels.
The History of Higher Education Funding
The funding of public higher education in the United States can be marked by several large decisions
made by the federal government as well as many divergent decisions made by state legislatures.
Beginning in the mid-19th century, the 1862 Morrill Act represents a burgeoning of access and
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proliferation from a few North and Southeast states to the establishment of higher education across the
country (Heller, 2006). From the Morrill Act in the mid-19th century to the beginning of the 20th
century, attendance in higher education more than quadrupled, and the amount of public institutions
nearly doubled. The funding for these institutions was almost entirely received from state and federal
appropriations, with only nominal fees received from students in the form of tuition.
For a time, there seemed to be widespread agreement about the return on investment for public
institutions. Enhancements were made to further the role of science funding from the federal
government within public institutions in the late 19th century, but a general consensus about how states
and the federal government should continue to fund colleges with standard formulae created based on
enrollments was upheld (Thelin, 2004). This consensus began to unravel as the aims of higher
education grew among various stakeholders beginning in the 1940s (John & Parsons, 2005).
The GI Bill and Higher Education Act introduced 9 years later were major injections of both
demand and support for higher education from the federal government. Consistent with the transition
phases described by Martin Trow, the US higher education system went from serving the academic and
culturally elite to providing for all manner of citizens, complete with new funding in the form of
financial aid grants directly from the federal government (Altbach & Peterson, 2007). Even with some
growing concerns within the federal government about the return on public investment in higher
education, funding for public institutions was still highly favored. From 1940 to 1980, funding from
state and local governments was still the largest source of increased revenue to public higher education
(Heller, 2006).
Parity across states in terms of governance and funding structure was present for most of the
20th century. The Higher Education Act of 1965 required states to form coordinating bodies for higher
education institutions, which became governing political forces that manage the funds provided by
legislators (Cohen, 2007). Although funding for higher education institutions was always a political
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decision, the change in federal policy to provide more financial aid instead of institutional aid made
enrollment the compass point for institutional survival. By the 1960s, state legislatures had virtually all
elected a funding formula chiefly based on enrollment (Bowen, 1980; Thelin, 2004).
Two major changes occurred in the 1970s and 1980s with respect to higher education funding.
John and Parsons (2005) describe these changes as the loss of “consensus” on the social and economic
value of institutions and education as a public good.
The first change in this period was described as New Conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s,
which drove federal and state governments to begin believing higher education was unproductive, and
that aid increases should be scaled back. This theory is consistent with the revenue data for higher
education, which shows the share of total revenue from federal sources beginning in the 1980s
remaining flat at about 13%, and state aid as a source of revenue declining through the 1980s and
1990s (Heller, 2006). One product of the decline in funding as a part of institutional budgets was a rise
in institutional tuition rates, which further fueled questions about the worth of education in the eyes of
New Conservatives (Marklein, 2006).
The second major change in this period of American history was the rise of Performance
Funding. States originally favored accountability schemes for state higher education through the
development of state coordinating boards that would guide institutions from a central body. Over the
1980s and 1990s, states started to adopt a more direct approach to requiring accountability that
included specific student outcomes by which legislators could judge institutional worthiness (Burke,
2002; Zumeta, 1998). A number of recent studies testing the impact of these types of policies on
outcomes have determined they’ve had little or no impact since creation (Hillman, Tandberg, & Fryar,
2015; Hillman, Tandberg, & Gross, 2014; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014).
The story of higher education support among states in the late 20th and early 21st century,
beyond the increased skepticism of its mission and efficiency, has been the reduction of support on a
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variety of measures. The share of state budgets going to higher education has declined by more than
one third in the time between 1974 and 2004 (Ehrenberg, 2006a, 2006b). A more recent evaluation
from 1990 through 2014 revealed that the share of state general revenue going to higher education
dropped from 14.6% to 9.4% (AMACAD, 2015). In terms of real dollars, Quinterno (2012) posits that
in the 20-year period between 1990–1991 and 2010–2011, states added 10 billion dollars in adjusted
support to public education, but that number doesn’t take into account the rise in student enrollment,
and ignores the per-capita support trend suggesting that states are choosing to spend less on higher
education as a share of their state income. Quinterno found a 26% drop in public FTE funding over the
20-year period from 1990–1991 to 2010–2011, while looking at more recent data suggests the drop is
close to 30% if looking at data from 2000 to 2013–2014 (AMACAD, 2015). These trends suggest that
states have changed their views on the importance of funding higher education in the past 30 years,
leading scholars to take an interest in why and how states make decisions related to higher education
funding.
Defining Interest Groups and Lobbying
Before understanding the connection between interest groups, higher education institutions, and
state funding, it is important to explore the overall definition of interest groups and lobbying as well as
explain the underlying theory base behind how they work. Interest group theory is a branch of “group
theory,” which has roots in 19th century political theories put forth by scholars such as John Calhoun in
the Disquisition of Government and Karl Marx's Conflict Theory; these both emphasize the importance
of groups in society and their impact on political processes. Calhoun's theory of the “concurrent
majority” applied group theory to the government process. Calhoun believed that decisions in a
constitutional government weigh most heavily on private interest groups affected directly by the
outcome of proposed policies. Preferences of numerical majorities are second in importance to the
preferences of groups affected by the policies up for votes. Minority groups at the receiving end of a
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policy’s effects must have methods to veto potential policies. One of Calhoun’s chief criticisms of our
constitutional system is that the “separation of powers” approach between government branches can
often be at odds with the concurrent majority, favoring a numerical majority over one of those most
affected by a proposed policy. This early group theory integrates well into the idea of interest group
efforts working as a “veto” method for concurrent majorities.
In defining an interest group, early theorists such as Marx or Calhoun focused on physical or
economic characteristics that bind individuals. Later, 20th century scholars such as John Truman (1951)
interpreted an interest group as simply a group of people with “shared attitudes” attempting to
influence government. By abstracting the definition of groups from having physical characteristics to
ideological ones, we broaden the idea of who fits in a group, and how he or she might shift between
groups or have “co-membership.” In more recent scholarship, Berry (1997), defines the modern interest
group as “ …an organization that tries to influence government” (pg. 4), while not being part of the
government. Scholars within the public policy fields and higher education research field have shared
similar definitions that focus on the idea of a group with a common interest attempting to influence
government policy (Nownes, 2006; Thomas, 2004; Thomas & Hrebenar, 2004). Recent research has
focused on the delineation of lobbyists by field, organization type, and area of specialty; most relevant
to this study is the specification of government lobbyists as specialists working with state legislators
and bureaucrats to effect change in state policies such as budget appropriations (Nownes & Newmark,
2013).
With the understanding that any collective or group of organizations attempting to influence
government can be considered an interest group, the next step is to understand the nature of their
influence. William P. Browne (1998) describes the way interest groups lobby to affect policy in
Groups, Interests, and Public Policy, whereby he outlines ways social institutions such as colleges
utilize their resources. Interest groups hire “lobbyists” to carve out special budgetary earmarks or to
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maintain public support, provide soft money for political campaigns, and utilize their employees to act
on behalf of the institutions’ interests since they are limited by their non-profit status.
Many qualitative and quantitative studies have examined the questions of what lobbying is and
how it is carried out. Specific studies looking at higher education data suggest that the responsibility of
lobbying generally falls on high-ranking college administrators who may be specifically hired for this
purpose, or from professional lobbying groups hired through contracts (Avery, 2012; Ferrin, 2003).
Where lobbying takes place is a more complex matter depending on the issue being lobbied. Since
budget determinations are made through state legislatures, we know that lobbyists often target
legislative committees and subcommittees to influence bill creation and amendments (Berry, 1997).
Lobbying Influence
Beyond defining the term “lobbyist” and understanding how they work in policy arenas, it is
important to clarify how and to what extent they influence policy. Hojnacki et al. (2012) surveyed the
literature on interest group theory and empirical evidence in the 1990s and 2000s, concluding that
significant developments have been made in the literature on lobbying advocacy and influence. The
authors discuss the grouping of Empirical Theory as that which is directed towards policy studies and
the development of frameworks for how specific interests impact policy beyond the more normative or
formal theories of lobbying built in the mid 20th century. Gray and Lowery’s (1996) interest group
density theory fits into this category, as an attempt to model interest group influence by examining the
strength of particular interest groups compared to others within a system (states within the USA). This
theoretical development and accompanying studies have occupied the majority of the research agenda
on lobbying in higher education.
The idea of measuring the impact of lobbying by looking at the size and power of groups within
a system stretches back to some of the earlier formal theories in the lobbying literature. Olson’s (1965)
Logic of Collective Action served as a focal point for understanding interest groups and policy change,
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concluding that individuals in small groups seeking private benefits will have lower costs to mobilize,
and will be more likely to succeed than large groups, which suffer from higher mobilization costs,
higher likelihood for “free riders,” and the diffusion of benefits to any one individual. Baumgartner,
Berry, Hojnacki, Leech and Kimball (2009) provide evidence congruent with Olson’s theory in their
book Lobbying and Policy Change, where they look at the influence of a sample of organizations
through the lens of individual resources and then group resources and how they affect results. They
found that only the size of the assets of individual organizations surveyed impacted whether or not they
were successful in seeking policy change (including budgetary impact). They found evidence that
group power and resources mattered more, though it should be noted that the methods employed
consisted only of correlations among their one sample group of 186 businesses.
Despite the fact that the majority of literature on lobbying influence focuses on system level
models comparing different lobbying groups and outcomes, some critical literature has appeared.
Barber, Pierskalla, and Weschle (2014) point to a body of studies finding firm-level variables that are
critical determinants of a firm’s willingness to engage in political lobbying. This finding suggests that
firms may not conform to the principles Olson lays out in his theory for collective action, as decisions
to lobby may reach beyond the type of result, size of a lobbying interest’s collective group, and
strength of opposition; firms may seek to lobby based on internal characteristics and not external
stimuli. Barber et al. (2014) suggest that firms may be able to have some individual effect on their
ability to acquire private resources, citing one study connecting firm-level lobbying expenditures to
reductions in their effective tax rates (Richter et al., 2009).
A number of studies have found connections between lobbying on behalf of firms and financial
outcomes, suggesting lobbying as an investment at the federal level. Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, and Ness
(2013) found excess lobbying beyond industry norms was associated with firms increasing their market
values. They also pointed out some of the benefits of lobbying expenditures as a way of measuring
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returns to a firm, such as the fact that no cap exists on this type of measure compared to others, such as
campaign contributions. De Figueiredo and Richter (2014) expand significantly on this topic,
describing the value of expenditures as a measure of lobbying intensity. De Figueiredo and Silverman
(2006) used lobbying expenditures to examine outcomes of federal earmarks given out at the
committee level, and found significant relation between variables where the lobbying university had
representation on the appropriations committee. Hedge and Sampat (2015) found that lobbying
expenditures of organizations seeking research funding could increase earmarks from the National
Institutes of Health.
Incorporating measures of lobbying to examine their impact on policy outcomes is difficult
regardless of the level of study or choice of measure. De Figueiredo and Richter (2014) describe these
difficulties as issues of econometric identification and causal mechanisms. Knowing exactly how a firm
or entire industry makes a difference in the policy process is often not something easily observable or
measurable. Hojnacki et al. (2012) describe the category of Empirical Theory as a catchall area of
research, that is often made up of very specific policy arenas. While previous authors have elected to
utilize group-level theories to explore lobbying in higher education, this study approaches the matter of
lobbying from an alternative perspective, seeking to use similar methods applied in other business and
public policy research on the returns of lobbying, with the fairly in-depth models for appropriation
decisions at the institutional and state level.
Lobbying and State Budget Decision Theory
With an understanding of the basic identity and role of interest groups, we can comprehend
lobbying in the context of legislative decision-making. Early legislative decision-making theory did not
leave room for the role of special interest actions in policy outcomes. Median Voter theory, for
instance, suggests that legislators will vote purely based on how they feel the “median” voter would
prefer (Downs, 1957). If ideology is based on a one-axis scale between liberal and conservative citizen
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preferences, then capturing all voters on a legislator’s own side as well as the median voter will lead to
a majority (or plurality) of voters come reelection. Ignoring the role of government and external
influences on legislators has long fallen out of fashion, and many criticisms of Downs’ theory have
come forward (Krehbiel, 2004; Shepsle & Weingast, 1994). Major criticisms include: (1) outcomes in
legislative voting have been found inconsistent with citizen ideology; (2) the theory ignores all
influence of government on legislator action; and (3) the theory ignores the legislator’s own ideology,
polarization, and personality (Dar, 2012).
Legislative Organization theory, popularized in the 1970s, provides theoretical solutions to the
weaknesses in Median Voter theory. Legislative organization theory expresses legislative decisions as
being a combination of two forces: constituent demands, and the priority of legislators to maintain
reelection (Fiorina, 1977; Mayhew, 1974; Fenno & Fenno, 1978; Mitchell & Munger, 1991). This
policy has two central strengths from the perspective of studying political factors on legislative
decisions. First, legislative organization theory includes room for government influence on decisionmaking in the form of how legislators consider the factors that affect their reelection. A second valuable
contribution of this theory is that it leaves room for external factors, such as interest groups, to
influence legislative decisions in different ways. Firstly, interest groups can influence legislators
directly, by offering campaign funds, promises of votes, positive press, and pressure within other
branches of government, etc. Secondly, lobbyists can utilize methods to affect constituents that will
assist legislators in reelection.
Converging on the center-point between legislators and lobbyists, we turn to John R. Wright’s
(1996) Communications Theory of Lobbying. Similar to Legislative Organization theory, Wright holds
first that legislators are concerned with reelection. Their second and third order goals are to craft good
policy and rise to positions of influence within their respective legislative branches. To guide
legislators towards the completion of all these goals, lobbyists serve in the position of providing
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information to legislators, which has been labeled information lobbying in the literature (Wright, 1996).
The value of information lobbying is that it reduces uncertainty in decision-making about the
consequences of policy decisions. Nownes and Newmark (2013) discuss the relevance of this theory
for higher education by discussing how government lobbyists utilize their specific knowledge of policy
and their closeness with clients who hold stake in the college system to secure increased funding for
higher education. Studies focused on examining higher education leaders and their lobbyists
motivations emphasize that budget matters are the primary concern in lobbying state legislatures
(Avery, 2012; Burkum, 2009; de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014). These types of findings indicate a
relationship between institutions and lobbying efforts. Institutions expend effort to lobby for bigger
budgets—the more energy they expend in those efforts, the more potential return they hope to receive
through conveying information about the needs of their institutions over others.
As the development of a lobbying theory has helped interpret the relationship between
institutions, lobbying, and legislators, the higher education literature has developed an overarching
framework for higher education state budget decisions that includes the role of interest groups.
Tandberg’s (2010b) State Fiscal Policy Framework, and the empirical literature utilizing it, has helped
explain some of systematic decreases in state support seen over the past several decades. Where earlier
theories such as Median Voter theory or Legislative Organization theory relied on legislator-centric
explanations for budget decisions, the State Fiscal Policy Framework saves room for the role of
institutional forces affecting legislators and their decisions.
The State Fiscal Policy Framework is an attempt to describe a decision situation, a situation
where actors and characteristics of a system interplay to create an outcome. The role of the political
institution in affecting actors can be dated to Shepsle’s (1989, 2006) work on New Institutionalism
theory. The contribution of political system characteristics takes into account the “influence institutions
have on individual preferences and actions” (Tandberg & Griffith, 2013). Not unassociated to this
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perspective, Institutional Rational Choice theory highlights the idea of “action areas,” which is where
actors in a system carry out exchanges affected by the norms, rules, structures, and strategies inherent
to social space (Ostrom, 1991). Institutional Rational Choice theory focuses on decision situations, and
how internal and external forces impact decisions in a legislative institution.
There has been no shortage of higher education research employing these institutional theories
as a basis for state higher education budget frameworks. It was at the core of McLendon and Hearn’s
(2007) framework for political models in state higher education research, and has been utilized in many
other studies within the past 10 years (Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; McLendon, et al., 2007;
McLendon & Hearn, 2010; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005; McLendon, Mokher, & Flores, 2011;
Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a, 2013; Weerts & Ronca, 2012). By focusing on
decision situations and taking into account the economic, demographic, and political characteristics of
legislative institutions, the use of a state framework to examine the outcomes for institutions provides a
good model for differences across states.
Modeling Higher Education Support
After examining the most relevant theories to understand how state higher education budget
decisions are made, variables were chosen and grouped for this study using Tandberg’s State Fiscal
Policy Framework (2010b) as a guide. Some key differences between this study and much of the
current literature are a focus on institutional outcomes, and the addition of institutional controls to
established state-level controls. Instead of using a state-level Interest Group Activity variable to control
for differences in lobbying across states, this study disaggregates lobbying to the campus level, where
decisions about resource allocation to lobbying are generally made. Finally, variables in Tandberg’s
model were vetted using both his findings and those across the wider body of literature examining
determinants of state higher education appropriation decisions. Elements not found significant in
Tandberg’s model as well as the greater body of literature were omitted.
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This section will first examine the state-level research on determinants of state appropriations.
These variables are grouped according to how they appear in this study’s model, and mirror the
groupings set out in Tandberg’s model at the state level. A review of research on institution-level
variables that impact state decisions will be included in the next section. The dependent variables
measuring institutional support are then discussed. Last, this study’s model is visualized and the
variable relationships to legislators and budget decisions are shown.
Mass political attributes.
Citizen ideology.
In Tandberg’s (2010b) framework, mass political attributes included measures of citizen
ideology, among other measures of citizen engagement. McLendon and Hearn (2007) also reference
this idea in their state higher education budget model, defining them as “systemic political influences”
within a state. These differ from what scholars might consider “internal political characteristics,” since
mass political attributes describe the engagement and orientation of citizenry within a state, while
internal political characteristics describe characteristics of the way states organize their legislature or
government, and the way rules govern the process of legislating. The theoretical body of work related
to this type of variable leads back to multiple theories, while the empirical evidence has been divided
down two avenues of thought.
Elazar’s (1966) Political Culture theory is often referenced as an explanation for how state
citizen preferences and engagement can determine legislative outcomes (Tandberg, 2008, 2010a).
Elazar looked at settlement patterns for early US settlers as a way of parsing political subcultures
across the country. Elazar believed that state legislatures acted similar to marketplaces, and catered to
different demographic groups based on the values each group held. Certain factions of people who held
similar beliefs, and shared other common characteristics such as race or ethnicity often dominated
states. Gray, Lowery, Fellowes & McAtee (2004) carried forward the term “political culture” later to
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describe climate within legislatures based on this same concept of measuring legislator preferences as a
determinant of decisions. Beyond focusing specifically on what happens within state legislatures,
changes in state citizenry may be the actual causal force behind changes in support for public higher
education.
Berry et al. (1998) developed a measure to determine state citizen leanings on a liberalconservative continuum, focusing on actual voter data on an electoral district level to examine
competition within states. The measure has been widely used by scholars to explain differences in state
policy and budget outcomes (Archibald & Feldman, 2006; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005;
Tandberg, 2010b; Yates & Fording, 2005). The empirical results suggest that liberal citizenry value
higher education more, which may explain increases in institutional appropriations if states become
considerably more liberal over the course of the dataset timeframe.
Some of the more recent studies on higher education appropriations have found citizen ideology
to not be a significant variable in overall models of state budget determinants. Weerts and Ronca
(2012) found this when utilizing a stepwise model, suggesting that other state factors better explained
appropriation changes. Other large models, which included state citizen ideology, also found the
measure insignificant (McLendon, et. al., 2009). Dar (2012) has suggested that polarization measures
(differences between legislator ideologies) may be more predictive than citizen or legislator ideology
on a liberal-conservative scale when predicting appropriations within states. Shor and McCarty (2011),
who started from a base of looking at elections and roll-call voting, included data from the National
Political Awareness Test (NPAT) into existing vote data to try and better gauge polarization and
ideology across parties. A response paper by Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner (2012)
examined differences between their government ideology measure and Shor and McCarty’s measure,
highlighting the very high correlation between them.
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Although there has been substantial debate over which ideological measures (citizen or
government) are more effective in determining state budget decisions, this study will focus on citizen
ideology as a measure of mass state political culture. Legislator characteristics are captured in other
variables described as “internal political characteristics.” Additionally, there are reasonable arguments
made by some scholars that measuring state legislator ideology accurately is difficult in practice
(Jenkins, 2006). Finally, when comparing datasets available for the time period in this study, data
availability was also an issue between state citizen and state government ideology scores. Using
Berry’s two measures available and updated through the 2014 elections, government ideology in some
states across several years are incomplete, due likely to missing roll-call data in some states. For these
reasons, citizen ideology was chosen to measure state political culture in this study’s model.

Governmental institutions.
Governmental institutions as a category in Tandberg’s (2010b) State Fiscal Policy Framework
represent characteristics of state political structures, which have an impact on state budget decisions.
McLendon and Hearn’s (2007) political framework for postsecondary education does not group these
variables in the same way, but points out legislative design and gubernatorial influence as separate but
important political indicators in comparing state higher education policy. Theoretically, New
Institutionalism (Shepsle, 1989) concludes that characteristics of political bodies can affect decisions of
its members, and this includes both legislative bodies as well as executive ones. This underlying idea
has driven multiple lines of research into the characteristics of each body affecting higher education
budgets: legislatures, state executives, and higher education governing bodies.

Legislative professionalism.
State legislatures can vary in many ways, and higher education researchers have investigated
how many of these differences may affect the state budget process. Featured prominently in the higher
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education research on this topic is the idea of professionalism. Some states have full-time legislatures,
while others have part-time legislatures. Some states pay their legislators significantly more, and have
larger staffs operating for longer periods of each calendar year. Professionalism represents a set of
characteristics that vary both across and within states (Bowen & Greene, 2014a). These differences
have existed for as long as states have, and professionalism as a determinant of state legislative
decisions has been found to matter greatly (Kousser & Phillips, 2012; Mooney, 1994; Squire, 1992,
2007).
Mentioned in many of the frameworks utilized to build this study, Squire’s (2000) index uses
measures of staff/resources, legislator salary, and session length, to create an indexed variable modeling
professionalism. It borrows heavily from Grumm (1971), who was the first to collect and label
differences in legislative characteristics dichotomously for state studies. Squire followed up his original
work in indexing concepts related to professionalism by detailing how more professional legislators
lead to more power in influencing policy compared to the executive branch, due to longer tenure by
members and increased time and ability to evaluate policy (Squire, 2007).
Although Squire’s approach has dominated much of the research on legislative professionalism,
some authors have taken alternative approaches to modeling its concept. Rosenthal (1996) provided
criticism of Squire’s index, suggesting that salary is a variable constituting “careerism,” a measure of
professionalism that encompasses the dimension of Squire’s analysis that would theoretically affect
legislator experience, ability to focus on legislating, and tenure. Woods and Baranowski (2006) broke
down the professionalism variable along the lines of Rosenthal’s theory, and concluded that legislative
professionalism as measured by Squire’s index can actually be separated into resources and careerism.
Careerism was represented by legislator salary, while staff and time in session represented resources.
Careerism was more a determinant of a legislator’s interest in visible, vote-getting activities than
bureaucratic oversight, with a body of support from political research on its effects on political
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outcomes (Barilleaux & Berkman, 2003; Carey, Niemi, & Powell, 2000; Fiorina, 1994). Considering
the relationship careerism seems to have on lobbying activity, and the high correlation it holds with
other measures in Squire’s index, a measure of salaries was an attractive choice for inclusion in this
study.
Turning to the research specifically on higher education funding, previous studies have sought
out simple measures to model legislative professionalism. Tandberg (2008, 2010a) included the
measure of legislator salary and found it a significant predictor of several forms of state support
including percentage change in appropriations. Tandberg also tested Squire’s index measures to
determine correlation, and found the individual Squire measures highly correlated. Another similar
study confirmed these findings (Tandberg & Ness, 2011). Bowen and Greene (2014b) found salaries
highly correlated with other measures of professionalism, even when those other measures varied
significantly from each other, which likely explains the findings of previous high correlations between
salaries and the overall index. For more recent studies that chose to use Squire’s compound measure of
professionalism, the results were mixed, with one study finding a significant result and the other
finding it insignificant (McLendon, et al., 2009; Weerts & Ronca, 2012). In light of these findings and
the theoretical relevance of careerism in a study of higher education appropriations, legislator salaries
were chosen to model professionalism in this study.
It should be noted that some other characteristics related to legislatures as governmental
institutions have been examined in the higher education literature. Term limits have been looked at as
to their effect on legislative decisions. Recent large-scale higher education appropriation studies have
included this variable as well as other noted characteristics such as tax and expenditure limitations
(TELs) and found them either significant at only the .1 level with a small effect, or insignificant in their
analysis when included with legislative professionalism as a standalone variable (McLendon, et al.,
2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a; Tandberg & Ness, 2011).
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Budgetary powers of the governor.
One variable often found in comprehensive higher education studies of state appropriations are
gubernatorial budget powers. The role of the governors in the budget process varies greatly from state
to state as well as to some degree over time with changes in state law (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003;
Beyle, 2003). Explained in Gray et. al.’s (2012) Politics in the American States, Thad Beyle lays out a
six-variable “institutional power rating” for gubernatorial powers. This original index borrowed from
Schlesinger’s (1965) indices of powers held by the governor. The indices contain measures for
governor tenure potential, appointment power, budget power, veto power, extent to which the
governor’s party controls the legislature, and whether or not the state provides for separately elected
executive branch officials.
Several frameworks for studying political variables have pointed to gubernatorial budget
powers as an important determinant of budget outcomes (McLendon & Hearn, 2007; Tandberg, 2010a).
There are theoretical and empirical reasons to reconsider the use of this variable in a new state fiscal
policy framework.
First, Kousser and Phillips’s (2012) recent book on gubernatorial power found that budgetary
powers as measured by Beyle did not have a significant impact on the governor’s ability to pass desired
legislation. This was based on 25 years of state comparative analysis as well as state-based case studies.
The measure of legislative professionalism was found to be a key intervening variable in gubernatorial
power in the budget process. The party of the governor also mattered, and both legislative
professionalism and gubernatorial party are already included in this study’s framework. Second, the
most recent studies using measures of gubernatorial budget powers, including Tandberg’s own study
with gubernatorial budget power as a framework variable, have failed to find the measure significant
(Tandberg, 2008, 2010a; Weerts & Ronca, 2012).
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State higher education factors.
Higher education governance structure.
Higher education governance structures play an important role in the relationship between state
lawmakers and individual public colleges. Before the construction of more complex political models of
budgetary outcomes, scholars found significant differences in budget outcomes for higher education
based on differences in state higher education governance systems (Thompson & Felts, 1992; Wilson
& Sylvia, 1993). Newer scholarship has delved further into how different governance structures affect
funding outcomes. In addition to governance structure as an intermediary between government budget
processes and colleges, the latest higher education studies suggest that governance structures may have
an impact on the level of lobbying performed by individual institutions.
Just as models of higher education support have increased in complexity over the past 20 years,
so have studies of governance structures as an intermediary between institutions and government. A
group of studies around the beginning of the 21st century focused on whether or not states with more
controlling education boards were better at raising funds for state colleges from legislatures. The
general consensus was that more “consolidated” boards enabled higher education to speak with one
voice, improving funding outcomes (Elling, 1999; Gormley, 1996; Jacoby & Schneider, 2001; Lowry,
2001). McGuinness (2003) created a fairly common variable representing the level that control boards
have over individual campuses, which became popular in later academic studies.
More recent studies examining the power of governance structures within states suggest that the
previously understood theoretical explanations may not be correct. Many recent studies found no
significant relationship between governance structure type and higher education finance outcomes
(Delaney & Doyle, 2011; McLendon, et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a; Weerts & Ronca, 2006,
2012). These studies tested a variety of outcome variables with a similar design and the same
governance structure variable from previous studies. More interestingly, some studies have actually
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contradicted earlier findings about the strength of one type of governing board (consolidated) in
aggressively pushing for more financial support. Tandberg and Ness (2011) found that more
consolidated governance boards had a significant negative effect on financial outcomes for higher
education capital expenditures. Their explanation is that more consolidated boards may act as an
“academic cartel” that restrict individual campuses form directly interacting with legislators for their
own projects.
The theory that certain types of governing boards may serve as a screen between institutional
lobbying activities and legislative decisions is worth further examination. Tandberg (2013) addressed
this idea directly in a later work looking at state-level data, simplifying states as either consolidated or
non-consolidated entities. He found that consolidated boards have a muting effect on the power of
overall higher education interest groups in state-level analysis. In states without a consolidated board,
the power of college lobbying using the state-level lobbying density variable was found to be
significantly larger. This analysis looked at state-level data, but came to conclusions about institutionlevel outcomes including the muting of lobbying activities. This study will contribute to the literature
by looking at whether or not resources put forth by institutions to lobby differ significantly in
consolidated governing board states. This analysis will not answer the question of which direction
guides the relationship. If institutional lobbying resources are lower in consolidated governing board
states, is it due to pressure from governing boards, or fewer incentives from institutional leaders to
represent themselves directly to legislators?

Enrollment in private and 2-year colleges.
State enrollment patterns in higher education are an important theoretical construct in models of
higher education appropriations. Both McLendon and Hearn’s (2007) groupings for political factors in
comparative state study and Tandberg’s (2010b) State Fiscal Policy Framework include enrollment
trend measures as controls of state higher education factors. The reason these trends matter according
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to these frameworks are that legislators are affected by the trends they see in citizen preferences for
higher education. Higher enrollment in private higher education within a state represents a decrease in
demand for public higher education and, therefore, a corresponding decrease in legislator support
through appropriations. An increase in demand for public 2-year institutions compared to public 4-year
institutions creates a similar signal of preferences leading to decreases in appropriations.
Empirically, the findings for the relationship expressed in these frameworks are mixed,
suggesting they should be included, but the results should be considered critically. For instance, recent
studies have found that the percentage of private enrollment compared to public enrollment has a
negative relationship with appropriation outcomes (Delaney & Doyle, 2011; McLendon, et al., 2009).
Alternatively, Tandberg (2008, 2010a) has found the opposite conclusion when using an outcome
variable of share of state budget to higher education, compared to measures of appropriation outcome
in dollars. Tandberg’s explanations for his findings that oppose the theoretical constructs include:
private enrollment serving as a proxy for overall state enrollments, and private enrollment serving as a
proxy for increased state financial aid money. The second explanation relates to issues with the source
of those studies’ dependent variable data. IPEDS data separates out appropriations from state financial
aid money received by individual institutions, and should, therefore, not encounter that issue with this
independent variable.
State 2-year college enrollments as a percentage of overall public enrollments have a similarly
checkered set of findings in the higher education literature. Tandberg (2010b) finds it insignificant
when looking at the share of state budgets going to higher education, as do several other major studies
(Tandberg & Ness, 2011; Weerts & Ronca, 2012). McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher (2009) find it to be
a significant predictor of appropriation results, and find it to be negatively related to appropriation
outcomes. Delaney and Doyle (2011) have results that also find the variable significant and negative in
relation to appropriations. It is tempting to consider that the dependent variable design may be an
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important factor in the study results finding significance, since Tandberg’s studies were looking at
shares of state budgets to higher education versus the other studies, which looked at appropriation
outcomes. The findings of Weerts and Ronca (2012) are the most unique and similar to this study, as
they look at logged change in appropriations at the institution level in their analysis. This study will
employ multiple dependent variables representing institutional appropriations, allowing for a
comparison of results across multiple different studies in the last decade using similar theoretical
approaches.

Economic and demographic factors.
State income and unemployment.
The relationship between education and state economics is complex, and considering the goal of
education is to build human capital, it has been hypothesized that education and economies have twoway effects (Aghion et al., 2005; Curs, Bhandari, & Steiger, 2011). This section will examine the
literature on how state economies affect state policy and, by extension, what concepts should be
included as variables in this study. Two central measures of state fiscal health frequently seen in higher
education budget studies include state income measures and the share of the unemployed population,
which have been shown empirically to matter in the funding of higher education within states (Rizzo,
2006; McLendon & Hearn, 2007; McLendon, et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a; Weerts & Ronca,
2012).
Theoretically, the income of a state is tied to its available resources for higher education and
other budget items. It would seem as though increases in per capita income should correspond to
increases in support for higher education, all things being equal. Several studies have pointed out that
the relationship between income and higher education funding may not be quite that simple, even if
most studies have found a significant positive relationship between the two. Alexander (2001) found
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that some poorer states might actually fund higher education more than richer states. There are also
intervening variables that may matter. Layzell and Lyddon (1990) found a link between large private
institutions within a state and reduced state appropriations for public colleges, a finding that has been
confirmed through many studies since then (Lowry, 2001; McLendon, et al., 2009; Rizzo, 2006;
Weerts & Ronca, 2012). Preferences for public spending on higher education among citizenry as well
as preferences in what forms of aid to supply in relation to supporting private institutions over public
ones may interfere with a hypothesized linear relationship between state income and public higher
education support. For these reasons, state income alone is not the only measure of state economics that
will be included in this study.
Hovey (1999) contributed a theory about the role of economic cycles on higher education
funding. His balance wheel hypothesis is still viewed as valuable for explaining the overall cyclical
reduction in public higher education funding among states. This theory has served as a jumping off
point for studies such as one by Kane, Orszag, and Gunter (2003), who focused on other state
expenditures such as Medicaid and corrections, and their intervening effect on higher education
subsidies. The unemployment rate is seen as a good measure of economic cycles, and has been used to
approximate the relative strength of an economy over time within major studies on the topic (Lowry,
2001; McLendon, et al., 2009; Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998). Delaney and Doyle (2007) address the
importance of including multiple measures of economic health in any large-scale study of higher
education support, as individual measures may not fully capture the changes in state fiscal health on
their own.

State demographics.
Just as the economic trends in a state have been found to affect legislator views on higher
education as a budget item, so too have state population trends been found significant as a factor in
higher education support. Major frameworks speak only briefly about how these trends specifically
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impact higher education appropriations, though certain demographic groups show up reliably in largescale higher education budget studies. Tandberg (2010b) posits that larger shares of the college-aged
population within a state will drive up support in the form of appropriations. Similarly, larger shares of
the elderly population will drive down support for higher education, as priorities for college shift based
on larger shares of younger people.
Much of the recent literature confirms what higher education support frameworks state about
demographics and finances. Most studies utilized “share of” population groups, which yielded
significant results (McLendon, et al., 2009; Rizzo, 2006; Tandberg, 2008). Weerts and Ronca (2012)
used a different measure, tracking a 6-year average of high school graduate totals, and also found the
measure significant and positive with respect to a relationship with appropriations. For this reason, both
the share of college-aged population, as well the share of elderly population will be included in this
study.

Other budgetary demands.
A number of authors have sought to examine how other budgetary demands influence state
higher education appropriation outcomes (Kane et al., 2003, 2005; Okunade, 2004; Toutkoushian &
Hollis, 1998; Weerts & Ronca, 2012). There is much evidence for the inclusion of some measures of
other budgetary demands [beyond higher education], since the expansion of individual state programs
can affect all others in the context of finite state resources. One explanation of the relationship is
portrayed by Hovey’s (1999) balance wheel hypothesis, suggesting that a crowding-out effect is
occurring between mandatory state spending categories such as corrections, Medicaid, and K–12
education, which negatively impacts higher education support. Delaney and Doyle (2007) explored this
hypothesis, finding that these mandatory budget items have a more linear relationship with state
budgets compared to the more cubic relationship of higher education that the balance wheel hypothesis
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suggests. This idea is carried forward in other frameworks such as Tandberg’s (2010b) State Fiscal
Policy Framework.
There is empirical evidence to suggest that other budgetary demands impact higher education
state support. Tandberg (2008, 2010a) and Weerts and Ronca (2012) both include other budgetary
demands along with robust political, economic, and demographic variables into their analysis.
Tandberg found Medicaid’s shares of state budgets to be a statistically significant explanatory variable
for shares of state budgets to higher education as well as appropriations to higher education directly.
Weerts and Ronca utilized similar methods, though with a dependent variable of institutional
appropriations, and found a significant negative relationship between spending on corrections and
institutional appropriation outcomes. For higher education, Ness and Tandberg (2011) focused on
capital expenditures at the state level, and confirmed a negative relationship between Medicaid
spending and general fund expenditures. They also found that the same relationship did not extend
specifically to Medicaid and capital expenditures for higher education, which they took as confirmation
of their hypothesis that the process for determining capital expenditures should not be assumed as
congruent to general fund expenditures for higher education.
Earlier studies on the topic of competing budget items also found significant results, but lacked
some elements of the more recent comprehensive studies. Kane, Orszag, and Apostolov (2005) utilized
a long, temporal dataset to examine Medicaid and the business cycle within states, determining that
Medicaid indeed has crowded out state funding for higher education in the past several decades.
Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) also reached similar conclusions when examining the relationship
between Medicaid spending and higher education appropriations. They also found K–12 spending in
states to be an important determinant of higher education appropriations. Both studies neglected
political characteristics as intervening variables, and Kane et al. (2005) did not consider some
important higher education factors such as enrollments. Okunade (2004) utilized economic,

44
demographic, and political variables in a study of higher education appropriations determinants, and
also found that increases in support for Medicaid crowded out investments in higher education within
states. Okunade (2004) also confirmed that relationships between political variables, such as control of
the legislature and gubernatorial party, were important determinants of higher education support. One
weakness in Okunade’s (2004) study is that it utilized only 2 years of data across 50 states.
The most compelling findings in the research come from the more recent and comprehensive
studies of Weerts and Ronca (2012), and Tandberg (2010a), which conform to the hypothesis set out in
the State Fiscal Policy Framework and in Hovey’s (1999) original theory. The findings from this area
of the research base suggest that both Medicaid and K–12-education funding should be included in an
analysis of differences in funding patterns for public higher education across and within states.

Attributes of policymakers.
Party strength in legislature.
Outside the characteristics of government institutions, the attributes of individual
legislative members are considered an important determinant of higher education support in the state
budgets. Theoretically and empirically, this idea has been explored in prior studies, with the most
recent and interesting findings suggesting that there may be some differences in the type of support
provided by different parties instead of a clear difference between one party’s overall support compared
to the other’s.
McLendon and Hearn (2007) describe the relationship between parties and state financial
support as stemming from Democratic Party ideals for taxing and spending more willingly on things
such as education. They cite a number of studies in support of this theoretical link (Alt & Lowry, 2000;
Barilleaux et al., 2002; Berry & Berry, 1990). Tandberg’s (2010b) State Fiscal Policy Framework also
cites these findings, and suggests that there are clear differences between party support for higher
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education within states. The past 12 years have produced several studies confirming this directional
relationship (Delaney & Doyle, 2007; McLendon, et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2008; Delaney & Doyle,
2011; Rizzo, 2004). These findings all suggest that legislator party is an important indicator in
explaining differences in state support from year to year.
Beyond looking at whether the variable is important, there are more recent findings that
suggest the relationship may be more complex than originally thought. Several recent studies have
found that Republicans in the legislature are more likely to increase spending for higher education
compared to Democrats (Dar, 2012; Tandberg & Ness, 2011; Weerts & Ronca, 2012). To help in
understanding these conflicting findings, Dar (2012) presents two possible suggestions after testing
political variables against several outcome variables representing state support. She concluded that
depending on whether the outcome measure was absolute spending, such as appropriation dollars, or
higher education share of state budget, findings for party influence would be different. Dar’s other
explanation relates to the role polarization plays in affecting legislator choice. In highly polarized
environments, legislators on both sides will value the “redistributionist” definition of education over
the “public good” dimension of higher education, leading to less popularity and funding because higher
education is a “second order” good in state funding decisions (McLendon & Mokher, 2009; Rigby &
Wright, 2008).
The arguments put forth about the complexity of party interactions with funding are
interesting; it should be noted that the majority of higher education finance studies have not included a
variable for polarization. Another explanation for party support differences comes from Weerts and
Ronca (2012) who focused on how competing sectors of higher education may have explained past
differences. Associate’s degree level institutions received constant increasing support from all
governors, while Bachelor’s and beyond received much less steady support based on many state
factors. Weerts and Ronca (2012) argue that the level of education matters when discussing party
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support for higher education. Because of the lack of polarization variables available for the timeframe
of this study and the consistent findings related to party presence and higher education support,
percentage of legislature held by Republicans will be utilized as a variable to represent the attributes of
policymakers.

Party of the governor.
Considering the role governors play in passing laws across the 50 states, taking into account the
party of the governor has been covered extensively in both theoretical and empirical examinations of
state budget determinants. State higher education fiscal frameworks acknowledge the role that
governors play in the process, and have found a significant role for the gubernatorial party either by
itself or as part of an indexed variable (Alt & Lowry, 1994; Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Bailey, Rom,
& Taylor, 2004; Garand, 1985; Kane et al., 2003; McLendon et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a). The
theoretical explanation for including this variable rests on the idea that Democratic governors tend to
be more favorable to taxing and spending and, in general, this can lead to higher levels of spending on
education. There is some disagreement over this theoretical premise (discussed in this section) as well
as some findings about the overall role of governors in the budget process that merits further evaluating
gubernatorial influence.
Beginning with the most recent important theoretical and empirical findings, Kousser and
Phillips (2012) published a book on the power of governors, focusing on their importance in the
political and budget process. Their findings related to the gubernatorial influence over the budget
process contradict some of the assumptions about what is important in a political model of budget
determination. In particular, two intervening variables impact whether or not a governor will have the
ability to influence budget bills. First, the professionalism of the legislature has an impact on whether
or not a governor can exert his or her will on the legislature. This study already includes a variable to
represent professionalism of the legislature. Second, the partisanship of the legislature has an effect on
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whether or not a governor will have significant influence in the passage of budget legislation. For this
reason, examining whether or not the governor’s party aligns with the legislature is important in
measuring the governor’s impact on state budgets.
One oft-used measure of gubernatorial party power is Beyle’s index, which uses a mix of
different characteristics including party affiliation. This measure has been explored and found to be
significant in state budget studies (Knott & Payne, 2004; McLendon & Hearn, 2007; Nicholson-Crotty
& Meier, 2003); however, Barrilleaux and Berkman (2003) provided an important critique of such a
compound measure, suggesting that different gubernatorial characteristics may impact the budget
process in different ways. They separated out party affiliation and other factors to slim down the index
for only budgetary powers of the governor. This separation has been adopted more recently in
Tandberg’s (2010b) framework. Using Kousser and Phillips’ (2012) results, it seems wise to separate
different types of gubernatorial characteristics when examining the governor’s overall influence on the
budget, especially since party seems to play a more significant role than particular budgetary powers.
Considering the fact that only the gubernatorial party was significant alongside intervening political
variables, only the governor’s party was included in this study’s analysis.
Even though many studies have reported a significant relationship between the party of the
governor and appropriations outcomes, the findings are not ubiquitous. Some studies have found the
relationship between gubernatorial party and appropriations insignificant (Delaney & Doyle, 2011;
Tandberg & Ness, 2011; Weerts & Ronca, 2006, 2012). Tandberg (2010a) found a significant result but
in the opposite direction of the party hypotheses. Tandberg’s explanation for his opposite finding is that
the dependent variable chosen for the analysis is important in predicting the finding. Dependent
variables that look at appropriations in dollar amounts are more likely to see the relationship between
Democratic governors’ appropriations outcomes, compared to other measures that look more at budget
item priorities within state budgets. He further states that although Democratic governors are more
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likely to spend in state budgets overall, they may spend in areas outside of higher education more than
within, leading to results that make it look like Republican governors favor more higher education
spending compared to Democrats. This idea does not conflict with overall ideas of Democratic
spending priorities assumed by other scholars (Alt & Lowry, 1994; Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003;
Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Yates & Fording, 2005).
Tandberg provides only one explanation for why findings on the significance of the governor’s
party in budget outcomes may look counter to theoretical explanations. This study will include the
gubernatorial party as an explanatory variable, with the expectation that Democratic governors will
favor higher education spending more than Republican governors, but the explanation of Tandberg’s
findings should be reviewed after running this study’s statistical analysis.

Institution-level variables.
The majority of studies examining determinants of state higher education budgets focus on
state-level outcomes (McLendon & Hearn, 2007; McLendon et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a). This
study utilizes frameworks built to explain state fiscal policy outcomes from the perspective of statelevel studies, and draws on a rich literature base of previous study’s testing state-level determinants.
The interest in examining institution-level outcomes was driven by the nature of this study’s focus on
lobbying by higher education institutions. Since the decision to levy lobbying resources is often made
on the campus level, it makes sense to analyze the results of those decisions with respect to the
relationship between lobbying resources and budgetary outcomes. Weerts and Ronca (2012) provide a
good example of a state fiscal framework adapted for an institution-level analysis, drawing on similar
frameworks as this study does. Similar to Weerts and Ronca’s (2012), adding institution-level control
variables to state-level controls was a necessary step in modelling institutional appropriations
outcomes. This section discusses the institution-level variables used for this study and their place in the
literature.
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Lobbying effort.
It would be best to describe the empirical and theoretical literature on lobbying and higher
education finance as young. Ness, Tandberg, and McLendon (2015) conclude that we are still in an
“exploratory” state with regard to the major research questions linking lobbying and state higher
education policy outcomes. Research into these questions relies heavily on research in other fields such
as public policy and politics, which has a larger number of authors examining relationships between
lobbying efforts and attempts to accumulate larger budget apportionments from state and federal
legislatures (de Figueiredo & Silverman 2006; Helland 2008; Kelleher & Yackee, 2009).
Having already discussed the theoretical basis for how lobbying impacts legislative decisions on
higher education state budgets, the empirical findings on lobbying in the higher education research
provide guidance on why and how it can be used in this study. A number of researchers have
investigated the power of lobbyists on behalf of public institutions in influencing government policy
decisions in the past 25 years (Browne, 1990; Gray & Lowery, 1988, 1996; Jacoby & Schneider, 2001;
Nownes & Freeman, 1998). The contribution of these early studies caught the attention of higher
education researchers; however, the majority of research prior to the turn of the century was based on
case studies and cross-sectional analysis, which made making inferences about the impact of lobbying
across states difficult (McLendon & Hearn, 2007).
Some notable advances in the empirical literature include work by Hrebenar and Thomas
(1992) which led to creating group influence rankings by state, used in at least one large scale study of
higher education accountability mandates and university governance systems (McLendon et al., 2006).
The most recent higher education research looking at lobbying and the state budget process has relied
on Gray and Lowery’s (1996) Population Ecology theory, which states that as groups within a
population increase their energy, size, and area, they grow in influence within their environment
(Tandberg, 2008, 2010a; McLendon et al., 2009; Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Weerts & Ronca, 2012).
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These studies model lobbying and assess outcome variables at the state level with the exception of
Weerts and Ronca (2012), which still model lobbying at the state level on institution-level outcome
variables. The actual variable approximating interest group power in these studies uses state lobbyist
registration data (higher education lobbyists divided by all other lobbyists in a state). The term used to
describe this measure is interest group density.
There is a comparatively smaller body of research on institution-level lobbying and its
relationship to state or federal level budgetary outcomes. De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006)
examined lobbying expenditures by institutions and their effect on federal congressional committee
earmarks, determining that lobbying provided a return on investment, which also varied by institutional
characteristics including the institution’s size and prestige. One reason for the focus on state-level
aspects of lobbying in the research was discussed early in the chapter; it mostly stems from the
theoretical and empirical analysis suggesting the importance of group-level resources compared to
firm-level resources when it comes to impacting government budgetary outcomes (Baumgartner et al.,
2009). Recent scholarship has raised a number of questions about whether or not ignoring firm-level
decisions is the right approach to studying the impact of lobbying (Barber et. al., 2014). A number of
studies have been produced in the past 10 years suggesting firm-level resources may impact their
outcomes in relation to government policy, warranting more research on the connection between the
firm and their returns on investment lobbying (Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, & Ness, 2013; Richter et al.,
2009).
In addition to theoretical reasons to consider further study of lobbying at the campus level and
its impact on state budgets, there are issues related to the construction of variables representing
lobbying efforts or influences that should be considered. De Figueiredo and Richter (2014) catalogued
different measures for lobbying across the political and higher education research. When examining the
use of registration data on lobbying, they point out that registration laws do vary across states,
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something that may affect 50 state studies attempting to utilize registration as a universal tool for
comparison (LaPira & Thomas, 2013). Registration data also does not describe the intensity of
lobbying efforts, since registered lobbyists can spend nothing and receive no compensation in a session
but still register. This will make it difficult to connect actual energy spent by institutions with outcomes
of lobbying. Transactional data, like that used in de Figueiredo and Silverman (2006), presents a more
accurate depiction of the effort expended by universities on their aims. Policies on lobbying transaction
records (expenditure records) also vary across states, presenting a weakness similar to registration data,
but they do more accurately portray the amount of effort and resources an institution is seeking to
spend on lobbying activities within a recorded period than registrations. These reasons, along with the
theoretical and empirical findings about the relationship between institution-level lobbying and policy
outcomes, suggest modeling lobbying expenditures at the institution-level—as this study plans to do—
will represent a significant contribution to higher education literature.

Enrollment and prestige.
Hossler (2004) discussed the historical issues that have pressured institutions into worrying
about increasing enrollment and prestige. As states have increasingly pushed the marketization of
higher education, institutions have become pressured to grow and compete more fiercely for students of
higher aptitude, sending signals to state legislators that they should be rewarded with higher levels of
funding, a sentiment echoed by Alexander and Layzell (2006) in their investigation of the Illinois
public university system. The origin of this notion is summed up in Bowen’s (1980) Laws of Higher
Education, which stresses the fact that colleges have an unending hunger to improve and grow for their
own posterity.
Though institutional size seems like a straightforward metric for how legislators may examine
institutional needs, it is important to use caution when considering enrollment directly in an analysis of
determinants for state appropriations. There is a dual-causality concern with using enrollment as an
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explanation for appropriation level, since increased appropriations can lead to school expansion and
higher enrollments (McLendon & Hearn, 2009; Tandberg, 2010b; Trostel & Ronca, 2009). There is a
significant body of research that has examined this relationship and suggests that enrollments have a
relatively one-to-one relationship with appropriations, and that utilizing an outcome variable such as
appropriations per FTE can help control for enrollments while measuring state support (Tandberg &
Griffith, 2013). This study utilizes appropriations per FTE as an outcome variable in one model of state
appropriations determinants, which does not include enrollments, while utilizing a second model for
appropriation change as an outcome variable that does.
Institutional prestige is another factor that is often considered when trying to determine
differences in how states support their institutions. Sweitzer (2008) surveyed empirical literature on the
topic, concluding that institutional size, faculty productivity, and admissions selectivity have emerged
as longstanding trends related to prestige (Astin, 1970; Astin & Lee, 1972; Astin & Solmon, 1981;
Grunig, 1997; Porter & Toutkoushian, 2002; Schmitz, 1993; Solmon & Astin, 1981; Volkwein, 1989;
Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006). Weerts and Ronca (2006, 2012) performed multiple studies focusing on
institution-level support outcomes utilizing Carnegie classification grouping to capture differences in
the research focus of institutions. The “basic” Carnegie classification system tracks the number and
type of degrees offered by an institution, and places institutions into six categories based on the number
of undergraduate and graduate-level programs the institution offers. The only other institution-level
study looking at higher education support outcomes with a focus on lobbying also included Carnegie
classifications and found it to be an important determinant of federal committee earmarks (de
Figueiredo & Silverman, 2006). This study utilizes the Carnegie classification in a similar way to
Weerts and Ronca (2012), which serves similarly to a variable representing institutional level.
Looking at studies that examine selectivity measures for colleges, many have employed
admission selectivity as a proxy. A common measure of this is applicants admitted to an institution,
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divided by the amount of applicants, which has been used consistently as a measure of institutional
selectivity over time in the higher education literature (Geiger, 2004; Hoxby, 1997; Meredith, 2004;
Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999a, 1999b).
Private gift-giving.
Private gifts to universities represent an alternative revenue source for institutions similar to
tuition and have competing explanations in the theory base as well as contradicting empirical findings
in the literature. Rizzo (2006) reasoned that private giving would be seen as an alternative revenue
source to appropriations by state legislators, and that they would reduce future appropriations based on
increases in private giving. His state-panel analysis confirmed the hypothesis that private giving and
appropriations would have a negative relationship. These findings are congruent with the crowding-out
hypothesis of other researchers, who found support from states dropping as institutions increased their
private fundraising (Sav, 2012). An alternative explanation to the theoretical link of legislators reacting
to institutions is that institutions may be reacting to legislators. If institutional leaders foresee future
reduced appropriations, they may act to increase fundraising.
Adding to the complexity of this measure is that not all authors have found a negative
relationship between private fundraising and state support. Cheslock and Gianneschi (2008) provide
several hypothesized reasons for why that may be. Their research using panel data found a positive
relationship between private giving and appropriations, and they suggest that the motivations of donors
are important for understanding what hypothesis to form about the effects that giving will have. Donors
may be focused on specific outcomes of the university, such as research. They may be sensitive to the
existing prestige and support for the university, an example of the Matthew Effect, where advantage
begets advantage in terms of resources (Rigney, 2013).
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Weerts and Ronca’s (2006) study looked at institutional appropriation determinants across all
50 states in a cross-sectional, one-year model. It was found to have a positive relationship with
appropriations, which the authors concluded might mean that private giving is a proxy for general
support of higher education within the state. This effect was not found in Weerts and Ronca’s (2012)
later work also focusing on institutional appropriations, which was more statistically rigorous
compared to the 2006 study, relying on a longer temporal period instead of a one-year snapshot.
Overall, the research on the effect of private giving on state support is mixed in terms of the directional
effect and its power. This study includes private giving as a measure and expects that it may have a
positive relationship to state support as other authors in the higher education literature have found.

Tuition and fees.
The inclusion of average state tuition rates are found in some of the theoretical frameworks and
studies built to explore determinants of state appropriations, but several scholarly works suggest that
including tuition as a determinant should be interpreted cautiously. Starting at Hovey’s (1999) balance
wheel hypothesis, higher education is in the unique position as a public body to self-fund its activities.
Legislators may see this as an advantage for higher education over other state bodies that can use
tuition as a pressure valve if state support is reduced. Economic downturn leads to reductions in state
appropriations for higher education, which triggers increases in tuition. Several scholars have pointed
out an issue of dual-causality where it appears that increases in tuition are driving reductions in
appropriations, while it is actually intentional reductions in aid by legislators guided by the knowledge
of higher education’s self-funding ability equation (Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Rizzo, 2006;
Tandberg, 2010a, 2010b). The hypothesis of tuition increases driving reductions in support comes from
the idea of “tax revolt,” where public opinion about high tuition leads legislators to punish higher
education institutions for increases in tuition. This can put institutions in a double bind when it comes
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to asking for support from legislators, where they are seen as being self-sufficient through tuition
funding but greedy for utilizing tuition as revenue.
Tandberg (2010b) acknowledges this dual-causality issue in his framework for higher education
appropriations but still chooses to include the variable. His study cites a number of previous works that
also included tuition as a control variable for explaining state appropriations (Dar, 2012; Geiger, 2004;
McLendon et al., 2009; Rizzo, 2006). Looking further into these studies, Dar (2012) and Geiger (2004)
consider a limited set of explanatory variables compared to more comprehensive studies of higher
education appropriations. There are also other comprehensive studies that do not focus on state-level
outcome variables which either did not find tuition significant, or did not include it as an explanatory
variable (Weerts & Ronca, 2006, 2012). Aside from the significant findings of Tandberg’s (2010a)
work, Rizzo (2006) actually presents the strongest finding for tuition driving appropriations when he
instrumented for lagged tuition with other common factors, but found that tuition uniquely affected
drops in appropriations. For these reasons, tuition deserves to be included as a factor in determining
appropriations despite its cautionary nature.
Outcome variables.
In a recent chapter of the Handbook for Higher Education Research and Theory, Tandberg and
Griffith (2013) dive deeply into the reasoning behind the choice of dependent variables in state support
studies, with the goal of helping researchers match up their questions with the best outcome measures.
This study is interested in how institutional and state factors are impacting the welfare of institutions,
which is well modeled by appropriations per FTE. Tandberg and Griffith (2013) describe the use of
appropriations per FTE as measuring how well states are meeting the needs of institutions. Measuring
institutional appropriations this way also helps control for the effects of enrollment on appropriations,
which has been the subject of considerable research over endogeneity concerns (Tandberg, 2008,
2010a; Trostel & Ronca, 2009). Tandberg and Griffith (2013) suggest that, in fact, enrollment may
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actually be a bigger driver of appropriations than vice versa.
Looking beyond the overall measure of appropriations, this study is fundamentally interested in
what drives change in state budgets. Weerts and Ronca (2012) asked this same question with a similar
set of data. The advantages of modeling change include the conversion of appropriations data into
percentages from year to year. This removes some of the correlation issues between appropriations
from year to year and other variables that may be related to appropriations within the budget.
Another recent trend in the higher education literature is taking a broader view of what kinds of
state support may be affected by state contextual forces. This is evident through Tandberg’s (2013)
research on capital expenditures and how they are similar to appropriations in terms of their
determinants. Especially in the case of political variables such as lobbying, it seems prudent to include
other non-appropriational forms of support within the control of legislators. This study included a
measure of higher education support including state appropriations, state institutional operating grants
and contracts as well as state non-operating grants and contracts. The IPEDS data description makes
particular mention of research grants or contracts from the state as a form of direct operating grant but
also includes all other types of contracts or grants provided to the institution. No further delineations
are made in the survey related to the data. The appropriations, its changes, and other grant aid were
measured as inflation-adjusted-percentage change from year to year.

This Study’s Model
Returning back to the purpose of this study, the possible relationship between lobbying efforts
of public colleges and universities and their state support can only be examined within the greater
context of political decision-making. To adopt a relevant framework, Tandberg’s (2010b) State Fiscal
Policy Framework presented a fruitful and up-to-date reference point for determining important
variables. Theoretically, this study relies on the same theory base as Tandberg’s model, borrowing from
New Institutionalism and Institutional Rational Choice Theory to model how state legislative decisions
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are shaped by their state environment and legislator beliefs, culture, and norms. Following
recommendations from the literature and past studies on the topic of state support determinants, a panel
dataset was used with a panel regression equation to examine how changes in independent variables
affected the outcome measures over time.
An important point where this study’s model diverges from the State Fiscal Policy Framework
is in the utilization of institution-level control variables. Fig. 2.1 reflects these changes in the overall
study design. Similar studies in higher education examining state support at an institutional level
include Weerts and Ronca’s (2012) study, which adopted a similar set of variables to examine the role
of institutional- and state-level variables impacting support decisions.

The other significant change from past models is the disaggregation of lobbying to an institution
level. This data was collected specifically for this study through the collection and combination of
institutional data across state government websites. The decision to disaggregate lobbying to the
institutional level is based on recommendations from De Figueiredo and Richter (2014), who advocate
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for examining lobbying data in specific time periods and situations instead of in aggregate measures, as
well as the critical findings of Barber et al. (2014) which suggest institution level study on lobbying
may be valuable to the theory base.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
This chapter begins with a review of this study’s purpose as well as the research questions
designed to address problems in the literature. The methodology for this study is then described, broken
down into four sections. The first section covers data collection procedures, highlighting the process of
collecting and treating a new variable to represent higher education lobbying efforts. This section also
involves a conversation on variables and their operationalization based on the study’s model presented
in Chapter 2. The second section describes the overall dataset, how states and institutions were
included or excluded from the analysis, and how the dataset differs from a national sample as well as
issues related to missing data. The third section describes the design of the study and analytical method.
Finally, a closing section explains a brief summary encapsulating the relevance of the study and
descriptive analysis to better understand college-lobbying behavior.
Purpose of the Study
There is no shortage of data on the increasing pressure applied to state budgets over the past
several decades. The higher education literature has put a focus on the ways in which this has led to
declining support for colleges and universities when taking into account the rising demand for
enrollment in these institutions. State political context has developed as a partial explanation for
changes in higher education support in addition to economic and demographic factors; some authors
have chosen to focus on competing interest groups as a political force.
The purpose of this study is to examine the possible relationship between college spending on
lobbying efforts of state government and the returns to those colleges in the forms of appropriations
and other financial support. Due to the limitations of current data on higher education interest groups
and college lobbying, the decision was made to compile new data about lobbying that represents a
measure of college resource allocations in the form of institutional expenditures on lobbying activities.
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This decision guided many of the methodological aspects of the study, including the level of analysis,
and the inclusion criteria for states and institutions as well as the analytical methods employed.
Additionally, the decision to compile new lobbying data on institutions allows for a better
understanding of how much different types of institutions spend on lobbying, and how different state
environments relate to lobbying expenditures.
It is also not well known how lobbying expenditures interact with other institutional and state
characteristics, such as institutional prestige or size as well as state economic cycles or educational
governance structure. To best utilize the new dataset created for this study, it is important to find out
more about college lobbying characteristics that may provide future research questions in a stillexploratory area of the literature.
Research Questions
The first research question addresses the distribution of institutional lobbying expenditures
across institutions—by type and level—as well as across state governance models. The second and
third research questions for this study explore the existence of a relationship between institutional
lobbying efforts and state appropriations as well as other forms of direct support. The idea of measuring
“effort” in this sense is to understand more about the effectiveness of lobbying, a critical piece of
information for institutional decision-makers. Past research in the higher education literature has
focused on lobbying density in states, which suggests that where higher education institutions can
concentrate lobbying efforts compared to other groups in the state, higher education support will be
stronger (Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a). Others have investigated federal-level
lobbying of congressional committees and found that high research-level universities, lobbying specific
individuals on the committees, were more effective in attaining research grants (de Figueiredo &
Silverman, 2006). This study attempts to take an institution-level approach similar to de Figueiredo and
Silverman’s study, but focused on appropriations and controlling for state-level context similar to
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Tandberg (2008, 2010a) and others such as Weerts and Ronca (2012). To do this, research questions
must be shaped around controlling state- and institution-level intervening variables.
Tandberg and Hillman (2014) comprehensively explored the many dependent variables that
have been used to model state support for higher education, with each form having benefits and
drawbacks when used in large state studies. This study utilizes both appropriations per full-time
equivalent as well as log appropriations and non-appropriations support. These two dependent variables
have some historical precedence in recent studies (Tandberg, 2008; Tandberg & Ness, 2011).

1. How are lobbying expenditures distributed among public 2- and 4-year institutions within the
states included in this study, and how do lobbying expenditures differ based on institutionallevel, and state-governance models?
2. Does a relationship exist between a public institution’s expenditures on lobbying and its
received state appropriations when holding constant economic, political, and demographic
differences in institutions?
3. Does a relationship exist between a public institution’s expenditures on lobbying and its overall
state support received from all sources, when holding constant economic, political, and
demographic differences in institutions?
Section 1: Data Collection and Operationalization
When studying public colleges in the United States, several unique features of the American
higher education system should be kept in mind. States within the United States vary contextually in
their political and economic structures as well as in their demographics. They also interact heavily with
in-state public colleges and universities, though the level of control exercised as well as the level of
support provided varies greatly. Because of this context, it is important to control for the differences in
states and their political environments, while controlling for institutional differences that matter in
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funding outcomes from state legislatures. Thankfully, there are ample empirical and theoretical
examples for modeling many of these differences (McLendon & Hearn, 2007; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a;
Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Weerts & Ronca, 2012).
Contrary to the ample theoretical and empirical literature on most political, economic, and
demographic variables related to state higher education support, lobbying as a measure has much less
of a literature base in existence to discuss aspects of operationalization and the pros and cons of proxy
choices for college lobbying efforts. De Figueiredo and Richter (2014) provide the best overall critique
of the empirical literature on lobbying; they were an important source for guiding the way lobbying
could be operationalized using accessible state data. The first part of Section 1 focuses on the lobbying
expenditure variable compiled for this study. The general collection procedure, issues related to missing
data, and transformations as well as internal and external validity are discussed. In this study’s analysis,
the only variable including missing data was lobbying expenditures—and by extension—lobbying
yearly change. The second part of Section 1 contains information about the collection and
operationalization of all dependent and independent variables included in this study.
Lobbying expenditure record collection process.
To utilize lobbying expenditure reports to build a dataset including multiple states, several
hurdles had to be overcome. The first part of the data collection process consisted of extracting
transaction records and the recording of expenditure amounts for compensation, gifts, and other
expenses on behalf of higher education institutions. This required decisions related to what would not
be included in the calculation of institutional spending. All records in state databases that could be
directly attributable to public colleges and universities were included. Organizations such as faculty
and student unions and private foundations linked to institutions were excluded, due to these
organizations not being under the direct control of public colleges and universities. It would dilute the
ability to draw conclusions about the spending of college resources, if resources outside the college’s
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control are included in the analysis of lobbying impacts.
The largest concern in the data collection process and one shared with the design of other
measures such as registration data is the internal validity of lobbying expenditures as a similar measure
across states. The major issues discussed below include: (a) Issues related to state disclosure laws
including minimum reporting amounts and what must be disclosed, (b) Missing data in several states
requiring imputation, (c) Adjustments required for states with biennial budgeting processes, and (d)
Other issues encountered during data collection that affected the dataset in minimal ways. Appendix B
includes source definitions for lobbying, lobbyists, and expenditure disclosures.
State Disclosure Laws for Lobbyists.
There are several internal validity concerns regarding the comparison of lobbying across states
where laws and regulations differ. This was discussed earlier in relation to other work that utilized
registration laws for lobbyists in creating a measure of lobbying density. In the same way that
registration laws for lobbyists differ from state to state, so, too, do disclosure laws for lobbying
expenditures by institutions. Although the basic definitions of what lobbying is do not differ widely
across states, regulations related to what must be recorded as well as who must be recorded doing so
are known to differ (Buck, 2011). In short, it is somewhat clear what lobbying is, but there are
exceptions for how much needs to be recorded and who may be exempt.
Appendix C provides an overview of minimum disclosure amounts, expenditure types tracked,
and exemptions for certain individuals. Most states require tracking of common expense types such as
travel, lodging, food, entertainment, communication costs, and gifts (though some states ban gifts on
behalf of public institutions). Because this study overall used certain expenditure types as requirements
for inclusion, this was less of a concern for internal validity of the lobbying measure.
Differences in minimum disclosures represent an internal validity threat in several states.
Pennsylvania requires reporting once institutions spent more than $2,500 per 3-month session in
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lobbying expenditures, with New Jersey having a $2,500 minimum in a one-year period. New York
requires disclosure after hitting the $5,000-per-year mark. California represents the other state with a
minimum threshold deviation from most states, where either employers spending more than $5,000 or
compensation to a lobbyist equaling more than $2,000 annually will trigger requirements to disclose. It
is a concern that this could under-record the amount lobbying institutions spend, representing a threat
to internal validity. Table 3-1 below shows the relative average expenditure rank of a handful of states
from the analysis. The existence of a minimum requirement does not appear to affect institutions
equally in terms of their relative ranks. In fact, some of the highest average-spending states have
minimum disclosure requirements.
Although some states with minimum reporting rules do tend to have high average spending,
they also have significantly more non-reporting institutions. The four states with minimum rules of
$2,500 or more have 46% of institutions reporting no expenditures in 2012–2013, compared to only
17% in all other states that do not have such high minimum rules. In the combined states without
$2,500 or higher minimum disclosure rates, 43% have total expenditures of $2,500 or less. There is no
way to know how institutions would report differently without these minimum disclosure regulations,
but there is some evidence to suggest that this dataset may exclude a number of institutions spending at
least some yearly amount on lobbying activities.
Table 3-1
Average Lobbying Expenditure Rank (10-Year Dataset)
State
Final 3-year average
California
8th
New York
3rd
New Jersey
12th
Pennsylvania
1st
Kentucky
13th

The second internal validity issue related to differences in disclosure laws is exemptions for
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certain individuals to not file as lobbyists. A useful study for understanding these significant differences
in addition to King’s (2011) study was the Pacific Research Institute’s (PRI) 2010 examination of
government lobbying across all 50 states (Clemens et al., 2010). Of the states labelled as having acute
issues with exemptions for state employees, four states included in this study were of interest:
Colorado, Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York. In the case of New York, colleges and universities are
specifically named in the lobbying law as not being exempt from state disclosure laws. In the case of
Colorado, some state agencies are completely exempt, but higher education institutions are not
included on that list. There are differences in registration rules for state employees, but state colleges
and universities in Colorado must designate state liaisons who are required to include data on their time
spent lobbying as well as their compensation. Pennsylvania, Kentucky, New Jersey, and California do
represent significant concerns for underreporting due to state employee exemptions that include
compensation data. In all these states, exemptions do not include hired lobbyists or local government
employees such as those working at community colleges, which is why there are still records for many
state colleges and universities included in the analysis. Appendix C contains information related to
exemption regulation, and the average expenditure data rankings in Table 3-3 suggest that these
exemptions may mean that Kentucky and New Jersey, in particular, are underreported compared to
other states in the dataset.
Missing lobbying data.
To understand the effects that missing lobbying expenditure data might have on the study’s
model, imputation is used on a 13-state subset of the model to generate a balanced panel for analysis.
Excluding South Carolina and Wisconsin creates a 473-institution dataset that is missing only 10.8% of
lobbying data overall. The reason for this missing data is due to states passing lobbying registration
laws within different periods of time since the year 2003 as well as record retention laws that allow
states to only maintain records for a certain number of years. This necessitates imputation of data,
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which was something already surmised during the collection phase. In this smaller dataset, 100% of
institutions have reported lobbying data from Fiscal Year 2008 and later, while only 73% of the data
from the first 4 years exists. The states requiring the most imputation were New York and Oregon,
which required the first 4 years of data to be imputed. Pennsylvania required 3 years of imputation.
The process for imputing this variable used the interpolation command in STATA, consistent
with methods and recommendations of other higher education researchers (Chen, 2012; Zhang, 2010).
Data for the expenditure variable was examined before and after imputation set-wide as well as
examined on a state basis pre- and post-imputation. Table 3-2 reflects the overall change in means for
the variable before and after imputation. As expected, imputation had a minor additive effect, raising
the mean lobbying expenditure-per-institution dataset wide. This is due to New York and Pennsylvania
being some of the highest average states for lobbying expenditures. It should also be noted that early
years of the dataset had a noticeably lower skew and kurtosis compared to later years pre-imputation.
The addition of imputed years for the three states with missing data raised the skew and kurtosis in the
variable to where it was consistent across years. Lobbying expenditure data is highly skewed, since
larger institutions tend to spend a lot, while smaller institutions tend to spend little or nothing on
lobbying. This also helps explain the kurtosis of the variable.

Table 3-2
Average Expenditure per Institution (select years)
Year
Pre-Imputation
Post-Imputation
2003–04
$11,932
$12,603
2004–05
$12,035
$12,449
2005–06
$13,045
$13,143
2006–07
$14,233
$14,484
The purpose of this imputation was primarily for descriptive analysis of lobbying data in the 10year time period. An unbalanced panel with the larger 15-state dataset is of primary interest for
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answering the second and third research questions about relationships between lobbying state support
outcomes. Descriptive statistics discussed in Chapter 4 will focus on the smaller imputed dataset to
better understand changes in lobbying over the past 10 years. Table 3-5 reflects that overall the
imputation altered the mean lobbying expenditures no more than 5% in the year with the most missing
data and only 1.7% in the year with the least missing data.
Adjusting lobbying data in biennial and annual budget states.
Another challenge to examining lobbying data for different states is being able to compare
states with biennial and annual budgets. Biennial and annual budget states both release yearly budgets
for their states; however, the deliberation of budget decisions in biennial states occurs over a 2-year
period. When examining the reporting of state lobbying disclosures, it became obvious that lobbying
expenditures were very uneven between budget and non-budget decision years. To compensate for the
difference in allocation of funding for lobbying, biennial state lobbying data was averaged in every 2
years leading to a budget decision. This also required adjustment of the data when integrating it into the
dataset3.
Institutions in biennial states accounted for just over 26% of the overall dataset. The states in
this study with biennial budgets are Nebraska, Oregon, South Carolina and Washington. Arizona has a
biennial budget, but many departments have annual budget votes including institutions of higher
education.
Other lobbying data issues during collection.
Aside from the major issues related to the collection and design of the lobbying variable, there
were other decisions that should be included in the overall discussion of how this variable was designed
for measuring state lobbying. The record search of state databases was in most cases straightforward.
3

For instance, 2001–2002 and 2002–2003 years of lobbying expenditure data leading up to a June 2003
adopted budget are matched up to predict variation in the 2003–2004 and 2004–2005 budget for institutions in a
biennial state. This is different from the 1-year lag for each year of lobbying applied to annual state budgets.
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Most college or university records were properly labeled and could be aggregated if the database only
included lobbyists with records that tied them back to institutions. It was also fairly straightforward to
determine private higher education lobbying groups not directly tied to institutions such as faculty
groups, unions, student groups, and independent colleges. In several cases, however, system-level
lobbying occurred when a community college network or public university system chose to lobby on
behalf of all its constituent members. This occurred in less than 5% of the overall dataset, particularly
for community colleges in Colorado, New Jersey, and Michigan, and in California (CSU system).
Lobbying funds from these associations were distributed proportionally by constituent institutional
size. Where possible, systems with branch campuses were aggregated to a single institution if an
IPEDS data file existed that matched the lobbying entry for the system. Private foundations or other
groups such as student government or faculty union representation were not included in compiling state
lobbying expenditures. The rationale for excluding these bodies was that they are not under the control
of institutions and may have different lobbying goals than financial support. These were not prevalent
across institutions or states, but appeared mostly in addition to doctoral-level institutions.
Variable operationalization.
Institution-level variables: lobbying.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the lobbying expenditure variable in this study was derived to create
an accurate measure of effort by higher education institutions to influence the state political budget
process. Previous to this study, the use of registry data has almost exclusively been chosen to model
interest group effects on state finance, and the measure has only been used at the state level through a
derived measure of interest group density (McLendon, et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010; Weerts &
Ronca, 2012). The advantages of registration data include its relative longevity compared to other
tracked data, and its use in examining state environments when looking at density of registered
lobbyists by industry.
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After reviewing the validity threats to utilizing transaction records for lobbying expenditures in
the previous section, it is clear that registration data shares some of those same threats. As noted by de
Figueiredo and Richter (2014), registration laws differ significantly across states, just as expenditure
records do. Registration can also occur even when the lobbyist reports no lobbying activities, and the
institutions they represent report no expenditures. Institutional lobbying expenditures do not suffer
from this drawback. For these reasons, the decision was made to compile a new institution-level
variable representing lobbying expenditures by institution, and to utilize this variable in an institutionlevel study of state higher education support. This first variable, LOBBY, represents expenditure data in
real 2013 dollars. Other studies outside higher education have utilized this variable in studies of state
policy outcomes (Kang, 2012).
De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) utilized institutional federal lobbying expenditure data to
model earmark distributions on a congressional committee, which is the closest similar use of this type
of data in the higher education literature. The authors chose to model expenditures not in real terms, but
as a percentage change from year to year. This measure addresses the idea of how changes in lobbying
expenditures can impact policy decisions. To utilize this study’s new data to its fullest, raw lobbying
data was transformed for a second variable, LOBCHANGE, which is the percentage change in
lobbying expenditures from year to year. In addition to the first two variables, this study also sought to
explore lobbying expenditures controlling the size of an institution. Larger institutions may inherently
have a greater capability to hire staff, and controlling for such a variable will allow for measuring the
lobbying expenditures made by institutions of the same approximate size. This variable is calculated by
taking the total lobbying expenditures for an institution and dividing it by the institution’s full-time
equivalent students.
Variable List:
 Institutional Lobbying Expenditures (LOBBY)
 Institutional Lobbying Expenditures Change (LOBCHANGE)
 Institutional Lobbying Expenditures per FTE (LOBFTE)
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Other institution-level variables.
Outside of the literature on institutional lobbying and its effects, many authors have addressed
the role that institutional characteristics play in explaining differences in appropriations across
institutions and states. Size and prestige have been often noted as important characteristics for state
support (Hossler, 2004; Sweitzer, 2008), while other authors have addressed the issue of institutional
support through private gift-giving as a measure of state support by state citizens (Weerts & Ronca,
2012). Additionally, average tuition and fees are included in the initial analysis as control variables.
Size is measured by using full-time equivalent undergraduate and graduate enrollments. As
discussed in the previous chapter, it is built into one of the dependent variables used for the second
research question in this study. It is utilized as a separate independent variable when explaining the log
of appropriations and non-appropriations grants and contracts addressed in the third research question.
Prestige is measured through two variables. Institutional selectivity is modeled with the admission rate,
which is calculated by dividing admitted students by applied students, and was derived automatically
by IPEDS for 8 of the 10 years included in this study. The variable was derived outside of IPEDS for
2003–2004 and 2004–2005, using the requisite values downloaded from IPEDS. Carnegie
classification was also included using the “basic” measure available through IPEDS. This measure is
grouped into a simple categorical variable representing institutional level, with community colleges
being 0, baccalaureate institutions being 1, and doctoral/graduate institutions being 2. The reason for
both measures being included is that faculty research and selectivity were separately found to affect
appropriations in previous research, and faculty research is linked to institutional type (Sweitzer, 2008).
Private gift-giving represents a form of alternate revenue for institutions. As discussed in the
last chapter, institutions that continually show increases in support through private methods may send
signals to legislators that less public support is necessary. In this way, it can be looked at similarly to
tuition and fee increases. The difference in these two variables is that institutions may have little or no
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control over tuition and fee setting, while having some control over efforts to attract private donorship.
Both of these variables were collected through IPEDS. Private gifts were measured in their own
category, “gifts and contracts, outside organizations,” a part of the Finance Survey. Tuition and fees, as
defined by IPEDS, is the tuition and fee costs for a first-time, in-state freshman student.
Variable List:
 Total institutional enrollment (FTE)
 Institutional admissions selectivity (PRESTIGE)
 Institutional Carnegie classification (CARNEG)
 Private institutional gifts (PRIVGIFT)
 Average tuition and fees (TUITFEE)
State contextual variables.
Most of the data collected for this study were gathered from several sources. The National
Center for Education Statistics IPEDS database stores a great deal of information on state
characteristics tied to institutions, while the State Higher Education Executive Officer group maintains
state higher education finance survey data. Finally, the The Book of the States’ databook handles much
of the structural data pertaining to legislative and executive makeup, which is important for capturing
political variations across states. These sources have been written about thoroughly as the most
common sources for data on this type of analysis (Tandberg & Griffith, 2013). In one case, a derived
variable was used for citizen ideology, based on previous work by William Berry, and maintained by
higher education scholar Richard Fording, as detailed in Appendix A (Berry et al., 1998). This was for
the political culture measure of citizen ideology, which has a rich empirical background at this point in
the literature. To organize this section on state context, variables are grouped according to the major
policy frameworks outlined above.

Higher education demography, organization, and governance.
McLendon and Hearn (2007) describe the characteristics of state-governing boards for higher
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education as a measure of the “overall statewide approach to governance.” This is a reference to
whether or not states have a more restrictive consolidated governing board for public higher education,
compared to looser forms of administration that provide higher levels of autonomy to states.
Theoretically, these differences in the approach to managing institutions can influence the outcome of
how state appropriations and other forms of aid are doled out to individual campuses. There is a wide
body of evidence examining the effects of these boards on state policy outcomes (Lowry, 2001;
McLendon et al., 2006). When operationalizing this variable for study, the Council of State
Governments maintains a dichotomous variable in The Book of the States, which classifies a 0 for
coordinating, regulating, and other forms of state board for higher education that exert only partial or
no control over individual institutions, and a 1 for consolidated governing boards that exert significant
power over the actions and characteristics of individual colleges.
Higher education demography is measured by two variables meant to model preferences for
higher education within states: (1) the share of state college enrollment in 2-year colleges, and (2) the
share of state college enrollment in private colleges. These are preference signals to legislators
(McLendon & Hearn, 2007). If more students choose to pursue 2-year educational opportunities, or
show a preference for private colleges, legislators may see this as a signal that 4-year public colleges
and universities (the more expensive institutions) are becoming less desirable and decide to cut public
education funding. The creation of these variables was done using SHEEO (2012) data on enrollment
totals found in annual SHEF surveys. The variable is represented in percentage terms, similar to other
studies on this topic (Tandberg, 2008, 2010; Weerts & Ronca, 2012).
Variable List:
 State governing board type (HESTRUCT)
 Share of state enrollment in 2-year colleges (PER2YR)
 Share of state enrollment in private colleges (PERPRIV)
Socioeconomic climates.
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There are ample findings to conclude that economic health and population diversity within
states can impact their overall wealth and preferences for higher education (Delaney & Doyle, 2007;
Rizzo, 2006). McLendon and Hearn (2007) attribute these connections to greater differences in
population preferences and resources that shape policy outcomes within states across many topics. This
study utilizes GSP per capita, and state unemployment levels as distal measures of economic state
climate. GSP per capita, in particular, has shown to have a strong relationship with public funding
(Tandberg, 2010a). These measures were available through the United States Census Bureau website
using the annual population survey tool.
To examine population differences, the share of state college-aged population (between 18 and
25) was included. Elected officials will attempt to bring benefits to the college-aged population if they
represent a growing constituency in states (McLendon et al., 2009; Rizzo, 2006; Tandberg, 2010b).
These statistics were derived from United States Census Bureau data using the Annual Population
Survey tool. The elderly population is also considered a control variable; it is included as a share of
state population for ages 65+. Both measures were derived from the United States Census Bureau’s
yearly estimates.
Variable List:
 Gross state product per capita (GSPCAP)
 State unemployment rate (UNEMP)
 Share of state population college-aged (POPCOLL)
 Share of state population aged 65+ (POPELD)
Political culture and ideology.
In an attempt to measure the political will of state citizens, many scholars have tried to build
ideological measures of state political cultures (McLendon & Hearn, 2007). Much of the more recent
literature utilizes a compound measure of citizen ideology created by Berry et al. (1998) to gauge
differences among state constituents which explain their voting preferences, and by proxy, the types of
legislators they choose to elect. The citizen ideology index is a compound variable measured on a scale
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between 1 and 100. The score uses interest group ratings of elected officials as well as challengers and
looks at election outcomes to determine district ideology. Those scores are averaged to determine statelevel ideology scores. Higher scores are associated with more liberal ideologies, while lower scores are
associated with more conservative ideologies. The index is maintained online by its original author,
among others. The online location can be found in Appendix A.
Variable List:
 Compound measure of state citizen ideology (CITIDEO)
Legislative organization and membership.
Much of the focus on past operationalization of legislative organization and membership has
been on the use of compound indices such as Squire’s Index (1992, 2000), to capture many of the
variables related to legislatures and public policy outcomes. This kind of compound analysis fell out of
favor as many authors questioned the underlying assumption of each factor of membership having a
unique effect on policy outcomes. Many authors have opted for a simpler measure of professionalism:
salaries (Tandberg, 2008). Kousser and Phillips (2012) outlined the reasoning for why complex
schemes and indices do not provide a more significant predictor of state finance outcomes. This study
continues with the trend of utilizing legislator salary data and retrieved average salary data from The
Council of State Government’s The Book of the States.
Variable List:
 Average state legislator salary (LEGPROF)
Party strength in government institutions.
The national parties in the United States tend to have different preferences for higher education.
There is a long list of study frameworks including measures of party strength and control that examine
how party composition and control affect budget and policy outcomes within states (Alt & Lowry,
2000; Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Yates & Fording, 2005). The prevalent theoretical explanation for why
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parties matter as an intersecting force in higher education appropriations is that Democrats generally
hold higher education as a higher priority and will support more funding for this budget item compared
to Republicans.
Recent research has found mixed results for how measures of political party affiliation affect
appropriation outcomes, and challenge some of the assumptions of earlier political science frameworks
on the issue. Dar and Lee (2014) found that Democratic legislature representation was positively
associated with appropriations per $1,000 in personal income, but this effect was lessened when
unemployment or polarization increased in legislators. Dar’s (2012) previous study found Democratic
representation negatively impacted state spending, though a number of studies involving
comprehensive frameworks found the opposite effect (McLendon, et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2010a).
Dowd and Shieh (2013) found that Republicans have an affinity for community colleges over 4-year
institutions, as they are seen as a cost-effective form of higher education. Weerts and Ronca’s (2012)
results also led to a conclusion that Republican representation may lead to higher levels of support.
This study used a percentage measure for party representation of Republicans across all houses,
averaged together. The measure used is consistent with operationalization in other recent studies, with
percentage of Republican legislators drawn from United States Census Bureau Statistical Abstract.
Variable List:
 Percent of state legislature held by Republicans (LEGPARTY)
Gubernatorial influence.
Choosing to avoid more complicated indexed variables to measure the role of governors on
state appropriations for public colleges, this study focuses on the gubernatorial party, which has been
repeatedly found to be important in impacting state policy outcomes (Dometrius & Wright, 2009
Krupnikov & Shipan, 2012). It has also been found important in the more targeted research on state
support for higher education in the form of budget share and appropriations (McLendon, et al., 2009;
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Tandberg, 2008). The Council of State Governments collects this measure annually. Party affiliation is
measured as a straightforward dichotomous variable. All governors in the dataset were either
Republican or Democrat. The measure in this study is operationalized using Republican governors as 0,
and Democratic governors as 1, interpreted as the effect of a Democratic governor.
Variable List:
 Party of the governor (GOVPARTY)
Competing state interests.
Although not specifically categorized in the McLendon and Hearn (2007) framework for
postsecondary state-budget determinants, other state-budgetary items and their effects on higher
education funding have been studied aggressively in the past several decades (Archibald & Feldman,
2006, 2008; Hovey, 1999; Jenny & Arbak, 2004; Kane et. al., 2003; Schuh, 1993). Of particular
importance is K–12 education funding, which may have similar bases for support along political party
affiliations, but is seen as a first-order expense among legislators, without the ability to raise its own
revenues (Rizzo, 2006; Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998).
Spending on Medicaid, which has increased during recent fiscal downturns in state revenue due
to recessions, has also had special attention paid to it by scholars. Recent state support studies have
consistently found changes in Medicaid spending significant in explaining higher education
appropriations and share of state budgets (Tandberg, 2010a). Including these two competing interests as
controlling variables will help control political differences in state legislatures which may put a higher
priority on these other items, impacting the overall appropriations received by institutions across states.
Since the reason for inclusion of these competing state interests is the same, both variables are
structured as a percentage of state budget. The data was derived from the National Association of State
Budget Officers’ (NASBO) State Expenditure Reports.
One concern in using these variables is that they may be highly correlated if they both share
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similar patterns of elasticity to changes in state economic cycles. Delaney and Doyle (2007) explored
the differences in how K–12 budgets and Medicaid budgets within states reacted as compared to the
balance wheel hypothesis for higher education. Both K–12 and Medicaid did not conform to the cubicform nature that the balance wheel proposes for higher education budgets. It did note that K–12
funding was closer to higher education spending in its shape over time, which implies that these budget
items may not be highly correlated. Pairwise correlation of the two variables revealed virtually no
correlation across the dataset (Pearson coefficient of .0091), so both variables were retained for
analysis.
Variable List:
 Percent of state budget dedicated to Medicaid (MEDICAID)
 Percent of state budget dedicated to K–12-education funding (K12EDU)
Dependent variables.
Many higher education studies focusing on state or institutional budgets have utilized higher
education appropriations, appropriations per capita, or appropriations per student FTE as a dependent
variable (Ness, et al., 2015; Tandberg, 2010a, 2010b; Toutkoushian & Hillman, 2012; Weerts & Ronca,
2012). Other studies have focused on percentage share of state budgets (Rizzo, 2006; Tandberg, 2008,
2010a). The dependent variable is chosen and justified based on the goal of what the author is
attempting to measure and sometimes to control for effects that may have dual-causality with the
desired outcome measure (Tandberg & Griffith, 2013). Most studies in the higher education literature
have focused on state-level outcomes and how higher education fits or fairs within a state environment.
Other studies have taken an institutional-level approach, using state-level controls to account for
differences across states. This study joins the latter group focusing on institutional outcomes with statelevel controls. The choice of including appropriations and total support by FTE represent an interest in
how lobbying and other variables are affecting the outcome representing an institution’s need for state
aid.
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Weerts and Ronca (2012) conducted the most similar study to this one, pointing out the
importance of not only focusing on levels of appropriations, but on modeling change in appropriations.
This was shown to reduce issues of autocorrelation in the residuals of their study’s models. This study
utilizes logged appropriations per FTE, to examine institutional and state effects with relation to the
needs of institutions. The APPCHANGE and TSCHANGE variables are year-to-year percentage
changes in appropriations or appropriations plus grants. These variables are created through the use of
log differences, which approximates percentage. These different dependent variables will allow for the
research questions to be explored in terms of both what affects appropriation levels as well as what
drives change in appropriations and other types of support. The measures of support used in this study
can be derived entirely from IPEDS data, and were transformed using the Consumer Price Index to
adjust for inflation through 2013. This source and transformation is similar to other studies (Tandberg,
2008; Weerts & Ronca, 2012).
Variable List:
 Inflation-adjusted state appropriations per FTE student, logged (APPFTE)
 Inflation-adjusted state appropriations and grants per FTE student, logged (TOTSUPPFTE)
 Inflation-adjusted, 1-year percentage change in state institutional appropriations
(APPCHANGE)
 Inflation-adjusted, 1-year percentage change in institutional appropriations and grants
(TSCHANGE)
Section 2: Study Dataset
A wide variety of data sources were utilized to attain information about lobbying, state finance
outcomes, and state/institutional characteristics, however, the size and shape of the overall study
dataset was guided by the desire to add institution-level lobbying data to the study’s analysis. Sources
such as King (2011) and the NCSL (2015) lobbying disclosure law summaries were valuable in
creating inclusion guidelines and then checking state fitness for inclusion in the study. In the end, 15
states met inclusion requirements determined from the sources above, and lobbying data was then
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compiled from state databases on public websites. This section outlines the creation of inclusion
criteria for states and institutions, as well as how the dataset was compared to a larger national sample.
The specific department or office with the responsibility for collecting lobbying reports varied
from state to state, usually housed within ethics-related offices, or departments of state. A list of these
database locations is outlined in Appendix D and discussed later in this chapter.
State and institutional inclusion.
Considering one purpose of this study was the examination and comparison of institutional
lobbying expenditures, inclusion of states was driven first by the availability and comparability of
institutional lobbying data. Much of the empirical literature on lobbying includes small-scale studies
focusing on a single state, or multiple states (Burkum, 2009; Grasse & Heidbreder, 2011; Lewis, 2013).
Even groups focusing on large-scale compilation of all lobbying expenditure records such as the
National Institute on Money in State Politics examines only 19 states in their compilation of state
lobbying records. This is due to legal differences across states limiting collection—or outright not
requiring it—on top of differences in laws that may exclude public sources or portions of public
spending. For these reasons, recent studies focusing on comparability of records done by the NIMSP
and Sunlight Foundation drove inclusion guidelines for states, and led to the overall decision to include
only 15 states in this study.
Results for inclusionary guidelines are displayed in Table 3-3. The inclusion rules for states
were: (1) the state mandated the tracking of aggregate lobbying expenditure amounts per lobbyist
employer or client for all public higher education institutions, and (2) disclosure requirements included
compensation for lobbying and other direct expenditures on events, gifts, or legislative communication.
The final guiding inclusionary rule was that (3) records were made publicly available on the state
website or by request through the governing body responsible for lobbying registration and tracking.
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Table 3-3

State Inclusion Guidelines
Excluded by Rules 1 & 2
Excluded by Rule 3 States' Meeting Inclusion Rules
Data Available by Employer,
Data Available
and Recorded Compensation
Publically
Alabama
Missouri
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Montana
New Hampshire
California*
Connecticut North Carolina Virginia
Colorado
Delaware
North Dakota
Vermont
Iowa
Florida
New Mexico
Kentucky*
Georgia
Nevada
Michigan
Hawaii
Ohio
Mississippi
Idaho
Oklahoma
Nebraska
Illinois
Rhode Island
New Jersey*
Indiana
South Dakota
New York
Kansas
Tennessee
Oregon
Louisiana
Texas
Pennsylvania*
Massachusetts Utah
South Carolinaᶧ
Maryland
West Virginia
Washington
Maine
Wyoming
Wisconsinᶧ
Minnesota
* Some state employees are exempt from disclosure (Rule 2)
ᶧ States removed for descriptive analysis due to amount of missing data

The decisions on state inclusion were inspired by a desire to maintain as much internal validity
as possible in the lobbying expenditure measure while still keeping adequate institutional cases for
statistical analysis. The guiding literature that helped develop the rules for inclusion was King’s (2011)
study for the Sunlight Foundation and National Institute on Money in State Politics. The first two
guidelines for state inclusion were at the root of King’s analysis comparing state lobbying disclosures.
Out of the 50 American states, only 28 met the second inclusionary guideline of reporting lobbying
compensation as a part of their disclosures (King, 2011). Inclusion of compensation data was a key
measure of whether or not state disclosure was considered comprehensive, as was ready available data,
which was the third guiding criterion.
Disclosure by what are called lobbyist employers or clients (the first inclusion criteria) in this
context refers to entities within the state that either lobby directly using in-house lobbyists, or hire
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independent lobbying firms to lobby on their behalf. Without this information, there is no way to
connect organizations that seek to lobby with the lobbyists registering within the state. In summary, the
first two inclusionary guidelines allow for connecting institutions with lobbyists and ensuring that what
is reported contains important expenditure categories. The National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL) keeps up-to-date records on reporting guidelines for state lobbying, and serves as a
confirmatory source for information on what entities are required to disclose as well as the relevant
statutes and codes that provide further detail (NCSL, 2015).
The first and second inclusion rules removed 31 states from the analysis. The third inclusionary
rule required the elimination of four additional states which made the data unattainable through a
public records search online or through request. Of the final 15 states, two lacked significant available
data within the desired time period of this study. South Carolina was missing all data prior to the 2008–
2009 fiscal year, which provides only 5 years of data on lobbying expenditures. South Carolina is also a
biennial budget state, which leads to 1 year of additional lost data while converting biennial state
lobbying expenditure data to annual data. Wisconsin only had data on institutional lobbying for the
2011–2012 year and beyond. To examine the effects of missing data from earlier in the dataset due to
these two states, and the other states missing up to 3 years of early data, two versions of the overall
dataset are run through this study’s model. An unbalanced panel is run with 15 states, which will be
discussed throughout the rest of this chapter and is featured in Chapter 4. A second, balanced panel,
using imputation was run with only 13 states to compare a balanced version of the dataset with a larger
unbalanced version.
Beyond setting rules for state inclusion in the study, institutional inclusion in the study was
based on at least one factor. As this study seeks to answer questions about state funding determinants,
institutions that received no state appropriations or non-appropriations support were excluded, which
required the exclusion of five institutions, all federal tribal colleges in mid-western states. All other 2-
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and 4-year institutions as defined by the IPEDS survey data are included in this analysis.
Two other circumstances required decisions related to how institutions were included within the
dataset; both related to how lobbying expenditures and IPEDS data are recorded in their respective
databases. Pennsylvania State University (Penn State) is recorded in state lobbying databases as having
one central office for lobbying expenditures. In IPEDS, appropriations data is offered both centrally
and by campus. To match up these two data sources, Penn State is considered as one system in the
analysis. This same issue also presented itself in New Jersey with Rutgers University, and was dealt
with by consolidating the state university system campus data into one institution for the purpose of
analysis. Finally, California community colleges have individual IPEDS entries per campus as well as
grouped entries by district. California lobbying disclosure records indicate lobbying data is broken
down by district; therefore, California community colleges are grouped by district for the purposes of
this analysis. Jaquette and Parra (2014) discuss this type of parent-child consolidation of data from
IPEDS based on campus groupings and revenue sources.
Overall, 534 institutions from 15 states are included in this study’s analysis, which represents all
public institutions in the 15 states, excluding those dealt with through the inclusion criteria and those
adjusted for through consolidation. It should be noted that there is considerable variation in the size of
state public college systems. California (96 institutions) and New York (78 institutions) represent 32%
of the overall institutions included. To examine how this group of states may differ from a greater
national analysis, mean differences for the first year of analysis are included in Table 3-4 below.
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Table 3-4

Comparison of National and Sample Means for Dataset including all 15 States (2003-04 only)
Variable

Appropriations per FTE*
State Appropriations, One-Year Percentage
Change*
Total Support per FTE*
Total State Support, One-Year Percentage
Change*
Private Gift-giving
Tuition & Fees
Carnegie Class
(reflected as 2 and 4-year institutions)
Full-time Equivalent Students
Institutional Prestige
GSP per Capita
Percentage of State Enrollment in 2-year
Colleges
Percentage of State Enrollment in Private
Colleges
State Unemployment Rate
Share of State Population College-aged
Share of State Population Elderly
Share of State Budget to Medicaid
Share of State Budget to K-12
Citizen Ideology
Legislative Professionalism
Party of the Governor
Legislative Party Ratio
Higher Education Structure
Lobbying Expenditures

National Mean
2003-04

Sample Mean
2003-04

Mean Difference % Difference

$7,786

$5,998

-$1,788

-23.0%

-0.02%
$8,973

-0.01%
$7,098

0.01%
-$1,875

-20.9%

-0.01%
0.79%
$2,878,021
$3,641,714
$3,592
$4,589
2 years (63.33%) 2 years (65.75%)
4 years (36.66%) 4 years (34.24%)
6019
7625
89.67%
86.81%
$47,964
$47,546

0.80%
$763,693
$997

27%
28%

1606
-0.03
-$418

27%
-3.2%
-0.9%

31%

32%

2%

5.9%

28.1%
5.99
9.94%
0.1236
0.223
0.214
49.62
$39,564
0.48
0.5033
0.48
(24 states CGB)
N/A

26%
6.179
10.16%
12.58%
0.2203
0.2108
49.51
$46,473
0.733
0.466
0.333
(5 states CGB)
N/A

-2.080%
0.189
0.22%
0.22%
-0.0027
-0.0032
-0.11
$6,909
0.253
-0.0373
-0.147

-7.4%
3.2%
2.2%
1.8%
-1.2%
-1.5%
-0.2%
17.5%
52.7%
-7.4%
-30.6%

Sources for national statistics are the same as those reflected in Appendix A
*Comparisons for dependent variables are from 2004-05 data

The results of comparing national and sample means suggest there are both similarities and
differences between this study’s sample and the greater population of institutions and states. The
majority of demographic and economic state-level variables reflect that this study’s sample does
resemble a national sample. Additionally, the average citizen ideology and legislative ratios are close to
this study’s sample and the national population, suggesting that in some ways this study approximates
the nation with respect to political views and representation.
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The differences between this study and a nationwide population show in the institutional
characteristics and some political variables. General support appears to be lower in this study’s sample
when measured by appropriations per FTE or appropriations change, though overall state support
change appeared to be higher in these states than the national population. Only 5 of the 15 states
included have consolidated governing boards (CGBs), where almost half of the nation’s states have
CGBs. The legislative professionalism measure of this sample suggests the states in the sample have a
more professionalized legislature than the average state of the nation. Finally, there is a
disproportionate amount of Democratic governors in this state sample compared to the nation at large.
These differences suggest that the results of this study should be viewed with caution when
trying to make generalizations about other states or the nation as a whole. The trend of increasing
numbers of states tracking and disclosing lobbying expenditures, exhibited by the increasing number of
states that began doing so throughout this study’s timeline, suggest that future studies will have a larger
number of states to include when examining lobbying effort. Even if the differences between this
study’s sample and a national population can be considered a constraint, the new data compiled for this
study represents the best possible measure for examining the intensity of lobbying efforts by colleges
(de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014). Even without the ability to extrapolate beyond the bounds of the
states included in this study, exploring whether or not a relationship exists between institutional
lobbying expenditures and appropriation outcomes will provide a test of the underlying theories about
the effectiveness of lobbying as a tool for colleges to improve their financial returns in the state budget
process.
Section 3: Analytic Method
To study determinants of state budget outcomes over time, data is required that is both crosssectional and time-series, also called panel data. The goal is to analyze the factors that impact a policy
decision and analyze the variations across and within states and institutions. The use of panel data to
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analyze decision-making has a number of advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data alone.
Panel datasets allow one to control for individual heterogeneity, by studying both within and across unit
variations (Zhang, 2010). In the case of this study, there are likely to be many differences among states,
both demographically and politically. There are also likely to be changes in each state over the course
of 10 years, such as the strength of political parties in control of government or employment trends.
Using panel data analysis allows for control of these differences; it produces accurate parameter
estimates for the effect of each independent variable.
To investigate the first research question for this study, the descriptive analysis in Chapter 4 will
feature tables examining interstate differences and measurements of growth for lobbying expenditures
in the sample. Comparisons of mean lobbying expenditures will also be performed for institutions by
level and Carnegie classification as well as by state governance model. Better understanding of how
institutions of different Carnegie classification lobby across states as well as the intensity of the divide
between levels are important contributions to the higher education literature, as trends in lobbying
expenditures may raise questions about where and when they are effective in changing public policy.
Additionally, state-level variables such as governance models have been hypothesized as having an
effect on state-level interest group variables. Understanding how different governance models interact
with lobbying expenditures represents another significant finding from this research.
To address the second and third research questions about the relationship between lobbying,
appropriation levels, and appropriation change, this study employs a linear mixed-effects model. Much
of the scholarship on this topic to date has focused on the state level, and has ignored the role of timeinvariant variables on changes in state support for higher education (McLendon, et al., 2009; Tandberg,
2008, 2010a; Tandberg & Griffith, 2013). These studies utilized methods for analyzing panel data after
surveying the available methods for state comparative research (Zhang, 2010). The difference between
this study and much of the literature is that examining institutional outcomes in a cross-state study
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requires the acknowledgement of working with nested data. Yearly observations are nested within
institutions, which are nested within states. To examine the across-subject and within-subject variations
across the panel dataset, multilevel analysis must be used. The closest study in analytical design to this
one is the work of Weerts and Ronca (2012), who utilized a similar design to examine institutional
outcomes. The biggest difference between this study and that one is the disaggregation of lobbying as a
variable and the limited states included in this analysis due to data restrictions.
Diagnostics were performed to examine the overall dataset’s fitness for a multilevel mixedeffects model. Procedures for these diagnostics were obtained from Chapter 2 of Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal’s (2012) Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling for Stata guide. It was hypothesized that
residuals for the model would be highly correlated, considering the longitudinal nature of the data and
utilizing a pooled-OLS model that reflects that within-subject residuals are correlated in many cases
between .85 and .95 across years. For this reason, a multilevel approach that attempts to manage the
serial correlation issues in the data is required to examine relationships in the data. The STATA package
was used to carry out statistical analysis, using the xtmixed (mixed) syntax, and including an AR(1)
term to compensate for residual autocorrelation.
Other regression diagnostics were performed to determine that significant issues related to
multicollinearity do not exist. A VIF post-estimation test was run on all variables using the regress and
then VIF commands in Stata to determine any issues with multicollinearity. This test resulted in no
variables returning a VIF over 10, with the highest being 5.42, and the mean VIF being 3.26. No
tolerance levels were below .18. This suggests that no multicollinearity issues exist between the
independent first-level variables (UCLA, 2016).
The basic random intercept model for nested data is written below reflecting the cross-sectional
unit of observation (institutions) as i, with the temporal reference (year) of t. The y represents an
individual institutions appropriations or state support for the purposes of answering research questions
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1 and 2. The a represents the intercept coefficient, while the p and c represent independent controlling
variables such as prestige or size. The 𝛿 (2) and 𝛿 (3) represent the random intercept for state s at
institution i and intercept for just institution i, and e designates institutional error terms. The
combination of the three final terms should represent all variations not explained by the model
predictors.
(2)

(3)

𝛾𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏2 𝑝2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3 𝑐3𝑖𝑡 … + 𝛿𝑠𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖

+ 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡

This model addresses the study’s second and third research questions, by providing estimates of
the effects for institutional characteristics while also accounting for across-state and institution
variations, which allow for the inclusion of time-invariant variables important to this analysis.
The reasons for using the model specified above and analytical approach are many. First, a
mixed-effects model is appropriate in this case due to the nature of institutional data being nested, and a
multilevel model allows for the accounting of first- and second-level variations. Second, although
many other studies on this topic utilized a fixed-effects model to examine economic, political, and
demographic variables and their effects on support outcomes, time-invariant predictors would need to
be dropped from the model, which would eliminate important possible predictors such as the Carnegie
classification or higher education governance structure. Finally, there is reason to believe this data has
high autocorrelation in the residuals, and the use of an AR(1) structure for the residuals allows for
measurement and account of that problem across the models using different dependent variables. This
issue of autocorrelation is discussed by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012), who note that AR(1) terms
should only be included when there is a reason to understand the autocorrelation in the dependent
variable. In this case, the AR(1) term allows for a simple explanation of how much of this year’s
appropriations are explained by the previous year’s appropriations in the sample.
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Section 4: Summary and Expectations
This study attempts to bring new data on lobbying expenditures into the existing base of studies
utilizing panel data methods to examine relationships between lobbying and state-support outcomes for
higher education. This task is something that has been widely advocated for in the research on lobbying
and politics as well as higher education (de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014; McLendon & Hearn, 2007;
Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Ness et al., 2015; Tandberg, 2010b; Tandberg & Griffith, 2013). The
theoretical literature that crosses these topics has also come a long way in enveloping political variables
into existing higher education finance studies, borrowing from theories across disciplines. Because the
nature of this type of investigation is exploratory, there is still much that isn’t known about the way
lobbying interacts with other forces in state budget decisions.
The central hypothesis for this study is that, controlling for other factors and time, lobbying
provides a return for institutions through the state budget process. As presented in this chapter, there are
certainly some caveats to this expectation. State lobbying data is not collected in the same fashion
across states. The guidelines for inclusion in this study attempted to account for those differences by
including only states with some minimum levels of accounting that were considered comprehensive
according to other professional evaluations (King, 2011). Even so, future authors should recognize that
differences in data collection rules across states are something with which any author examining
lobbying expenditure data will be presented (de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014).
The statistical methods utilized in this study follow in a similar path of existing studies adopting
similar frameworks of state fiscal policy (Tandberg, 2010a; Weerts & Ronca, 2012). The biggest
difference between this study and some of the past panel models predicting higher education
appropriations, is a focus on institutional variables being added to measure lobbying on an institutional
basis as well as controlling other institutional factors likely significant in state funding decisions.
Expectations for the results of this analysis include the determination that lobbying expenditures vary
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widely across institutions and states, but are also related to the institutional type and governance model
employed by states. It is also expected that a relationship exists between lobbying expenditures and
levels of state support.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Chapter 4 focuses on the descriptive statistics for the dataset, and the results of statistical
analyses to answer the three research questions asked in this study. The first research question is
addressed by examining the descriptive statistics for lobbying expenditures by inter-group differences,
growth, and relationship with relevant state characteristics. The second two research questions are then
addressed, beginning with the impact of lobbying within the study model and followed by a breakdown
of significant political, economic, and demographic influences on institutional appropriations.
Descriptive Characteristics
Examining the economic and demographic changes over the dataset first, there are some
important findings to note. First, trends in institutional support for this sample confirm the many
foundation report findings and research of the past 5 years on reductions in state support. Table 4-1
details the sample descriptive changes from the beginning to end of this dataset. Political and
demographic changes within the states are not surprising based on the differences between the
beginning and end of this sample’s timeframe. Most important to the purpose of this study is the very
clear upward trend in inflation-adjusted lobbying expenditures over just a 10-year period. That trend is
discussed more in the next section of this chapter.
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Table 4-1

Descriptive Statistics including all 15 States (Standard Deviations in Parenthesis)
Variable

Mean 2003-04

Mean 2012-13

Appropriations per FTE (04-05 and 13-14)

$5,998

$4,842

(APPFTE)
Appropriations, One-Year Percentage Change (04-05 and 13-14)

(9561)

(8881)

-0.12%
(1.05)

(APPCHANGE)
Total State Support per FTE (04-05 and 13-14)
(TOTSUPPFTE)
Total State Support, One-Year Percentage Change (04-05 and 13-14)
(TSCHANGE)
Undergraduate and Graduate FTE enrollment
(FTE)

Difference

-19.27%

0.06%
(.556)

N/A

N/A

-1266.00

-17.84%

N/A

N/A

1132

14.76%

$7,098

$5,832

(10334)

(8345)

0.0079%

0.0874%

(.159)

(.176)

7670

8802

(8432)

(9522)

Carnegie Class

0: (2-year colleges)

349 institutions

(CARNEGIE)

1: (4-year Bach/Masters)

132 institutions

2: (4-year Doctoral/Graduate)
Private Gift-giving

Percentage Change

-$1,156

53 institutions

$3,641,714
($19,155,161)

$4,632,871
($20,351,318)

$991,157

27.22%

86.81%
(19.6%)

87.03%
(19.1%)

0.22%

0.25%

$4,590
($3,140)

$5,139
($3,608)

$549

11.96%

$47,546
($7,436)

$50,743

$3,197

6.72%

($9,066)

32.43%
(8.9%)

29.01%
(8.34%)

-3.42%

-10.55%

26.01%
(11.49%)

28.64%
(14.26%)

2.63%

10.11%

6.18
(1.06)

7.97
(1.63)

1.79

29.03%

10.16%
(.87%)

9.92%
(.43%)

-0.24%

-2.36%

Share of State Population 65+

12.58%

14.48%

1.90%

15.10%

(POPELD)

(1.35%)
21.6%

(1.1%)
22.5%

0.94%

4.4%

(5.3%)

(4.8%)
-0.92%

-4.5%

-1.32

-2.67%

-$5,062

-10.89%

(PRIVGIFT)
Institutional Prestige
(PRESTIGE)
Tuition & Fees
(TUITFEE)
Gross State Product per Capita
(GSPCAP)
Percentage of Enrollment in 2-Year Colleges
(PER2YR)
Percentage of Enrollment in Private Colleges
(PERPRIV)
State Unemployment Rate
(UNEMP)
Share of State Population College-aged
(POPCOLL)

Share of State Budget to Medicaid
MEDICAID)
Share of State Budget to K-12 Education

20.3%

19.4%

(K12EDU)

(4.2%)

(4.2%)

Citizen Ideology Score

49.51

48.19

(10.34)

(8.08)

Legislative Professionalism

$46,473

$41,411

(LEGPROF)

(35979)

(27961)

0.733

.466

-0.27

-36.43%

-0.16

-34.39%

0.00

0.00%

$9,657

82.48%

$1.22

75.93%

(CITIDEO)

Party of the Governor
(GOVPARTY)
Legislative Party Ratio

47.40%

31.10%

(LEGPARTY)

(7.7%)

(5.7%)

Higher Education Gov Structure

0.333

0.333

(HESTRUCT)
Institutional Lobbying Expenditure, One-Year Change

0.16%

0.36%

(LOBCHANGE)

(1.55)

(2.622)

Institutional Lobbying Expenditures*

$11,708

$21,365

(LOBBY)

(33201)

(60669)

$1.61
(4.00)

$2.83
(11.814)

Institutional Lobbying Expenditure per FTE
(LOBFTE)
Any monetary measure adjusted to 2013 dollars using CPI

*Data includes imputation and excludes SC and WI, Research Questions 2 and 3 include non-imputed results
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Addressing the institutional descriptive statistics, three trends emerge beyond the growth of
lobbying expenditures. First, support for institutions both per full-time equivalent and on a total support
basis (including appropriations and non-appropriations) declined over the course of the 10-year dataset.
Appropriations per full-time equivalent student dropped 19% over the course of the dataset, while the
overall total state support through appropriations and non-appropriations dropped about 17%. Although
inflation-adjusted appropriations levels have remained fairly flat for several decades, results from this
study’s descriptive analysis complement the reported declines found by other scholars, who’ve detailed
higher education dropping as a share of overall state budgets as well as on a full-time equivalent basis
(American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2015; Mitchell & Leachman, 2015; Mortensen, 2012).

Appropriation per FTE over Dataset (15 states)
Appropriation per FTE (2013 dollars)
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Figure 4-1: Appropriations per FTE over Dataset (15 states)
One important distinction to make when exploring the trend of declining appropriations per
FTE is that the drop in support has not affected all types of institutions the same. Figure 4-1 provides a
basic view of the trend lines for institutions by type. The drop in 2-year support between the beginning
and end of the dataset is approximately 10.5%. For baccalaureate/master’s institutions, the drop was
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14%, and for doctoral and graduate institutions, the drop was almost 20% on average. This provides
significant detail to what kinds of institutions have been more affected in terms of their needs for state
aid.
Another trend apparent in this study’s dataset is the rise of alternative revenue sources for
institutions. Tuition and fees rose by nearly 12% while private gift-giving rose by 27%. It should be
noted that overall private gift-giving changed on average by about one million dollars, a small sum
when considering the expenses of a college or university. The rise in private gift-giving is not
surprising considering the professionalization of fundraising in public higher education and the rising
drive to replace dropping state support with other funding sources (ASHE, 2011; Cheslock &
Gianneschi, 2008). The rise in tuition unsurprisingly relates to the loss of state support and rising
enrollment, also detailed in the descriptive statistics (American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2015).
Many of the changes in the dataset reflect wider changes in the political landscape of the United
States. The rise in Republican governors corresponds with an overall rise in the country’s Republican
governors who currently occupy 31 out of 50 states. This study’s sample shows how the prevalence of
Democratic governors have dropped from almost 75% to less than 50%. The legislative
professionalism variable reflected a 10% drop in salaries, which is consistent with other research on
multiple measures of professionalism (Bowen & Greene, 2014b).
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Research Question One

1. How are lobbying expenditures distributed among public 2- and 4-year institutions within the
states included in this study, and how do lobbying expenditures differ based on institutionallevel and state-governance models?

The study’s first research question aims to reveal information about the shape and relative size
of institutional lobbying expenditures as well as their relation to variables found relevant when
discussing other measures of lobbying such as number of registered lobbyists. This type of analysis has
been brought up before in both higher education and political lobbying, to examine the idea of lobbying
efforts by institutions (de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014; Ness, et al., 2015). The descriptive analysis of
institutional appropriations is broken down into sections discussing inter-group differences, growth,
and relationships with state characteristics.
Overall, institutional lobbying expenditures throughout the 10-year period of this study
amounted to about $84 million dollars4 across the smaller, more complete, 13 state dataset. This
amount was not spread equally amongst all institutions, as 114 institutions spent nothing on lobbying or
at least did not meet minimum thresholds for disclosure by state law. The remainder of the 473
institutions had some expenditures throughout the 10-year period. Growth was substantial across all
states included in the study. The additional states of South Carolina and Wisconsin are not accounted
for in this section due to their partial records, but trends for growth and inter-group differences are
similar to other states for the years where records are available.
Intergroup differences.
Lobbying expenditures varied extensively across states in the sample. As figure 4-1 shows,
4

This figure would likely be higher if Kentucky and New Jersey did not have exemptions for state employees,
where only contract lobbying and local employee compensation is included.
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Pennsylvania, Michigan, Oregon, Colorado, and New York had the highest average spending per
institution over the entirety of the dataset, spending between $20,000 and $30,000 per institution each
year. Most other states were spending between $10,000 and $15,000 per year on lobbying per
institution outside of Kentucky.

Figure 4-2: Yearly Lobbying Expenditures per Institution Grouped by State (10-year average).
These results align to some degree with conclusions made by Burkum (2009) who described the
Pennsylvania lobbying atmosphere as more competitive than other states such as Arizona or Iowa in
this sample, meaning Pennsylvania colleges would be more likely to apply resources to lobbying
institutionally. Considering Pennsylvania’s governance structure allows relative freedom for institutions
to lobby state legislators directly, this may explain their relatively high spending compared to other
states in the sample. A state such as New Jersey or Kentucky, with a non-consolidated governing board,
may have their low average spending explained by their more lenient lobbying law requiring only
contract lobbying and non-state employee lobbying compensation data collected.
Differences across states help visualize some of the variation in lobbying expenditures, but
other divisions can better show who is, and is not, lobbying within their states. Table 4-2 displays the
spending per level of institution over the dataset using grouped Carnegie classifications. Two-year
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institutions spent the least amount of money on lobbying, which in itself is not surprising considering
the different size budgets and appropriations levels for 2-year institutions compared to 4-year
institutions. Another consideration is the fact that 2-year institutions can rely on local support; in many
cases, that leaves them less reliant upon and in need of state lobbyists. More interestingly, doctorallevel research universities spent about 10 times what 2-year institutions did on average over this study’s
timeframe. Baccalaureate-level institutions spent twice as much as 2-year institutions. This data on
expenditures aligns with information about the location and number of state relations agents within
institutions in past survey-based studies (Murphy, 2001). The curve of expenditures can be seen from
this analysis, suggesting that lobbyists for doctoral-level institutions may be more numerous, more
highly paid, and more active.
Table 4-2

Lobbying Expenditures by Institutional Level over Dataset
Institutional Level
# of Institutions Total Lobbying Yearly Spending per Institution
1: 2-Year institutions
311
$25,997,450
$8,359
2: 4-Year Baccalaureate/Masters
113
$18,229,348
$16,132
3: 4-Year Doctoral/Graduate
49
$40,361,789
$82,371

Table 4-3 accompanies the previous table in examining the frequency of lobbying amongst institutional
types. Only 72% of all 2-year institutions reported lobbying expenditures over the 10-year study time
period. This suggests several possibilities. These institutions may have no dedicated staff specifically
working on state-level lobbying, or lobbying expenditures may not have reached state-minimum
thresholds for reporting, or both. On the other end of the spectrum, virtually all doctoral-level
institutions are lobbying their state legislatures. Two of the four doctoral institutions without any
lobbying expenditures listed are Kentucky flagship universities, which likely spend significant
resources on lobbying, but do so in-house only, since contract lobbying would require disclosure.
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Table 4-3

Institutional Frequency of Lobbying over Dataset
Institutional Level
1: 2-Year Institutions
2: 4-Year Baccalaureate/Masters
3: 4-Year Doctoral/Graduate

# of Sample
Institutions

# of Lobbying
Institutions
% of Institutions Lobbying
311
224
72%
113
100
80%
49
45
92%

Growth.
A number of scholars have reported on rising levels of state lobbying activity spanning over the
past several decades (Berry, 1997; Browne, 1998; de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014; Laskow, 2006;
Tandberg, 2008; Whyte, 2016). The rise in lobbying registrations by higher education institutions and
interest groups indicated that institutions were expending more resources on the act of lobbying. The
data from this study align with this expectation of rising resource allocations to these activities. Figure
4-3 and 4-4 reflect the growth of overall lobbying expenditures in 2013 dollars and average yearly
expenditures.

Figure 4-3: Total Lobbying Expenditures across Dataset
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Figure 4-4: Average Institutional Expenditures across Dataset
Over the course of this study’s 10-year timeline, total institutional lobbying rose 82% between
2003–2004 and 2012–2013. The average institution went from spending $11,708 in 2003–2004 to over
$21,000 one decade later. This finding represents a significant contribution to the literature to date on
lobbying in higher education, as the limitation on available data of this type has muted the ability of
researchers to collect and measure comprehensive records on lobbying by institutions.
In addition to only looking at expenditures, the number of disclosing institutions also increased
significantly. Figure 4-5 shows the proliferation of lobbying within the sample, whereby only 217 of
the 473 institutions examined were disclosing expenditures meeting the threshold in 2003–2004, about
46% of institutions. By 2012–2013, 319 institutions were disclosing lobbying expenditures, about two
thirds of all institutions. These findings support previous reports of the rise in lobbying by higher
education entities, and show that not only are institutions spending more, but more institutions are
spending.
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Figure 4-5: Number of Lobbying Institutions Reporting Expenditures
Table 4-4 takes our understanding of differences in growth between institutional levels further.
Both 2-year colleges and doctoral-level institutions have increased their spending per institution by
almost 100% over the 10-year period of this study, while baccalaureate/master’s level institutions only
increased their expenditures by about 33%. There is no reason in the literature why this may be the case
nationally, but it is an interesting finding worth further research exploration. Another interesting finding
is the peak in lobbying expenditures around 2008–2009 and 2010–2011. This can also be seen in some
of the previous figures where around the time of the 2008–2009 financial crisis, a large spike in
lobbying expenditures can be seen in all sectors. It may be that lobbying expenditures have a
relationship with state economies, and that institutions in more unsettled economic times turn to
lobbying as a way to fight for state resources.
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Table 4-4

Lobbying Expenditure Growth per Institution
Year
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13

2-Year Colleges
$5,549
$5,751
$6,730
$7,331
$8,631
$10,084
$10,005
$10,178
$9,706
$9,628

4-Year Baccalaureate/Masters Doctoral/Research Universities
$12,090
$49,924
$11,733
$51,898
$13,231
$54,031
$15,414
$65,997
$17,727
$83,842
$17,810
$100,519
$19,650
$105,901
$18,335
$102,685
$18,442
$102,722
$16,889
$106,190

Relationships with state characteristics.
Research on the political variables affecting state support for higher education have singled out
higher education governance structures as being related to lobbying density outcomes (Tandberg,
2013). Burkum (2009) also suggests that a relationship exists between governing boards and lobbying
in his case study analysis of Pennsylvania and other states. The findings from descriptive analysis
suggest that lobbying institutions do spend more in states with non-consolidated governance structures.
Five states in this study’s sample had consolidated governing boards over the timeline of the sample,
while 10 states maintained a looser form of governance.
Table 4-5

T-test for Lobbying Expenditures Across State Governance Structures
Groups (2011-12 data)
Institutions under Non-Consolidated Governing Boards
Institutions under Consolidated Governing Boards
t-statistic
0.5788

Count
414
106
DoF
277

Average
21680
19132
p value
0.5632

Std. Error Std. Dev.
2863
58261
3342
34416
Decision
Do Not Reject

Groups (2012-13 data)
Institutions under Non-Consolidated Governing Boards
Institutions under Consolidated Governing Boards
t-statistic
-0.2386

Count
414
120
DoF
198

Average
20835
22246
p value
0.8117

Std. Error Std. Dev.
2869
58395
5170
56639
Decision
Do Not Reject

Using the larger non-imputed data encompassing 15 states, the analysis in Table 4-5 shows that
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means are relatively close between the two groups, with the larger average spending changing between
institutions in non-consolidated and consolidated governing board states. Two different years were
examined, since these years represent the most populated years of the sample with respect to lobbying
expenditures. Using an independent T-test of means, it could not be stated that there was a statistically
significant difference in the means between institutions in states with strict or looser forms of
governance. There was a large difference in the institutional count across the sample for each group,
with many more lobbying institutions in the 10 states with non-consolidated governing boards.
Breaking down institutions into 2-year vs. 4-year institutions for sub-groups across governing board
types did not change the T-test results. Future research will hopefully include more states that choose to
make lobbying information publicly available. Additionally, a deeper analysis of governance structure
could yield multiple categories to utilize in an analysis of variance.

Research Question Two
2. Does a relationship exist between a public institution’s expenditures on lobbying and its state
appropriations received, when holding constant economic, political, and demographic
differences in institutions?

The results for Research Question Two include tests of two different dependent variables, both
with the objective of looking at appropriations and how they relate to institutional and state
characteristics. The first test examines appropriations per full-time equivalent, while the second test
looks at adjusted 1-year appropriational changes from the previous year. The results will focus on the
different groups of characteristics and their relationships to the literature overall. Many of the included
variables were found significant in the direction predicted in the literature review for this study, while
measures of lobbying were found to not have a significant effect on either dependent measure and are
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discussed further at the end of the section. All tests were run on non-imputed data including 15 states.
Additional tests run on the imputed data and without the states with weaker lobbying records laws did
not change the model results significantly, though the loss of observations reduced the size of
coefficients in many cases.
One surprising result in the first two models was the issue of serial correlation affecting this
sample differently from the findings of Weerts and Ronca (2012). This study’s first model found
residual autocorrelation explaining about 40% of the variation in the dependent measure of
appropriations per FTE. In the second model using logged differences as an approximation of
percentage change in appropriations from 1 year to the next, half of the variation could be explained by
the previous year’s percentage change. One possible reason why the first measure of appropriations did
not have the high serial correlation found by Weerts and Ronca, was the decision to use appropriations
per FTE as a dependent measure instead of only logged appropriations. The reason for the second
model having high autocorrelation could be due to numerous issues. First, this sample is smaller than a
nationwide sample, with fewer observations. Additionally, there could have been less variation in
appropriations levels in this study’s time period compared to other, longer time series. Regardless of
the reason, future researchers should consider the issue of autocorrelation and attempt to control for this
measure in panel data analysis of appropriations measures.
Table 4-6 shows that many of the state characteristics hypothesized as important in this study’s
framework are significantly predictive of appropriations levels. Only Carnegie classification and
institutional tuition and fees were significant from the institutional factors in the model. Institutional
lobbying expenditures both in total and per FTE were insignificant, but also had a negative directional
relationship with support. This may be related to the broader trends of the data, where the highest
supported institutions lost the most in support while also increasing their lobbying expenditures the
most. The institutional results almost mirror Weerts and Ronca’s (2012) findings, where only Carnegie
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classification was significant. The results for significant institutional predictors are in the direction
hypothesized in this study’s model, with each higher sector from 2-year colleges, to bachelors/master’s
and doctoral levels seeing a 50% increase in appropriations per FTE. Every $1,000 increase in tuition
and fees was associated with 3% higher appropriations levels per FTE. These results are unsurprising,
since higher level and more expensive institutions within any state generally receive more support from
legislative appropriations decisions.

Table 4-6
Final Model - Dependent Variable (Log Appropriations per FTE)
Random Effects
SD
SE
State
0.51308
0.09977
Institution
0.44066
0.02099
First-Order Serial Autocorrelation AR(1)
ɸ = 0.40039
Fixed Effects
Value
SE
t value
p value
(Intercept)
10.27972 *
0.5523
18.61
0.000
CARNEG
0.50348 *
0.0519
9.70
0.000
PRIVGIFT
-5.66E-10
7.33E-10
-0.77
0.440
PRESTIGE
0.00012
0.0007
0.16
0.870
TUITFEE
0.00003 *
0.0000
3.55
0.000
LOBBY
-3.57E-07
2.25E-07
-1.59
0.113
GSPCAP
-0.00001 * 3.91E-06
-2.75
0.006
UNEMP
-0.05347 *
0.0058
-9.13
0.000
POPCOLL
6.21691
3.2653
1.90
0.057
POPELD
-7.71200 *
1.3316
-5.79
0.000
CITIDEO
-0.00289 *
0.0009
-3.12
0.002
LEGPROF
-3.44E-06 *
0.0000
-3.36
0.001
GOVPARTY
-0.05344 *
0.0122
-4.37
0.000
LEGPARTY
-0.24517 *
0.1030
-2.38
0.017
HESTRUCT
-0.20826
0.2899
-0.72
0.473
PER2YR
-0.46639
0.3903
-1.19
0.232
PERPRIV
-1.08792 *
0.3414
-3.19
0.001
MEDICAID
-0.88277 *
0.1841
-4.79
0.000
K12EDU
-0.37777
0.2687
-1.41
0.160
Variables from separate iterations in place of LOBBY
LOBCHANGE
-0.00015
0.0007
-0.21
0.834
LOBFTE
-0.00071
0.0013
-0.53
0.598
* Significance at the .05 level
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The results from the first model suggest that many state economic, political, and demographic
factors explain variation in appropriations levels. Most state-level variables were found significant in
the direction hypothesized. Unemployment was found to be a significant determinant of both overall
appropriations support and change in appropriations from year to year. Higher levels of unemployment
were associated with lower levels of appropriations, where a 1% increase in state unemployment was
met with 5.3% less appropriations per FTE in the following year. Gross State Product (GSP) per capita
had a relationship opposite of what was hypothesized, but suggests that when state income does
increase, higher education may not be a high priority in new spending compared to other state
priorities. Every $1,000 increase in GSP per capita equates to 1% lower appropriations per FTE for
institutions. Unemployment findings and measures of the economy mirror past research performed in
similar analyses (Tandberg, 2008, 2010a; McLendon, et al., 2009; Weerts & Ronca, 2012).
Four other measures were found significant in the direction hypothesized. Higher proportions of
private enrollment in a state are associated with lower levels of state funding, as are higher proportions
of residents aged 65+. A 1% increase in the percentage of state enrollment going to private colleges led
to a 1% decrease in appropriations levels per FTE; a 1% increase in the share of elderly population led
to a 7% drop in appropriations levels. Higher levels of funding for Medicaid also impacted institutional
appropriations negatively, supporting the crowding-out hypothesis for other state priorities when it
came to direct aid for institutions. A 1% increase in the share of Medicaid in state budgets corresponds
to a .88% decrease in appropriations per FTE. The relationship direction for competing political
interests and demographic variables in the model is consistent with prior research as well as the original
frameworks for state appropriations determinants (McLendon & Hearn, 2007; Tandberg, 2008).
The political variables in the first model have a set of mixed results. Political party
representation has the highest t-value of all the political variables, and has a directional relationship as
hypothesized in this study’s model. The results suggest that Democratic representation in the legislature
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is aligned with higher levels of support for higher education when it comes to appropriations levels; a
1% increase in Republican representation is associated with a .24% decrease in appropriations per FTE.
This implies that Democrats may be more sympathetic to making higher education a high priority
budget item. Opposite to this hypothesized result is that of the governor party and citizen ideology.
Democratic governors are associated with 5.3% lower appropriations per FTE than states with
Republican governors. These results suggest that Republican-led states and more conservative states (to
a lesser degree) are associated with slightly higher levels of appropriations per FTE. The result of the
governor party variable may be attributed to that variable’s deviation from national samples, as this
study overrepresented states with conservative governors. The result does run counter to several studies
with similar dependent and independent variables (Kramer, 2011; McLendon, et al., 2009). Legislative
professionalism also had a result opposite to this study’s hypothesis, though similar to citizen ideology:
The coefficient size was very small compared to other significant variables in the model. These
findings suggest that the connection between political parties and overall funding levels for institutions
may not be as clear as hypothesized in current frameworks for political cross-state studies.
Table 4-7 presents an important comparison for the discussion of appropriations per FTE
funding. Table 4-6 discussed predictors explaining variations in funding levels, while Table 4-7
discusses predictors explaining variations in funding changes from year to year. The findings of Weerts
and Ronca (2012) suggest that there may be differences across model constructs in how demographic
and political variables impact higher education support level versus change. The findings in Table 4-7
will focus on those differences as well as any unique relationships worthy of note based on the study
model.
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Table 4-7
Final Model - Dependent Variable (Appropriations, One-Year Percentage
Change)
Random Effects
SD
SE
State
0.03849
0.01305
Institution
3.19E-10 3.37E-10
First-Order Serial Autocorrelation AR(1)
ɸ = 0.53116
Fixed Effects
Value
SE
t value
p value
(Intercept)
-0.72300
0.3852
-1.88
0.061
CARNEG
-0.01416
0.0160
-0.88
0.378
PRIVGIFT
3.92E-11
4.00E-10
0.10
0.922
PRESTIGE
0.00021
0.0004
0.52
0.603
TUITFEE
4.84E-06
3.87E-06
1.25
0.211
LOBBY
-2.87E-08
1.40E-07
-0.20
0.838
FTE
1.14E-07
7.78E-07
0.15
0.884
GSPCAP
-8.04E-07
1.98E-06
-0.41
0.684
UNEMP
-0.02680 *
0.0048
-5.49
0.000
POPCOLL
2.12766
2.3976
0.89
0.375
POPELD
4.94184 *
1.0316
4.79
0.000
CITIDEO
-0.00387 *
0.0009
-3.91
0.000
LEGPROF
1.03E-06 * 4.69E-07
2.20
0.028
GOVPARTY
-0.01206
0.0147
0.82
0.413
LEGPARTY
-0.08044
0.1006
-0.80
0.424
HESTRUCT
-0.02521
0.0326
-0.77
0.440
PER2YR
0.62843 *
0.1910
3.29
0.001
PERPRIV
-0.05689
0.1282
-0.44
0.657
MEDICAID
-0.57672 *
0.2409
-2.39
0.017
K12EDU
0.76316 *
0.3024
2.52
0.012
Variables from separate iterations in place of LOBBY
LOBCHANGE
0.00081
0.0015
0.53
0.599
LOBFTE
0.00004
0.0008
0.06
0.952
* Significance at the .05 level
The most important finding from Table 4-7 is that autocorrelation in the residuals of
appropriations changes is high. Fifty-three percent of the appropriations changes from the previous year
predict changes in the next year. This may be tied to the way appropriations are decided on by
legislatures, if legislators are looking at the previous year’s appropriations as a baseline for the next
year. One issue specific to this study was the limited sample of states included. During the timeframe
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of this study, 64% of states nationwide had annual budgets (Oregon changed in 2011 to annual
budgets), while 36% had biennial budgets. This study closely represents a national sample in this
regard, with 33% of the sample being biennial budget states.
It is also clear from the institutional standard deviation in Table 4-7 that significantly more
deviation occurs at the state level with respect to appropriations changes than at the institution level.
Different states maintain different systems for determining their year-to-year appropriations. These can
include more incremental base-plus models that make small adjustments to the previous year’s
appropriations, enrollment-based models that adjust support by measures of enrollment, or more recent
funding models based on metrics such as performance or outcomes chosen by state legislatures (Hearn,
2015). It is possible that this study’s inclusion of only 15 states misses out on considerable variations in
appropriations across other states with different appropriations formulas.
Findings from Table 4-7 for economic and demographic measures are mixed in relation to their
hypothesized relationships. Unemployment continues to explain variations in appropriations levels and
change. Larger unemployment levels are associated with both lower appropriations levels, and
decreases in support. A 1% increase in unemployment is associated with a 2.6% decrease in
appropriations. Surprisingly the proportion of elderly residents in a state-impact appropriations growth
counter to appropriations levels, where a one-percentage point increase in 65+ residents leads to a 4.9%
increase in appropriations support. This suggests that although states with high elderly populations may
prefer lower appropriations levels, they are not opposed to increasing appropriations support to colleges
in their states.
Competing state interests played an important role in affecting changes in institutional
appropriations. K–12 spending also had a relationship counter to what was expected. Even though
states with higher shares of spending going to K–12 were associated with lower levels of higher
education support, states more sympathetic to increasing K–12 funding may also be more likely to fund
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higher education increases. A 1% increase in the share of state general funds going to K–12 funding
was associated with a .76% increase in institutional appropriations. This phenomenon has been found
by other authors trying to understand the relationship between budget sectors, leading to a conclusion
that preferences for education can often make secondary and post-secondary sectors complementary
(Buhler, 2014). Medicaid growth had a negative relationship with institutional appropriations, where a
1% increase in the share of Medicaid in state budgets led to a .57% decrease in appropriations.
With respect to the political variables in the model, the only two found significant were
legislative professionalism and citizen ideology. Citizen ideology had the opposite effect as
hypothesized, with more conservative state constituencies being associated with increases in support
while higher salaried (more professionalized) legislatures were associated with appropriations
increases. Although both of these effects were significant, their affect on appropriations change was
very small. Several possible explanations can be considered for the contrary findings for political
variables in this study. First, it is possible that this 15-state study isn’t close enough to a national
sample to match the findings of other studies. Second, it is possible that some of the hypothesized
relationships between party and political leanings toward higher education are incorrect. Tandberg
(2010b) discusses this possibility, when his study found Republican governors were more favorable
toward higher shares of state budgets going to higher education. His explanation is that Republicans
may favor different types of higher education such as community colleges over Democrats and may
favor increases that rival or even overtake Democratic preferences. This study’s findings related to
governor party and levels of appropriations per FTE suggest that such a hypothesis can be supported.
Returning to the study’s main interest of lobbying and its role in state budget decisions, neither
variable approached the .05 significance threshold worthy of reporting. The results of the first two
models should be considered in conjunction with Table 4-8. Lobbying expenditures and changes
thereto have very little correlation with appropriations levels or measures of appropriations change. The
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largest Pearson value can be found between lobbying expenditure levels and total support per FTE,
where there is a very weak positive association. That is to say, that to a small degree larger lobbying
expenditures in 1 year are associated with higher levels of appropriations and grants in the next, though
no statistically significant relationship can be found to suggest that lobbying effort predicts
appropriations outcomes.

Table 4-8
Correlation between Lobbying and Dependent Variables
Variable
APPFTE
APPCHANGE TOTSUPPFTE TSCHANGE
LOBBY
0.147
-0.003
0.171
-0.003
LOBCHANGE
0.026
0.005
0.023
0.017
LOBFTE
0.057
0.002
0.037
-0.001
These findings should be considered complementary to the findings of de Figueiredo and
Silverman (2006), where a significant relationship was found between institutions increasing their
lobbying expenditures and higher earmark returns from a federal committee process. This study
attempted to test a similar hypothesis on the appropriations process, hypothesizing that lobbying may
have a systematic effect on appropriations outcomes across states and over time within institutions,
mediated by the level of institution. In this study, a weak positive correlation was found between
institutions that spend more and institutions that receive more.
One explanation for why this relationship may not be as strong as hypothesized, is in light of
the descriptive findings in Figure 4-1 and Table 4-4. Over the course of the dataset, doctoral institutions
lost the most in their appropriations per FTE while also spending the most on lobbying, which may be
muting the positive correlation expected. It is also possible that a dual-causality issues exists between
lobbying and appropriations, where institutions have advanced knowledge of an appropriations
decrease, and start spending more on lobbying to counteract future cuts. This is cause for further
examination of the relationship.
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Research Question Three
3. Does a relationship exist between a public institution’s expenditures on lobbying and its overall
state support received from all sources, when holding constant economic, political, and
demographic differences in institutions?

Research Question Three was designed to take a broader look at support including operating
and non-operating grants to public institutions, which are referred to below as total state support. Table
4-8 shows that appropriations change and total state support change are very weakly correlated in a
positive direction, which makes sense, but also suggests that there may be some significant divergences
worth investigating between lobbying and total support compared to lobbying and appropriations alone.
Analysis in this chapter will focus mainly on the differences between appropriations determinants and
total state support determinants, referencing Table 4-6 and 4-9 as well as Table 4-7 and 4-10.
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Table 4-9
Final Model - Dependent Variable (Log Total State Support per
FTE)
Random Effects
SD
SE
State
0.58347 0.12200
Institution
8.54E-08 0.00005
First-Order Serial Autocorrelation AR(1)
ɸ = 0.55260
Fixed Effects
Value
SE
t value
p value
(Intercept)
10.40771 *
0.8128
12.80
0.000
CARNEG
0.36759 *
0.0441
8.32
0.000
PRIVGIFT
1.59E-09 * 8.09E-10
1.97
0.049
PRESTIGE
-0.00204 *
0.0009
-2.21
0.027
TUITFEE
0.00004 * 1.04E-05
4.30
0.000
LOBBY
1.49E-07
2.98E-07
0.50
0.618
GSPCAP
0.00001 * 5.83E-06
-1.96
0.050
UNEMP
-0.07387 *
0.0090
-8.19
0.000
POPCOLL
6.15628
4.9978
1.23
0.218
POPELD
-3.75881
1.9848
-1.89
0.058
CITIDEO
-0.00347 *
0.0014
-2.42
0.016
LEGPROF
-9.50E-06 * 1.52E-06
-6.23
0.000
GOVPARTY
-0.04768 *
0.0188
-2.53
0.011
LEGPARTY
-0.44795 *
0.1606
-2.79
0.005
HESTRUCT
-0.40069
0.3280
-1.22
0.222
PER2YR
0.49845
0.5820
0.86
0.392
PERPRIV
-1.72142 *
0.4942
-3.48
0.000
MEDICAID
-0.04288
0.2895
-0.15
0.882
K12EDU
-0.12519
0.4191
-0.30
0.765
Variables from separate iterations in place of LOBBY
LOBCHANGE
-0.00027
0.0012
-0.23
0.822
LOBFTE
0.00083
0.0015
0.53
0.595
* Significance at the .05 level
The dependent variable of total state support was the only change in variables for the model
presented in Table 4-9 from the one in Table 4-6. The issue of autocorrelation in the dependent variable
appears to be similar to the appropriations model in Table 4-6, and the trend of larger variation at the
state level compared to institution level also remains. The role of political variables in total state
support and appropriations decisions themselves appear to be similar regarding the directional
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relationships between dependent and independent variables. Two highlights emerge from the results on
model variables. First, the lobbying variable of most interest in this study is still not found significant;
however, the directional relationship of lobbying expenditures has changed from negative to positive.
This also occurred in Table 4-10, looking at total support percentage change.
The second highlight emerging from the results in Table 4-9 is that institutional variables
became more important while other state demographics (with the exception of percentage enrollment in
private institutions) became less important. Private gift-giving to the institution became a significant
variable, but the results show that for every $1,000 increase in private gift-giving to the institution, the
total support level increased by only .0001%. Prestige had a surprising result, where a 1% increase in
the admission rate led to a small .2% decrease in total support. This very small effect could have to do
with the way grant programs are administered within states; it deserves further study, considering the
fact that how state grants are distributed is understudied in the higher education literature. The
percentage of private enrollment in the state had a much stronger effect on total state support, where a
1% higher share of private college enrollment is related to 1.7 % lower state support levels. This
suggests that private institutions also may be competing with public colleges for state operating and
non-operating grants, or that private enrollment in the state sends a message that they can reduce
certain forms of grant aid to public institutions.
Table 4-10 addresses the question of what drives total state support changes. This model
resulted in the lowest autocorrelation in residuals, suggesting that variation in total support percentage
change is not very well predicted by previous support changes. No institutional factors were found
significant in the model, including Carnegie classification, which suggests that increases or decreases
are not significantly related to the level of the institution. In both models measuring change in
appropriations and total support, changes in lobbying effort were of central interest to the study’s focus.
The LOBCHANGE variable was not significant in either model, but in Table 4-10 it does have a

113
positive coefficient and p-value lower than Table 4-7 looking at appropriations alone as a dependent
variable. Considering past studies have found connections between lobbying and the procurement of
earmarks for individual institutions, it may be worth looking deeper at the state process for grant or
contract distribution. This area of direct institutional support may be more susceptible to lobbying
efforts, and future research could also consider whether or not private institutional lobbying competed
for similar funds.
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Table 4-10
Final Model - Dependent Variable (Total State Support, One-Year Percentage
Change)
Random Effects
SD
SE
State
0.16857
0.03600
Institution
4.55E-12 9.73E-09
First-Order Serial Autocorrelation AR(1)
ɸ = 0.19913
Fixed Effects
Value
SE
t value
p value
(Intercept)
0.28926
0.2798
1.03
0.301
CARNEG
-0.00859
0.0071
-1.21
0.227
PRIVGIFT
2.13E-11
1.74E-10
0.12
0.902
PRESTIGE
0.00033
0.0001
1.86
0.063
TUITFEE
2.58E-06
1.73E-06
1.49
0.136
LOBBY
2.91E-08
6.06E-08
0.37
0.713
FTE
4.18E-07
3.42E-07
1.22
0.222
GSPCAP
-0.00001 * 1.77E-06
-7.21
0.000
UNEMP
-0.04048 *
0.0032
-12.42
0.000
POPCOLL
2.30136
1.8375
1.25
0.210
POPELD
6.1595 *
0.6269
9.82
0.000
CITIDEO
-0.00579 *
0.0004
-11.76
0.000
LEGPROF
-1.52E-06 * 5.13E-07
-2.97
0.003
GOVPARTY
0.05322 *
0.0068
7.81
0.000
LEGPARTY
-0.20517 *
0.0633
-3.24
0.001
HESTRUCT
-0.21466 *
0.0943
-2.28
0.023
PER2YR
0.56027 *
0.1560
3.59
0.000
PERPRIV
-0.05562
0.1231
-0.45
0.652
MEDICAID
-0.80674 *
0.1290
-6.25
0.000
K12EDU
0.16830
0.1730
0.97
0.331
Variables from separate iterations in place of LOBBY
LOBCHANGE
0.00076
0.0005
1.34
0.182
LOBFTE
-0.00004
0.0003
-0.14
0.892
* Significance at the .05 level
The variation in total state support appears more affected by changes in state characteristics and
political processes than appropriations alone. Many of these significant relationships are in the
direction predicted by this study’s literature review. One example of this is the share of state budget
appropriations going to Medicaid negatively impacting state support changes for colleges. This finding
is in line with results from Delaney and Doyle (2007, 2011), who conclude that budget forces such as
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Medicaid are crowding out spending on higher education. For every 1% increase in the share of state
budget going to Medicaid, an institution would experience a .80% loss in total state support.
Unemployment also had a predicted negative impact on total state support changes. A different, but not
necessarily surprising, finding is that the percentage enrolled in 2-year institutions positively impacts
total support changes. This suggests that as 2-year institutions flourish in relation to other levels of
higher education, legislators are willing to dedicate higher increases in total support, possibly in the
form of direct operating and non-operating grants. Of the remaining state characteristic variables, the
population aged 65 years and older had a very strong positive effect on change in total state support,
which is not in the direction hypothesized but does suggest that in this study’s sample, states with older
populations may be more sympathetic to supporting higher education support increases.
Higher education structure appears to play a role in impacting changes to institutional total state
support. Consolidated governing boards are associated with lower levels of appropriations and grant
support when considered together. This suggests a possible link between institutions being freer to
speak with their own voices to their legislature, and communicate for forms of aid that may be more
possible to secure in the form of a grant than as a change to their appropriations.
Turning to political variables in the analysis, there are several variables that should be
highlighted. First, governor and legislative party proportions were significant in the hypothesized
direction. Democratic governors and legislatures were more sympathetic to increasing appropriations
and grants compared to Republicans. This result more closely aligns with past findings of studies
reflecting how Democrats may treat higher education more favorably in the budget process
(McLendon, et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010; Weerts & Ronca, 2012). The broader partisan measure
of citizen ideology and the legislative professionalism variables remained significant just as in the first
model for this study, but they also had very small coefficients.
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The third research question in this study serves as an excellent complement to models focused
purely on appropriations decisions, since institutions are supported by state government through
numerous sources affected by legislatures and government agencies. The results from all three models
reveal some surprising facts about political variables in models of higher education support decisions.
Just as Weerts and Ronca (2012) discovered in their analysis, this study found that there are differences
in how state and political characteristics affect the level of support, versus change in support over time.
The result of the third model in this study found another layer of complexity, where grouping
appropriations with other forms of direct support activates predictors in the model differently. This was
found with respect to competing state interests, higher education governance structure, institutional
characteristics, and the lining up of democratic support in a unifying way.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This chapter will provide an overall summary of the study and its purpose, possible
explanations for the results including the contribution of study findings, and recommendations for
future research on the topic of lobbying and state support. For the past several decades, higher
education support for states has either stagnated or slightly declined based on a measure of interest
utilized by the researcher. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2015) detailed these declines
both in terms of state budget priority and institutional needs. Higher education as a share of state
general fund spending went from 14.6% in 1990 to 9.4% in 2014. Between 2000 and 2014, funding per
FTE dropped almost 30%, due largely to increases in the demand for higher education. These
significant changes in support warrant investigating the determinants of state budget decisions and
what, if anything, institutions and advocates of public higher education can do to reverse this trend.
Ample frameworks have been designed to understand how states make decisions about higher
education appropriations. McLendon and Hearn’s (2007) framework for cross-state study of political,
economic, and demographic factors affecting support as well as Tandberg’s (2010b) State Fiscal Policy
Framework helped shape the literature in this area. A number of authors since then have attempted to
empirically examine the political side of legislating higher education, and have provided a base for
comparing the usefulness of framework factors in cross-state studies (Dar, 2012; Delaney & Doyle,
2007, 2011; McLendon, et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2010a, 2013). Although these studies have tested
framework-dependent and independent variables in different ways and using different analytical
methods, interest group impacts on the legislative process appropriating higher education funds have
received significantly less attention. In fact, outside of the use of Tandberg’s Higher Education Interest
Ratio, only a handful of studies exist focusing on the role of interest groups in the higher education
research literature.

118
The absence of studies on lobbying in higher education mostly arise from the challenges of data
and design as well as a limited theoretical base. There are many measurement and design challenges
related to utilizing interest group measures in state- or institution-focused research, such as little
publicly available data at different levels of government as well as omitted variable bias and issues of
endogeneity in decisions to lobby (de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014). The majority of the formal theory
base on the role of lobbying in state politics is borne out of Olson’s (1965) Collective Action Theory,
which has dominated the research agenda for much of the 20th century, focusing on the concentration of
markets as a key factor in whether or not individual firms lobby and whether or not they attain results
(Hojnacki et al., 2012). This study chose to more closely mimic studies that were considered by
Hojnacki et al. (2012) as residing in the Empirical Theory category.
The reasons for straying from the more formal theories in lobbying research regarding market
concentration entailed in Olson’s theory stem from two observations. First, the empirical evidence that
concentration (number of firms) in a market guides lobbying decisions and activity is weak (Barber et.
al., 2014). Second, there is a growing vein of research finding private goods attained from government
by individual firm lobbying efforts (de Figueiredo & Silverman, 2006; Hedge & Sampat, 2015; Richter
et al., 2009). These studies employed a direct measure of lobbying expenditures or lobbying
expenditure growth to look at the returns to individual firms at attaining government benefits, and
found that expenditures were in some way tied to a policy outcome such as earmarks or effective tax
rates for the individual firm.
This study was not able to find a return to institutions in the form of state support based on their
level of lobbying expenditures or growth of expenditures over time. Examining what de Figueiredo and
Richter (2014) call the Challenges to Conducting Empirical Analysis on Lobbying, some compelling
possible explanations arise for this study’s results. Omitted variable bias is a threat to all cross-state
studies of policy outcomes. In the case of studying the effects of lobbying, this study did not take into
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account other forms of political influence individual institutions may have to impact legislators,
lobbying expenditures of private institutions, or the influence of competitive interests in the state that
may outweigh lobbying by individual institutions. The issue of endogenous selection is also something
that is difficult to avoid when utilizing measures of lobbying, since the decision to lobby is not a
random event, but a purposeful strategy of institutions that may already understand the stakes and
benefits to employing lobbying resources. By that same effect, other institutions may choose not to
lobby due to already perceiving the lack of benefit from lobbying, or by knowing the outcome of state
negotiations prior to making decisions about lobbying, calling into question the causal relationship of
lobbying and budget outcomes.
With hypotheses of why lobbying expenditures may not be a significant force in shifting budget
allocations explored, the next section will discuss how study findings contributed to the higher
education literature. Future researchers will benefit from examining the new data source of state
lobbying databases, and may attempt to continue examining individual returns to lobbying from this
source, or combine these figures for further state-level study.
Contribution
This study set out to explore the relationship between lobbying expenditures and measures of
institutional financial support from state legislatures, with a secondary objective of detailing how
lobbying expenditures vary across institutions, and how they relate to select institutional and state
factors explored by other authors in the higher education literature. To do this, guiding private
foundation reports were used leading to a sub-sample of 15 states with similar lobbying disclosure
laws. Beyond descriptive analysis of lobbying expenditure data, a multilevel model was used to analyze
the role of lobbying expenditures in state budget decisions. The descriptive analysis provides future
researchers with a deeper understanding of how lobbying expenditures have grown and how they are
dispersed, while the inferential analysis provides another test of modern state fiscal frameworks.
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Important results gleaned from this study’s first research question include that average lobbying
expenditures vary widely across states, but have increased on average at approximately 82% in
adjusted real-dollar terms just in the snapshot between 2003–2004 and 2012–2013. There is also a large
divide between average spending by institutional type. Interestingly, correlation analysis discovered
that there was very little correlation between lobbying expenditure levels and appropriations levels,
though mediating for institution size shows a positive weak correlation between lobbying expenditures
and appropriations per FTE. This supports the unsurprising hypothesis that larger, research-focused
institutions lobby more, and also see bigger returns in the form of support, even if this was not found to
be causally bound. One possible explanation for the lack of individual returns to lobbying found in this
study could be tied to the rise in lobbying expenditures across all institutions, at all levels, over the
study timeframe. It is possible that as all state institutions increase their lobbying efforts to draw the
limited attention of state legislators, no individual effort ends up drawing more attention, leading to a
sort of lobbying arms race among competitor institutions fighting for more of a limited higher
education appropriations budget.
Following up on results discovered by Tandberg (2013), this study also examined whether or
not states with consolidated governing boards had significantly different levels of lobbying
expenditures. No statistically significant difference could be found between institutions under
consolidated governing boards compared to other types of governing boards. These results could be
due to the study’s small sample size or the imbalance of states with and without consolidated boards
contributing to a lack of power in the analysis. Regardless of the outcome, further exploring
Tandberg’s (2013) conclusions about interest groups and lobbying should be considered a contribution
to the literature on higher education state support, even if no statistically significant relationships could
be found.
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This study further contributed to the higher education literature by creating a unique framework
bringing in elements of past frameworks at the forefront of the literature, and performing multilevel
analysis of panel data on a newer sample from the last 15 years. Utilizing similar methods to Weerts
and Ronca (2012), this study found that Carnegie classification as well as a number of economic,
demographic, and political variables are relevant to both appropriations levels, and appropriations
change over time. Findings of interest related to political variables include that higher Republican
representation in legislatures is related to lower levels of appropriations, but higher increases in yearly
support. Lobbying, whether measured by overall level or percentage change from year to year, was not
found significant in any model of state support. Considering the small body of research testing state
fiscal frameworks, this study’s results represent a contribution to the continued testing of how politics
may impact state support at the institutional level, controlling for other state factors.
A final unique contribution of this study was the approach taken to test a more encompassing
measure of state support, which included state operating and non-operating grants with appropriations
data. This greater measure of support diverged considerably from appropriations measures alone,
judging by the only moderate level of correlation in yearly outcomes. The results of testing this
dependent variable with study predictors revealed the sensitivity of this measure to competing state
budget priorities such as Medicaid, where no significant relationship could be found when testing
appropriations alone. IPEDS describes these grant categories as encompassing spending on research
projects or other special programs. This may be a fertile ground for testing hypotheses about the value
of lobbying, when looking at more politically volatile forms of direct aid to institutions compared to
more stable appropriations measures.
In addition to how various state demographic or political variables interacted with total state
support, the difference in coefficient for lobbying variables in the study suggests that this may be an
important area for state-level research on lobbying. Just as other researchers have honed in on federal
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earmarks, examining the relationship between state grant processes and lobbying efforts by institutions
could produce important new research on the effects of lobbying on state policy.
Overall, the results of this study’s analyses suggest that there is significant variation within and
across institutions and states with respect to state support and lobbying expenditures. Other authors
such as Ness et al. (2015) have advocated for further parsing of lobbying data, and this study advanced
those recommendations by utilizing the research of outside groups to derive a sample of states that
could be considered most similar with respect to lobbying disclosure, then using public records
searches to better organize lobbying data for analysis of trends.
Recommendations for Future Research
This research was chiefly interested in the effect that lobbying by institutional actors has within
state systems, as well as descriptive analysis on who lobbies, how much they lobby, and how that has
changed over time. It did not address other important facets of interest group research such as
mobilization, modes of lobbying, or motivations and factors that lead an institution to lobby. These are
important questions in the literature asked by a number of leading works in the field of political science
and higher education research (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014; Hojnacki et al., 2012; Ness, et al.,
2015). Recommendations for further study below will focus on how future researchers may explore the
effects of lobbying and how the design and findings of this study may aid in answering those types of
questions. The recommendations break down broadly into further parsing lobbying methods as they
relate to outcomes, re-examining registration and transaction data to better test the effort of institutional
actors in specific circumstances, and reinventing the operationalization of a density variable created by
Tandberg (2008, 2010b) to include transaction data.
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Consider lobbying patterns—contract vs. in-house, or specific bill targeting.
A number of authors have explored the differences in lobbying methods through the use of
surveys since the growth of higher education lobbying has been noticed. Ferrin (2003, 2005) explored
characteristics and tasks of in-house lobbyists. More recently, Avery (2012) examined perceptions of
how government relations offices work with respect to state legislators and institutional leaders. This
sort of work has helped expand the literature on in-house lobbyist strategies and impressions on
lawmakers. Ness et al. (2015) analyze the methods in which further surveys or grouping analysis could
be performed to examine differences in lobbying strategies and the effectiveness of those strategies.
They suggest further addressing questions regarding why institutions choose in-house lobbying versus
contract lobbyists. This study observed the recordkeeping systems of 15 states with similar lobbying
disclosure laws, but did not parse out the differences in types of lobbying expenditures by actor. All of
these states either directly specify expenditures by actor, or have enough information (such as position
of lobbyist or address of lobbyist) where a researcher could create a dataset of institutions using
internal or external lobbyists. At the least, hypotheses about the amount of money institutions spend on
different types of lobbyists, and how much they receive in varying forms of support could be examined
using the same source of data as this study.
A second opportunity using a similar design and same dataset as this study includes examining
a subset of states that specify bill targets for lobbying in addition to expenditures. Kang (2012) explores
this type of research within the energy sector by combining transaction records and bill targets. De
Figueiredo and Richter (2014) recommend this approach, with the obvious benefit being reduced
danger of omitted variable bias, since expenditure data does not break down the target or purpose of
lobbying that can usually only be inferred through theories or by directly surveying individuals within
lobbying agencies. A number of the states in this analysis require specific bill target data, with a
drawback being that this would be fit for a case-study approach over multiple states and would have
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limited generalizability. The combination of bill target and expenditure data would also help address
Ness et al. (2015) prospective research agenda for lobbying in higher education, by seeing how
expenditures have been spent on different targets over time, addressing questions about how the overall
lobbying landscape has changed in terms of the interests of institutions.
Related to the issue of specific bill targeting in transaction records, future research could focus
on lobbying and state grant or contract processes. The findings of this study suggest that certain state
grants or contracts may be more susceptible to lobbying efforts. An example of this type of research
includes Hedge and Sampat (2015), who recently found significant effects of specific non-profit group
lobbying on federal earmarks for science funding. Similar work could be done on higher education
state grants related to research. This approach can help address issues of omitted variable bias
discussed with respect to the target of lobbying expenditures being unclear when taken in the
aggregate.

Consider the relationship between registrations and expenditures.
As de Figueiredo and Richter (2014) discuss with respect to registration data, there are
significant internal validity threats to interpreting the amount of registrations as an approximation of
the lobbying effort institutions put forth. This study confirmed some of the threats to using registration
databases, and viewed records across each state in which registrations with no expenditures were
included. This study did not notate the number of these occurrences across states, but this represents a
future way researchers could substantially improve the higher education and lobbying literature. There
are fundamentally two questions involved in this recommendation: How are higher education lobbying
expenditures and registration records correlated across states?, and What is the incidence rate of
registration records involving no resource allocation on behalf of institutions? These are important
questions pertaining to the relationship between registration and transaction data, but also address
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research questions raised by other authors such as Ness et al. (2015), when they ask about the size and
resource base of higher education actors within a state.

Consider a new lobbying density variable.
Stepping back from approaches that focus on institution-level lobbying and state budget
outcomes, the issue of expenditure data versus registration data deserves revisiting in the context of the
wider higher education research agenda. Utilizing a statewide environmental model for lobbying efforts
helps address one issue of omitted variable bias related to competing state lobbies, since all lobbying
forces within a state are modeled using a variable such as the Higher Education Interest Ratio. With the
release of disaggregated expenditure data from groups like the NIMSP, future researchers could create
a new density variable using expenditure data, which more accurately reflects the resources spent (staff,
communication, and events), occupying the time of legislators. A new density variable using
expenditure data may be a more accurate reflection of the lobbying ecosystem, since it takes into
account the intensity of lobbying efforts through more detailed records of resources.
Utilizing expenditure data in a density variable within a state-level study would still necessitate
a smaller multistate study approach compared to a national 50-state study. This is due to considerations
discussed by Ness et al. (2015) with regard to sampling most similar-systems in the context of states.
The results of this study showed that there is significant variation between institutions and states over
time in lobbying expenditures. That bodes well for exploring relationships between variation in state
higher education lobbying efforts and state support outcomes. The next step to create such a variable
would be integration of institutional lobbying expenditure data with aggregate non-higher education
lobbying expenditure data available in state databases or yearly summary reports from respective state
government agencies overseeing lobbying registration.
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Final Thoughts
Up until very recently, little has been known about trends in higher education lobbying. Much
focus has been put on state-level aggregated analysis, and only recently have third-party groups started
to catalogue individual records on lobbyist clients and their resource expenditures on lobbying
activities. These sorts of sources are making it easier to learn about both the methods and intensity of
lobbying across the Unites States. Ness et al. (2015) summarize well the state of the research on higher
education lobbying as having large gaps in information on activities, efforts, and impacts. This study
helps to fill in some small portion of that information by codifying the efforts of individual institutions,
exploring growth within institutional expenditures, and testing the possible impacts of lobbying on state
support for a subset of American states. These contributions meaningfully forward the agenda set forth
by previous authors in the political science and higher education literature.
The uncertainty facing US institutions of higher education related to future levels of funding,
and the financial pressures placed on institutions to maintain access and quality while relying on
alternative forms of revenue have made the need to study what impacts state support even more crucial.
Considering lobbying efforts are one of the few decisions institutional leaders can directly control out
of the many factors identified in state higher education fiscal frameworks, it is important to report on
what kinds of impact these decisions have on sources of institutional support. Such a direct relationship
would also help explain why lobbying expenditures have dramatically increased over just the last
decade. Future survey research and multistate studies should parse the types and methods of lobbying
employed by higher education institutions, and seek to measure how institutional lobbying is altering
the budgetary and regulatory outcomes that matter considerably to institutional leaders and
policymakers.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF VARIABLES

Dependent Variables

APPFTE

TOTSUPPFTE

APPCHANGE

TSCHANGE

Logged Adjusted State
Appropriations per Full-Time
Equivalent Student. (Derived
continuous variable)
Logged Adjusted State
Appropriations plus
Operating and Non-operating
Grants per Full-Time
Equivalent Student. (Derived
continuous variable)
Logged Differences of
Appropriations Between
Current and Previous year.
2003-04 through 2013-14
data used. (Derived
continuous variable)
Logged Differences of
Appropriations + Operating
and Non-operating Grants
between current and previous
year. 2003-04 through 201314 data used. (Derived
continuous variable)

State Economic & Demographic Context
Gross State Product per
Capita, adjusted to 2013
GSPCAP
dollars. (Continuous variable)
Percentage share of state
population over 65 years old.
POPELD
(Continuous variable)
Percentage share of state
population between 18-24.
POPCOLL
(Continuous variable)

UNEMP

State Unemployment Rate.
(Continuous variable)

Competing State Interests
Percentage share of state
general fund expenditures on
Medicaid. (Continuous
MEDICAID
variable)
Percentage share of state
general fund expenditures on
K12 education. (Continuous
K12EDU
variable)

Source
State Appropriation Data from IPEDS Data Center files- Finance Survey
2004-05 through 2013-14. Institution Full-time student equivalency
derived from IPEDS Data Center files - Enrollment Survey, 12 month
FTE 2004-05 through 2013-14. All Appropriation data was adjusted by
US Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator into 2013 dollars.
State Appropriation Data from IPEDS Data Center files- Finance Survey
2004-05 through 2013-14. Survey items "State Appropriations" + State
Operating Grants" + "State Non-Operating Grants". Institution Full-time
student equivalency derived from IPEDS Data Center files - Enrollment
Survey, 12 month FTE 2004-05 through 2013-14. All Appropriation data
was adjusted by US Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator into
2013 dollars.
All finance data was drawn from NCES IPEDS Data Center files Finance Survey 2002-03 through 2013-14. Data was adjusted for inflation
using US Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator into 2013 dollars.

All finance data was drawn from NCES IPEDS Data Center files Finance Survey 2002-03 through 2013-14. Survey items "State
Appropriations" + State Operating Grants" + "State Non-Operating
Grants". Data was adjusted for inflation using US Bureau of Labor
Statistics Inflation Calculator into 2013 dollars.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment
Earnings. Regional Economic Information Systemhttp://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp/
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Estimates Program,
http://eire.census.gov/popest/archives/state/st_sasrh.php
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Estimates Program,
http://eire.census.gov/popest/archives/state/st_sasrh.php
US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Local Area
Unemployment Statistics (published data)
http://www.bls.gov/lau/data.htm

National Association of State Budget Officers. State Expenditure Reports,
FY 2004 - FY 2013. https://www.nasbo.org/reports-data/stateexpenditure-report
National Association of State Budget Officers. State Expenditure Reports,
FY 2004 - FY 2013. https://www.nasbo.org/reports-data/stateexpenditure-report
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Higher Education Demography and
Governance

PERPRIV

Percentage share of full-time
equivalent enrollments in
private institutions. Private
enrollment divided by total
state student enrollment.
(Derived continuous variable)

U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,
Digest of Education Statistics: 2001-2012. U.S. Department of
Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)
Surveys via WebCASPAR. Http://caspar.nsf.gov; U.S. Department of
Education's Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) via
WebCASPAR; IPEDS Peer Analysis System www.nces.ed.gov/ipedspas/

PER2YR

Percentage share of full-time
equivalent enrollments in 2
year institutions. Enrollment
in 2-year colleges divided by
total state student enrollment.
(Derived continuous variable)

U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,
Digest of Education Statistics: 2001-2012. U.S. Department of
Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)
Surveys via WebCASPAR. Http://caspar.nsf.gov; U.S. Department of
Education's Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) via
WebCASPAR; IPEDS Peer Analysis System www.nces.ed.gov/ipedspas/

HESTRUCT

Higher Ed Governance
Structure. A dichotomous
variable. (1 = Consolidated
Governing Board, 0 = All
other board types: advising,
individual governing,
coordinating)

Education Commission of the States. Book of the States 2003.
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/bos-2003-chapter-9-selectedstate-policies-programs. Follow up from McGuinness (2013) NCHEMS
report:
https://highered.colorado.gov/CCHE/Meetings/2013/oct/Desktop/Agenda
%20item%20II%20A%20Attachment%20A%20State%20Structures.pdf

Appendix A (cont.)
State Political Context

LEGPARTY

State Citizen Ideology
(derived continuous variable)
Percentage of the total 2-party
seats held by Republicans in
the state's lower and upper
chambers. Indicator is the
average proportion of
Republicans in both chambers.
Range 0-1 (Derived
continuous variable)

LEGPROF

Legislator Salary as measured
in adjusted 2013 dollars.
(Continuous variable)

GOVPARTY

Party of the Governor.
Dichotomous variable. (0 =
Republican, 1 = Democratic)

CITIDEO

Institutional Characteristics

Source
Based on Berry's (1993) derived dataset which uses interest group ratings
of candidates and challengers aggregated to show overall political leanings
of the state's voting population. Database maintained by Richard Fording,
University of Alabama https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideologydata/
US Census Bureau. Statistical Abstract of the United States 2001-2011.
The 2012 data for this variable was drawn from the NCSL state data file.
State Partisan Composition Table.
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/legiscontrol_2012.pdf

Legislator Salary: Retrieved from Book of the States 2002-2012.
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/bos-archive

Data drawn from Council of State Governments Book of the States. 20012012. http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/bosarchive
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CARNEG

Basic Carnegie Classification
2000 divided into 3 categories
(Doctoral/Graduate, 15, 16,
52, 57; Baccalaureate and
Masters, 21-33; Associates,
40)

U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,
Digest of Education Statistics: 2003-2013. U.S. Department of
Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)
Surveys via WebCASPAR. Http://caspar.nsf.gov; U.S. Department of
Education's Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) via
WebCASPAR; IPEDS Peer Analysis System www.nces.ed.gov/ipedspas/

PRESTIGE

Number of students accepted
divided by number of students
applied in each Fall
enrollment period. Data from
IPEDS Enrollment survey.
(Derived continuous variable)

U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,
Digest of Education Statistics: 2003-2013. U.S. Department of
Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)
Surveys via WebCASPAR. Http://caspar.nsf.gov; U.S. Department of
Education's Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) via
WebCASPAR; IPEDS Peer Analysis System www.nces.ed.gov/ipedspas/

PRIVGIFT

Private Gifts to institution as
measured in Inflation adjusted
2013 dollars. Data from
IPEDS Finance Survey,
"Private Gifts" category.
(Continuous variable)

U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,
Digest of Education Statistics: 2003-2013. U.S. Department of
Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)
Surveys via WebCASPAR. Http://caspar.nsf.gov; U.S. Department of
Education's Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) via
WebCASPAR; IPEDS Peer Analysis System www.nces.ed.gov/ipedspas/

FTE

TUITFEE

LOBBY

LOBCHANGE

Full-time Equivalent student
count. Data from IPEDS
Enrollment Survey "12 month
full-time equivalent".
(Continuous variable)
Published In-state tuition and
fees (in dollars). Retrieved
from IPEDS Student Charges
survey data. (Continuous
varable)
Inflation Adjusted 2013
Lobbying expenditures (in
dollars). Aggregated
expenditures by client
(Institution or System Board
disaggregated to institution).
Expenditures include:
Compensation, Expenses,
Travel, Fees, Communication
costs, Gifts, Events.
(Continuous variable)
Yearly percentage change in
Inflation adjusted 2002-2013
Lobbying expenditures (in
dollars). Aggregated
expenditures by client
(Institution or System Board
disaggregated to institution).
Expenditures include:
Compensation, Expenses,
Travel, Fees, Communication

U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,
Digest of Education Statistics: 2003-2013. U.S. Department of
Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)
Surveys via WebCASPAR. Http://caspar.nsf.gov; U.S. Department of
Education's Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) via
WebCASPAR; IPEDS Peer Analysis System www.nces.ed.gov/ipedspas/

U.S. Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
System (IPEDS) Surveys via WebCASPAR. Http://caspar.nsf.gov

Dataset compiled for this study. Data drawn from state websites in state
lobbying databases. Appendix D outlines web addresses.

Dataset compiled for this study. Data drawn from state websites in state
lobbying databases. Appendix D outlines web addresses.
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costs, Gifts, Events. (Derived
continuous variable)

LOBFTE

Inflation Adjusted 2013
Lobbying expenditures (in
dollars). Aggregated
expenditures by client
(Institution or System Board
disaggregated to institution).
Expenditures include:
Compensation, Expenses,
Travel, Fees, Communication
costs, Gifts, Events.
Expenditures then divided by
Institutional full-time
equivalent students. (Derived
continuous variable)

Dataset compiled for this study. Data drawn from state websites in state
lobbying databases. Appendix D outlines web addresses.
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APPENDIX B
LOBBYING LAW DESCRIPTIONS

State

AZ

Expenditure reporting
Public body: Itemized list of
all single expenditures,
whether or not the
expenditures were made in the
course of lobbying. Shall be
itemized separately, include
date, amount, name of member
of legislature receiving or
benefiting, category of
expenditure and name of the
designated public lobbyist or
authorized public lobbyist who
made the expenditure on
behalf of the public body.
Aggregate amount of all
expenditures less than $20
benefiting a member of the
legislature. All expenditures
attributable to lobbying made
for the personal sustenance,
filing fee, legal fees,
employees' compensation,
meals, lodging and travel of
the public lobbyist.

CA

Activity expenses include gifts,
honorariums, consulting fees,
salaries and any other
compensation except
campaign contributions.
Whenever activity expenses
are reportable, include the
date, amount or value of each,
the full name and position of
the beneficiary and the payee,
if someone else.

Definition of Lobbying

Definition of Lobbyist

Relevant Law

Attempting to influence
the passage or defeat of
any legislation by
directly communicating
with any legislator, or
attempting to influence
any formal rule making
proceeding pursuant to
chapter 6 of this title or
rule making proceedings
that are exempt from
chapter 6 of this title by
directly communicating
with any state officer or
employee.

2. "Authorized public lobbyist" means a
person, other than a designated public
lobbyist, who is employed by, retained by
or representing a public body, with or
without compensation, for the purpose of
lobbying and who is listed as an
authorized public lobbyist by the public
body in its registration pursuant to section
41-1232.01. 3. "Designated lobbyist"
means the person who is designated by a
principal as the single point of contact for
the principal and who is listed as the
designated lobbyist by the principal in its
registration pursuant to section 41-1232.
4. "Designated public lobbyist" means the
person who is designated by a public body
as the single point of contact for the public
body and who is listed as the designated
public lobbyist by the public body in its
registration pursuant to section 411232.01.

Arizona Code
Chapter 7,
Legislature;
Article 8.1;
Registration and
Regulation of
Lobbyists; 411231. Definitions;
41-1232.04,
Registration,
exemptions. AZ
41-1232.02
41-1232.03

to communicate directly
or through his or her
agents with any elective
state official, agency
official, or legislative
official for the purpose
of influencing legislative
or administrative action.

any individual who receives two thousand
dollars ($2,000) or more in economic
consideration in a calendar month, other
than reimbursement for reasonable travel
expenses, or whose principal duties as an
employee are, to communicate directly or
through his or her agents with any elective
state official, agency official, or legislative
official for the purpose of influencing
legislative or administrative action.

California Code.
Government Code
Section 82039.
Gov't Code
86111-86116.5
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CO

(2). The secretary of state shall
prescribe the form for such
disclosure statement, which
shall include:
(I) The legislation on which
lobbying is being performed;
(II) Any expenditure of public
funds used for lobbying and
the amount thereof;
(III) An estimate of the time
spent on lobbying or
preparation thereof by any
state official or employee
named in the registration
statement or any other
employee of the principal
department.

communicating directly,
or soliciting others to
communicate, with a
covered official for the
purpose of aiding in or
influencing

IA

Information on all salaries,
fees, retainers, and
reimbursement of expenses
paid by the lobbyist's client to
the lobbyist for lobbying
purposes during the preceding
twelve calendar months,
concluding on June 30 of each
year. The amount reported to
the general assembly shall
include the total amount of all
salaries, fees, retainers, and
reimbursement of expenses
paid to a lobbyist for lobbying
both the legislative and
executive branches.

[Included in Lobbyist
definition]

(2) (a) In addition to the registration
statement filed pursuant to subsection (1)
of this section, the designated person, and
any person lobbying on behalf of an
institution or governing board of higher
education, shall file, monthly, a disclosure
statement with the secretary of state in
accordance with this subsection
an individual who, by acting directly, does
any of the following:
(1) Receives compensation to encourage
the passage, defeat, approval, veto, or
modification of legislation, a rule, or an
executive order by the members of the
general assembly, a state agency, or any
statewide elected official.
(2) Is a designated representative of an
organization which has as one of its
purposes the encouragement of the
passage, defeat, approval, veto, or
modification of legislation, a rule, or an
executive order before the general
assembly, a state agency, or any statewide
elected official?
(3) Represents the position of a federal,
state, or local government agency, in
which the person serves or is employed as
the designated representative, for purposes
of encouraging the passage, defeat,
approval, veto, or modification of
legislation, a rule, or an executive order by
members of the general assembly, a state
agency, or any statewide elected official.

Colorado Statute
24-6-301. 24-6301 - 303.5

68B.38 Joint Rule
4; Iowa Code s
68B.2
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Appendix B (cont.)
State

KY

MI

Expenditure reporting

Employers: Total lobbying
expenditures. Itemized list of
amounts spent for receptions
or other events, date, location,
name of the group of public
servants invited. Itemized list
of other amounts spent for
lobbying, including food and
lodging, reimbursements to
public officials; not including
personal expenses. Cumulative
compensation paid to
legislative agents, prorated to
reflect the time they were
engaged in lobbying during
the period.
Required categories are as
follows: food and beverage for
public officials that exceeds
$25/day or $150/year (include
recipient name and amount.
for large receptions, list total
amount, rather than prorated
per attendee); advertising and
mass mailings; other
expenditures of more than $5.
Must provide an account of
every financial transaction
during the immediately
preceding reporting period
between the lobbyist or
lobbyist agent, or a person
acting on behalf of the lobbyist
or lobbyist agent, and a public
official or a member of the
public official's immediate
family, or a business with
which the individual is
associated,

Definition of Lobbying

Definition of Lobbyist

Relevant Law

to promote, advocate, or
oppose the passage,
modification, defeat, or
executive approval or
veto of any legislation by
direct communication
with any member of the
General Assembly, the
Governor, the secretary of
any cabinet listed in KRS
12.250, or any member of
the staff of any of the
officials listed in this
paragraph.

Employers: Total lobbying
expenditures. Itemized list of amounts
spent for receptions or other events,
date, location, name of the group of
public servants invited. Itemized list of
other amounts spent for lobbying,
including food and lodging,
reimbursements to public officials; not
including personal expenses.
Cumulative compensation paid to
legislative agents, prorated to reflect
the time they were engaged in lobbying
during the period.

Kentucky Code
General Provisions
for Legislature
6.611, 6.821, 6.824

communicating directly
with an official in the
executive branch of state
government or an official
in the legislative branch
of state government for
the purpose of influencing
legislative or
administrative action.

(a) A person whose expenditures for
lobbying are more than $1,000.00 in
value in any 12-month period. (b) A
person whose expenditures for lobbying
are more than $250.00 in value in any
12-month period, if the amount is
expended on lobbying a single public
official. (c) For the purpose of
subdivisions (a) and (b), groups of 25
or more people shall not have their
personal expenditures for food, travel,
and beverage included, providing those
expenditures are not reimbursed by a
lobbyist or lobbyist agent. (d) The state
or a political subdivision which
contracts for a lobbyist agent.
LOBBYIST AGENT means a person
who receives compensation or
reimbursement of actual expenses, or
both, in a combined amount in excess
of $250.00 in any 12-month period for
lobbying.

Michigan Codified
Laws; Chapter 4,
Legislature; Act 472
of 1978 Lobbyists,
Lobbying Agents,
and Lobbying
Activities

4.412 Definitions
generally
4.413 Additional
definitions; 4.418
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MS

NE

Payments to lobbyists,
whether salary, fee,
reimbursement, other expenses
at request of lobbyist;
payments for those portions of
office rent, utilities, supplies,
support personnel attributable
to lobbying activities;
payments incurred soliciting
or urging others to
communicate with officials
when at the request of the
client; purchase, payment,
distribution, loan, forgiveness
of a loan or payment of a loan
by a third party, advance,
deposit, transfer of funds, a
promise to make a payment, or
a gift of money or anything of
value for any purpose.
The application shall be on a
form prescribed by the clerk
and approved by the Executive
Board of the Legislative
Council, and shall include as
a minimum the following: (1)
The name, permanent
residence address, and office
address of the lobbyist; (2)
The name and address of the
principal of such lobbyist; (3)
The nature of the business of
such principal and the
amounts or sums given or to
be given the lobbyist as
compensation or
reimbursement for lobbying. A
lobbyist who is salaried or
retained by a principal need
only report that portion of
compensation or
reimbursement reasonably
attributable to lobbying;

LOBBYIST'S CLIENT
means the person in
whose behalf the lobbyist
influences or attempts to
influence legislative or
executive action.

(i) Influencing or attempting to
influence legislative or executive action
through oral or written
communication; or (ii) Solicitation of
others to influence legislative or
executive action; or (iii) Paying or
promising to pay anything of value
directly or indirectly related to
legislative or executive action.

Mississippi Code
Section 5-8-3, 5-8-9,
5-8-11

a person who is
authorized to lobby on
behalf of a principal and
includes an officer, agent,
attorney, or employee of
the principal whose
regular duties include
lobbying.

the practice of promoting or opposing
for another person, as defined in
section 49-1438, the introduction or
enactment of legislation or resolutions
before the Legislature or the
committees or the members thereof,
and shall include the practice of
promoting or opposing executive
approval of legislation or resolutions.

The Nebraska
Political
Accountability and
Disclosure Act
(Neb. Rev. Stat.
§49-1433-34,
Lobbying, defined;
49-1434. Principal,
lobbyist, defined)
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Appendix B (cont.)
State

Expenditure reporting

NJ

Expenditures relating to
communication with, or
providing benefits to, a
legislator, legislative staff,
the Governor, the Governor's
staff, an officer or staff
member of the Executive
Branch, or communication
with the general public, in
these categories: media,
including advertising;
entertainment; food and
beverage; travel and lodging;
honoraria; loans; gifts; and
salary, fees, allowances or
other compensation paid to
an agent.

NY

Compensation paid or owed
to the lobbyist, and any
lobbying expenses, to be
listed in the aggregate if $75
or less and individually if
more than $75. For items
listed individually, disclose
the amount, recipient and
purpose. Expenses not to
include: personal sustenance;
lodging and travel
disbursements of such
lobbyist, printing and mailing
less than $500. Expenses paid
or incurred for salaries other
than that of the lobbyist shall
be listed in the aggregate.

OR

Lobbyist employers: Total
amount of money spent for
lobbying activities on the
lobbyist's behalf, excluding
living and travel expenses.
Name of any legislative or
executive official to whom or
for whose benefit, on any one
occasion, an expenditure in
excess of $25 for the purpose
of lobbying is made by the
person, but not including
expenses lobbyists reported
on their expense reports;
date, name of payee, purpose

Definition of Lobbying

to make any attempt, whether
successful or not, to assist a
represented entity or group to
engage in communication with, or to
secure information from, an officer
or staff member of the Executive
Branch, or any authority, board,
commission or other agency or
instrumentality in or of a principal
department of the Executive Branch
of State Government, empowered by
law to administer a governmental
process or perform other functions
that relate to such processes.
any attempt to influence: (i) the
passage or defeat of any legislation
or resolution by either house of the
state legislature including but not
limited to the introduction or
intended introduction of such
legislation or resolution or approval
or disapproval of any legislation by
the governor

Definition of Lobbyist

any person, partnership,
committee, association,
corporation, labor union or
any other organization that
employs, engages or otherwise
uses the services of any
governmental affairs agent to
influence legislation,
regulation or governmental
processes.

every person or organization
retained, employed or
designated by any client to
engage in lobbying.

influencing, or attempting to
influence, legislative action through
oral or written communication with
legislative officials, solicitation of
executive officials or other persons to
influence or attempt to influence
legislative action or attempting to
obtain the good will of legislative
officials.

(a) Any individual who agrees
to provide personal services
for money or any other
consideration for the purpose
of lobbying. (b) Any person
not otherwise subject to
paragraph (a) of this
subsection who provides
personal services as a
representative of a
corporation, association,
organization or other group,
for the purpose of lobbying.
(c) Any public official who
lobbies.

Relevant Law

New Jersey
Permanent Statutes
52:13C-20,
Definitions (d), (t),
and (u)

New York
Legislative Law
§1-c

Oregon Revised
Statutes
Chapter 171.725 —
State Legislature;
171.745, 171.750
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and amount of that
expenditure.

PA

An expense report required
under this section shall be
filed when total expenses for
lobbying exceed $2,500 for a
registered principal in a
reporting period. In a
reporting period in which
total expenses are $2,500 or
less, a statement to that effect
shall be filed.

An effort to influence legislative
action or administrative action in
this Commonwealth. The term
includes: (1) direct or indirect
communication; (2) office expenses;
and (3) providing any gift,
hospitality, transportation or lodging
to a State official or employee for the
purpose of advancing the interest of
the lobbyist or principal.

Any individual, association,
corporation, partnership,
business trust or business trust
or other entity that engages in
lobbying on behalf of a
principal for economic
consideration. The term
includes an attorney at law
while engaged in lobbying.

Lobbying
Disclosure Act
65 Pa. C.S. Sec.
13A03,
Definitions;
13A06, Exemption
from registration
and reporting

Appendix B (cont.)
State

SC

WA

Expenditure reporting
Sources, amounts of lobbyist's
income or amounts and
recipients of all lobbying
compensation the principal
paid. Itemized totals of all
amounts spent in the
performance of lobbying,
segregated by: office expenses,
rent, utilities, supplies, and
compensation of support
personnel; expenditures
reimbursed by the principal.
Name of each member of the
judiciary on whose behalf a
lobbyist initiated or made
expenditures and an itemized
account of the amount
expended by the lobbyist for
each member of the judiciary.
(6) In lieu of reporting under
subsection (5) of this section
any county, city, town,
municipal corporation, quasi
municipal corporation, or
special purpose district may
determine and so notify the
public disclosure commission,
that elected officials, officers,
or employees who on behalf of
any such local agency engage
in lobbying reportable under
subsection (5) of this section
shall register and report such
reportable lobbying in the
same manner as a lobbyist who
is required to register and
report under RCW 42.17.150

Definition of Lobbying

promoting or opposing through
direct communication with public
officials or public employees: (a)
the introduction or enactment of
legislation before the General
Assembly or the committees or
members of the General Assembly;
(b) covered gubernatorial actions;
(c) covered agency actions; or (d)
consideration of the election or
appointment of an individual to a
public office elected or appointed
by the General Assembly.

attempting to influence the passage
or defeat of any legislation by the
legislature of the state of
Washington, or the adoption or
rejection of any rule, standard,
rate, or other legislative enactment
of any state agency under the state
Administrative Procedure Act,
chapter 34.05 RCW. Neither
"lobby" nor "lobbying" includes an
association's or other
organization's act of
communicating with the members
of that association or organization.

Definition of Lobbyist
any person who is employed,
appointed, or retained, with or
without compensation, by
another person to influence by
direct communication with public
officials or public employees: (i)
the action or vote of any member
of the General Assembly, the
Governor, the Lieutenant
Governor, or any other statewide
constitutional officer concerning
any legislation; (ii) the vote of
any public official on any state
agency, board, or commission
concerning any covered agency
actions; or (iii) the action of the
Governor or any member of his
executive staff concerning any
covered gubernatorial actions.

any person who lobbies either in
his or her own or another's
behalf.

Relevant Law

South Carolina
Code 2-17-10; 217-30
2-17-35
2-17-40

Chapter 42.17
RCW
Dispositions
DISCLOSURE
— CAMPAIGN
FINANCES —
LOBBYING —
RECORDS
RCW
42.17A.005

152
and 42.17.170. Each such local
agency shall report as a
lobbyist employer pursuant to
RCW 42.17.180.

WI

Aggregate total lobbying
expenditures made by principal
and all lobbyists employed,
excluding expenses for clerical
support. Include compensation
and reimbursements to
lobbyists. Include expenses
incurred while preparing to
perform lobbying services, if
research conducted is less than
3 years old. Include, if over
$500, advertising campaigns
or costs of other efforts to urge
the general public to attempt to
influence legislative or
administrative action. Names,
addresses of lobbyists who
made or incurred more than
$200 in lobbying expenses
during the period, amount. If
lobbyist is an employee, officer
or director of the principal,
include expenses for office
space, utilities and employees
used in preparing lobbying
communications.

the practice of attempting to
influence legislative or
administrative action by oral or
written communication with any
elective state official, agency
official or legislative employee,
and includes time spent in
preparation for such
communication and appearances
at public hearings or meetings or
service on a committee in which
such preparation or
communication occurs.

an individual who is employed by
a principal, or contracts for or
receives economic consideration,
other than reimbursement for
actual expenses, from a principal
and whose duties include
lobbying on behalf of the
principal. If an individual's
duties on behalf of a principal
are not limited exclusively to
lobbying, the individual is a
lobbyist only if he or she makes
lobbying communications on
each of at least 5 days within a
reporting period.

Wisconsin
Statutes
Chapter 13,
Subchapter III of
Ch. 13
13.62; 13.68
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APPENDIX C
LOBBYING DISCLOSURE LAW MINIMUMS AND EXEMPTIONS

Appendix C
State

AZ

CA

CO

Minimum Disclosure
Amount

No Minimum
Employer filing more
than $5,000 in a
quarter, or Lobbyist
receiving more than
$2,000 in a calendar
month for lobbying.

No Minimum

IA

No Minimum

KY

No Minimum

MI

Lobbying
expenditures equaling
$10 or more.

MS

Lobbying equal to
$200 or less in a
calendar year.

NE

Lobbying equal to
$100 in any calendar
month

NJ

Over $2,500 per year
by client.

Expenditure Types Disclosed
Employee Compensation,
Expenses: Meals, Lodging, Travel,
Personal sustenance, Filing & Legal
fees. All other expenditures by public
body.

Non-state Employee compensation,
Expenses: Travel, Personal
sustenance, Public Communications
expenses, Gifts.

Employee Compensation,
Expenses: All related to public funds.
Employee Compensation,
Expenses: Fees, Retainers, and all
other Reimbursements.
Employee Compensation,
Expenses: Fees, Retainers, and all
other Reimbursements. Only contract
and local employees
Employee Compensation,
Expenses: All lobbying related
activities as well as Gifts, Advertising
and Media costs.
Employee Compensation,
Expenses: Fees, Personal
expenditures, Direct communication
costs, and gifts.
Employee Compensation,
Expenses: Miscellaneous,
Entertainment, including food and
drink, Lodging, Travel, Lobbyist
personal expenses, Admissions to
state-owned facilities or statesponsoreds industry or events, and
extraordinary office expenses.
Non-state Employee compensation,
Expenses: Communication costs of
media, including advertising;
entertainment; food and beverage;
travel and lodging; honoraria; loans;
gifts; fees or allowances.

Exemptions or Restrictions

None
Only lobbyists spending
1/3 of their time lobbying
considered as lobbyist. State
Employee exemption.
Records contain Contract
lobbying data.

Relevant Statute for
Lobbying
AZ Rev Stat § 411232.01 (2015)
AZ Rev Stat § 411232.03 (2015)

None
Only a designated official
representing "the official
position of the agency" may
lobby.

Cal. Govt. Code §
18239 (2015)
Cal. Govt. Code §
86300 (2015)
Colorado Statute 24-6301 (2015)
Colorado Statute 24-6303.5 (2015)
Iowa Code 2:2 65B.5A (2015)
Iowa Code 2:2 65B.38 (2015)

State employees exempt

KY Code 6.821 (2015)

None

MI Comp L § 4.417
(2014)
MS Code § 5-8-7
(2014)
MS Code § 5-8-9
(2014)

None

NE Code § 49-1434(a)
(2014)
NE Code § 49-1483
(2014)

None

State Employee
exemption. Records contain
Contract lobbying data.

NJ Rev Stat §
18A:3B-55 (2014)
NJ Rev Stat § 52:13C21 (2014)
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NY

OR

PA
SC

WA

WI

$5,000 or more in
compensation and
expenses in a given
year by any client

No Minimum

Over $2,500 per year
by client.
No Minimum

Thresholds set for
some categories, $50
for gifts.
Threshold set at over
$500 per year in
expense by principal

Employee Compensation,
Expenses: Personal sustenance;
lodging and travel disbursements of
such lobbyist, printing and mailing if
total is more than $500. All expenses
listed in the aggregate if $75 or less
and individually if more than $75.
Employee Compensation,
Expenses: All activities excluding
living and travel costs.
Employee Compensation,
Expenses: office costs, personnel,
gifts, hospitality, transportation and
lodging, and any other lobbying costs.
Total expenditures covering all
categories within Lobbying Law
Employee Compensation as
measured by proportion of salary
spent lobbying; Expenses: Including
but not limited to travel, consultant or
other special contractual services,
brochures and other publications.
Total expenditures covering all
categories within Lobbying Law

None

None
Some State Employees
exempt. Records contain
mostly Contract lobbying
data.
None

Public Lobbyists cannot
provide gifts to Legislators or
Executives

None

NY Legis L § 1-A
(2014)
NY Legis L § 1-H
(2014)
OR Rev Stat §
171.745 (2013)
OR Rev Stat §
171.750 (2013)
65 PA Cons Stat §
13A06 (2014)
65 PA Cons Stat §
13A05 (2014)
SC Lobbying Law
Section 2-17-5 (2016)

WA Rev Code §
42.17A.635 (2014)

WI Code 13.68 (2016)
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APPENDIX D
LOBBYING DATABASE LOCATIONS
Appendix D
State
AZ
CA
CO
IA
KY
MI
MS
NE
NJ
NY
OR
PA
SC
WA
WI

Retrieval Tool
Online Database (Principal
Search)
CAL Access Database
(Principal Search)
Online Database (Principal
Search)
Online Database (Principal
Search)
Online Database (Registered
Employer Search)
Online Database (Lobbyist
Search)
Online Database (Client
Search)
Online Database (Principal
Search)
Summary Data Forms from
Annual Financial Reports
Online Database (Client
Query)
Annual Summaries of
Lobbying Client/Employer
Online Database (Principal
Search)
Online Database (Lobbyist
Principal & State Agency)
Online Database (Public
Agency Search)
Online Database (Principal
Lobbying Efforts Search)

Retrieval location

Responsible Agency

http://apps.azsos.gov/scripts/Lobbyist_Search.dll

Secretary of State

http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/lobbying/

Secretary of State

https://www.sos.state.co.us/lobby/Home.do

Secretary of State

https://www.legis.iowa.gov/lobbyist

Iowa Legislature

http://apps.klec.ky.gov/searchregister.asp
http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,4670,7-1271633_11945---,00.html
http://sos.ms.gov/elec/portal/msel2/page/search/p
ortal.aspx

Legislative Ethics Commission

http://nebraskalegislature.gov/lobbyist/view.php
http://www.elec.state.nj.us/publicinformation/lob
by_statistics_archive.htm
https://onlineapps.jcope.ny.gov/LobbyWatch/Me
nu_reports_public.aspx
http://www.oregon.gov/ogec/pages/public_record
s.aspx
https://www.palobbyingservices.state.pa.us/Publi
c/wfSearch.aspx
http://apps.sc.gov/LobbyingActivity/LAIndex.asp
x
http://www.pdc.wa.gov/MvcViewReports/Lobbyi
ng/agencies

Nebraska Legislature
Election Law Enforcement
Commission

https://lobbying.wi.gov/Home/Welcome

Wisconsin Ethics Commission

Secretary of State
Secretary of State

Joint Commission on Public Ethics
Oregon Government Ethics
Commission
Department of State
State Ethics Commission
Public Disclosure Commission

